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Where to? Future steps for the 
global climate regime
Taishi Sugiyama
Leader of Climate Policy Project at the 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan
1. Background
How can we further develop international regimes to prevent climate change? We,
an international group of researchers, investigated this question in a two-year
research project called “Developing Post-2012 Climate Regime Scenarios.” This
book is the final product.
The Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) is an important first step in the development of a truly global
climate regime.
Through the Kyoto Protocol, the regime covers a range of gases, as well as emis-
sions from all economic sectors, leading to linkages of multilateral discussions on
energy, transportation, forestry, agriculture and broader issues related to trade and
investment.
Further, after coming into force in 2005, the importance of Kyoto over the long
term is not the specific targets or number of Annex B Parties in the agreement, but
that it has set the stage for ongoing international discussions on the issue. One
important aspect of the current agreement is that it has now assigned an interna-
tional market value to carbon. Carbon emissions now carry a price, and will con-
tinue to carry one after Kyoto expires in 2012.
That said, it must also be recognized that the regime looks markedly different than
what was originally intended, mainly due to the decision of the U.S. to opt out.
Moreover, there is no indication that the U.S. is willing to return to the Kyoto fold
anytime soon. For future negotiations, views are sharply divided between, and
among, developed and developing countries on how best to share the burden of
targets. While the Kyoto Protocol calls for another negotiation round, beginning
in 2005, to set further targets beyond 2012, countries may consider developing
alternatives to the current framework, particularly if the world’s largest emitters
refuse to re-engage in the Kyoto process.
In the first phase of this two-year project, we developed a range of scenarios that
countries may wish to consider for a post-2012 framework, illustrating the many
possible futures under which the global climate regime may evolve (Sugiyama
2005). The scenarios include: Graduation and Deepening, the strengthening of a
binding-cap approach under UNFCCC (Michaelowa, Butzengeiger and Jung
2005); Converging Markets, the bottom-up evolution of emission markets on a
global scale (Tangen and Hasselknippe 2005); Orchestra of Treaties, a regime con-
sisting of multiple treaties among like-minded countries (Sugiyama and Sinton
2005); and Human Development, a binding-cap regime with emphasis on equity
(Pan 2005).
Introduction
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Building upon the lessons learned in the scenario work, the papers in this book
further explore three key building blocks of the future climate regime. First, a
number of ideas on how to broaden the current cap-and-trade regime are dis-
cussed. Second, the role of technology is explored. Lessons from past successes are
reviewed with a view to developing options for their most effective use over the
near future. Last, the issue of financial flows to developing countries is addressed,
including the issue of mainstreaming assistance for climate-change response.
2. Future of the cap-and-trade regime
Many negotiators seem to think that a new protocol under the UNFCCC, with
binding targets and the same flexible instruments as in the Kyoto Protocol, would
be the best framework to control and reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
However, to be successful, negotiations will have to overcome significant and
entangled challenges, including re-engaging the United States, establishing com-
mitments for developing countries that are stronger than those under the Kyoto
Protocol, establishing new emissions targets, and breaking the current atmosphere
of suspicion and recrimination that currently exists between developed and devel-
oping countries.
Potential modifications to the Kyoto Protocol’s approach are discussed by Tangen,
Hasselknippe and Michaelowa. The ideas include: a procedure for permitting
allowances from non-Party trading schemes to be used for compliance; sector tar-
gets for developing countries; expanding the scope of Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) investments to cover sectoral, sub-national and/or policy-based
activities; target-setting for sectors or whole economies for reductions from estimated
baselines, approved by an international review team; and additional eligibility cri-
teria for CDM host countries. In order to break the current stalemate, it will be
important that some Parties show leadership. A coalition of like-minded countries,
notably those that have already introduced market-based mechanisms, might show
leadership by presenting a mandate or plan for future negotiations, and proposing
an allocation for these countries for the period after 2012. To be effective, this coali-
tion, like any leading group, should lead by uniting the world, not dividing it.
In terms of targets, the Kyoto Protocol has two major problems: the target-setting
was arbitrary and unpredictable; and the targets turned out to be immensely
skewed. Some countries, such as Russia, had very “lax” targets while others, such
as the U.S., Canada and Japan, took on targets that were beyond their ability to
achieve through domestic actions alone. Greater predictability would facilitate
more effective goal-achievement, and a model for guiding target-setting could be
helpful, although, of course, politics will always play a role in such negotiations. It
is worth considering whether a simple and transparent model could be used for
developing fair targets in the post-2012 period.
While seriously exploring possible options, Tangen, Hasselknippe and Michaelowa
admit that it is not likely that the world can implement a perfect cap-and-trade
system with global coverage and prices high enough to reverse rising global emis-
sions in the near future. Instead, the cap-and-trade system will likely remain par-
tial in coverage and low in price. Still, even with limited participation and weak
targets, it is important that the climate regime maintain the cap-and-trade system
Governing Climate: The Struggle for a Global Framework Beyond Kyoto
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so that the institution will develop and demonstrate the environmental effective-
ness of the approach, thus convincing other countries to follow suit.
3. Promoting climate technology development
A cap-and-trade regime alone will not be enough to induce the technological
innovation that is instrumental to prevent climate change in the long term. The
price signal created by the carbon markets is currently between five and 30 € per
tonne of CO2 and it is politically difficult to raise this much higher. At this level,
the price signal may foster short-term emission reductions using existing tech-
nologies, but it by no means represents a high enough price to justify significant
research, development and demonstration (RD&D) investments in nascent tech-
nologies. Hence, it is necessary to develop other policy instruments.
A distinctive opportunity lies in international cooperation on technology. If we
can successfully reframe the climate issue as the promotion of technologies, there
may be more chances for countries to mobilize a large amount of resources
towards preventing climate change. The current U.S. administration, for example,
has made it clear that it will emphasize technology in fighting greenhouse gas
emissions, and has initiated a number of voluntary, technology-centred bilateral
and multilateral partnerships.
Taishi Sugiyama, Takahiro Ueno and Jonathan Sinton develop a scenario in which
regional or like-minded partners cooperate on climate technologies in their mutual
national interests. Their technological choices may differ depending on their
respective resource endowments and political concerns, such as security. Examples
include cooperation on energy conservation among China, Japan and other Asian
countries; geological carbon storage among major fossil-fuel producers such as the
U.S., Canada, Norway, Australia, Russia and Saudi Arabia; and wind power among
EU and other countries. Once technologies are developed in niche markets and the
costs are brought down, they will diffuse to the rest of world through the interna-
tional interplay of technologies and institutions. A complementary global frame-
work may play a role in legitimizing these activities, to let the countries recognize
what their counterparts are doing, to maintain high political salience.
A distinctive feature of the paper is that they put emphasis on niche market cre-
ations and market transformations—deployment activities—rather than the basic
RD&D projects that have been popular and which have been most closely associ-
ated with the term “technology cooperation.” There are certain areas where basic
RD&D works, but they do not represent the full range of possible technology
cooperation. Creation of international niche markets for nascent technologies for
renewable energy, carbon sequestration and cutting-edge energy conservation
technologies (e.g., hybrid cars and geothermal heat pumps) could lead to rapid
technological change. For energy conservation in transport and the residential sec-
tor, transforming markets by implementation of energy efficiency standards and
labels is a proven and powerful policy, and harmonization of standards among
countries could harness powerful synergies.
The latest episode in the development of China’s automobile sector is very impres-
sive. Efficiency standards are approaching those of some developed countries, and
standards for sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are very ambitious. China’s deep con-
Introduction
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cern about its increasing oil imports has made this possible. The development of
its regulatory program was assisted by foreign aid, and there are many similar
ongoing activities. Further enhancing these activities could have significant
impact.
Axel Michaelowa provides case studies on how “green-and-greedy” coalitions are
at work in wind power and carbon sequestration technologies in Europe. Ingvild
Andreassen Sæverud and Arild Moe provide a case study of the Norwegian initia-
tive to develop carbon sequestration technology and international coordination
on the legal status of the technologies. While players and national circumstances
differ, there are many green-and-greedy coalitions that could bring to market tech-
nologies that are essential to cope with global climate change. Understanding their
dynamics is a prerequisite for designing an environmentally effective climate
regime.
The authors also discuss concerns about the “technology track,” including its
potential use as a disguise for doing nothing. In such a case, the technology track
would be worse than doing nothing because it could create the impression that the
countries are serious about climate change and that no further actions are needed.
4. The role of development assistance and investment
flows
4.1 Development
Jiahua Pan, Xianli Zhu, and Ying Chen provide a Chinese perspective. In their
innovative paper, they define terminology and develop a conceptual framework
markedly different from those produced by the climate policy circles of developed
countries. They argue that basic human needs are multi-dimensional and that an
essential part of human rights is fulfillment of these needs. Economic develop-
ment builds the material basis for the satisfaction of basic needs, but pursuit of a
low-emissions path poses substantial challenges for a developing country like
China. Large amounts of energy-intensive investment is needed to accumulate
fixed stocks of physical infrastructure and capital as well as durable goods. High
levels of energy flows are also required to support daily activities such as cooking,
lighting, heating and air-conditioning, in addition to maintenance, operation and
renewal of the fixed stocks. In comparison with developed countries, where fixed
stocks are already built, a rapidly industrializing China is at the stage of increasing
both stocks and flows of carbon.
However, the authors argue, there are approaches to low-carbon development that
can substantially reduce emissions without compromising development goals.
First, there exist many opportunities for China to contribute positively to building
a post-2012 climate regime through no-regrets commitments to greenhouse gas
emission reductions, taking energy conservation in the industrial sector as an
example. Second, they anticipate that there will be three major vehicles for post-
2012 climate negotiations: continuation of the Kyoto Protocol by amendment;
negotiation of a new protocol under the UNFCCC; and initiatives outside of the
UNFCCC process. In their view, a post-2012 climate regime is likely to consist of
a basket of treaties. The Kyoto Protocol aims at emission reductions, and either its
Governing Climate: The Struggle for a Global Framework Beyond Kyoto
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amendments or variations will be included in the basket. Developing countries are
likely to push for an agreement on adaptation, which would also be included.
Elements of a technological treaty are also in their primary stages, covering
research, development and deployment of technologies on renewable energy,
energy efficiency, and carbon capture and storage. Developing countries have to
address climate change issues in the context of sustainable development, so a com-
prehensive agreement concerning sustainable development, climate change miti-
gation and adaptation may also be included in the basket of treaties.
4.2 Assistance
John Drexhage argues for “mainstreaming” climate change in international assis-
tance. Developing countries have, for the most part, not identified climate change as
an issue of concern to development agencies. A number of analyses have indicated
that, while there have been some successful initiatives—particularly those related to
supporting G77 and China in preparing their National Communications and, to a
lesser extent, helping them develop National Adaptation Strategies—these successes
have not spread into “normal” technical assistance. In other words, the strong link-
ages that do exist between the threat of climate change and poverty eradication and
development are still not appreciated on the ground.
He further argues that mainstreaming climate issues with development priorities
means paying more attention to the “co-benefits” of climate mitigation and local
environments, integration of mitigation and adaptation at project and policy lev-
els, realizing that in many respects, they can be complementary drivers. It also
means broadening the scope of current market mechanisms, such as Joint
Implementation (JI) and the CDM, to cover sectoral policy and sub-national ini-
tiatives. It could also mean finding ways to include developing countries in emis-
sions, or allowance-based, trading.
They also note that it is necessary to be cautious when addressing the challenge of
mainstreaming. On both sides, there are concerns that climate-change response is
in competition with other development objectives for funding. Recipient nations
are worried that existing aid budgets will be cut in order to fund the solution to a
“developed country” problem, as the argument came to the fore during the nego-
tiation of use of ODA for CDM. Since current ODA projects are targeted at areas
that directly or indirectly support climate change response, there could be ways to
resolve these concerns in a constructive manner.
Another caveat is that developed countries’ willingness to pay would be insuffi-
cient to induce developing countries to choose less carbon-intensive development
paths immediately. However, development assistance, with modifications, could
catalyze other financial resources and enable developing countries to take further
actions themselves.
Felicia Müller-Pelzer and Axel Michaelowa assess 145 renewable energy, energy
efficiency and forestry projects financed by German ODA in the last 25 years. They
find that about a third of these projects have failed, illustrating the high risks fac-
ing project implementation under the CDM. They argue that pre- and post-proj-
ect evaluation could weed out unsatisfactory approaches.
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5. Closing remarks
What are the international regimes that can prevent climate change? Ultimately, all
members of this scenarios group share the view that, in the long run, a lasting
global solution will include three elements: (1) cap-and-trade schemes; (2) agree-
ments for technology development; and (3) assistance packages for developing
countries. However, there can be many different ways to reach the goal, and our
views on their feasibility and effectiveness are still divided.
One way is to continue the efforts started at Kyoto and to broaden and deepen the
current absolute, binding caps. Several ideas to envisage this are debated. This
approach assumes that countries have the necessary political will and that inter-
national agreements have the teeth necessary to make real change.
Another way to get there is to focus on creating an “enabling environment” for a
cap-and-trade regime through technology and development cooperation. Even if
effectively implemented, emissions trading will probably not be sufficient and may
prove politically unacceptable in some countries, particularly over the short term.
Be it ex ante or ex post to a cap-and-trade regime, it will be critical to effectively
deploy technologies. This assumes that countries are not yet ready to commit to
binding targets and that reframing climate issues so that they are more carefully
embedded in countries’ other national priorities will be a more effective way to
ensure that the climate regime will be economically and environmentally effective
in the long run.
Figure 1. “Cap First” and “Empower First” strategy of the future climate regime
These two strategies, named, respectively, “Cap First” and “Empower First” are
summarized in Figure 1. They may either be mutually reinforcing or conflicting.
Caution is necessary to ensure that technology and development cooperation do
not dilute political attention to climate change, and that the cap-and-trade regime
does not cripple technology and development cooperation by creating an adver-
sarial negotiation atmosphere.
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European countries will be the key players in setting the tone of the upcoming
negotiations on the post-2012 regime. If they remain within the framework that is
comfortable for them so far—competing to cut emissions from 1990 levels—and
insist that the rest of the world follow suit, then there will be no chance to make
any effective deal. The current framework itself favours Europe while making it
difficult for the U.S., Japan and Canada to even cosmetically make ambitious com-
mitments. The choice of framework and the target indicators for commitments
are critical for countries to impress their domestic constituencies, and what serves
one country well may not suit another. For example, if measuring energy efficien-
cy, Japan would be the best. If measuring R&D and scientific contributions, then
the U.S. stands out. It is of utmost importance that negotiators do not try to be the
sole winners of a negotiation, but to work toward arrangements where each nego-
tiating party can say it obtained a good deal, thereby inspiring the best efforts from
each country.
One danger lies in the adversarial nature of international environmental politics
itself. To paint itself as green, a negotiating party may desperately need an enemy
of a different colour. By creating a framework that looks fair to itself but which is
a non-starter to its counterparts, and by further announcing “ambitious targets”
for itself, such a party may keep its popularity with its domestic constituency while
actually hindering international coordination of action. We hope that voters in all
countries are wise enough to understand that this kind of populism can damage
the climate, and ultimately those domestic interests that negotiators serve.
Negotiation arenas must be chosen with care so that the negotiators can cooper-
ate to solve the common problems without being pitted against each other.
The authors hope that our efforts may contribute to setting the scene for policy-
makers and stakeholders to engage in constructive debate and make decisions in
the common interest. The story is told that when two disciples asked Confucius if
they should immediately do what they thought to be good, he answered, “Yes, do
it,” to the timid one and, “No, consult your father first,” to the arrogant one. He
always gave different answers to different disciples based upon his analysis of their
characters. In our view, the Kyoto Protocol is a significant first, bold step. The wiser
second step should now be undertaken with careful analysis of the characteristics
of the myriad alternative paths for international climate policies.
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Abstract
The scene is set for negotiations of commitments under the UNFCCC for the period
after 2012. This paper discusses how to move these negotiations forward. It argues
that a new protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), with binding targets and the same flexible instruments as in
the Kyoto Protocol, represents the most promising structure for establishing a
framework that will control and reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
However, in order to move towards such a framework, negotiations will have to
overcome significant and entangled barriers, including: re-engaging the United
States; establishing commitments for developing countries that are stronger than
those in the Kyoto Protocol; establishing new emission reduction targets; and
avoiding stalemates in the negotiations. With the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol
and other international agreements as a backdrop, the paper attempts to identify
modifications to the Kyoto structure and develop concrete strategies that could
move the negotiations forward. The suggested modifications to the Kyoto Protocol
include: a procedure for permitting allowances from non-Party trading schemes to
be used for compliance; sector targets for developing countries; target setting as
reductions from baseline; and additional eligibility criteria for CDM host countries.
In order to avoid stalemates, it will be important that some Parties show leader-
ship, and the EU is a natural candidate for this role. The paper concludes by dis-
cussing some ways in which the EU might play such a role.
1. Introduction
The international negotiations on climate change are about to enter a new phase.
Over the last decade, climate diplomats from all over the world have been pre-occu-
pied with negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC and the rules and
procedures that will guide its implementation (the Marrakech Accords). The scene
is now set for negotiations of commitments after the Kyoto period, i.e., after 2012.
These new negotiations got off to an early start in 2004 during the Tenth
Conference of the Parties (COP-10) in Buenos Aires. The conference did not do
much in terms of moving the negotiations forward but post-2012 commitments
clearly emerged as an (informal) agenda item, and were taken forward in the so-
called SOGE meetings (Seminar of Environmental Experts) in May 2005.
While the international negotiations can sometimes appear painfully slow, it is
worth bearing in mind that they have covered a lot of ground over the last 10 years.
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They have introduced an impressive framework that has the ambition—and, in
our view, the potential—to be an effective control of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions. It has also established innovative new mechanisms that have, so far, gone
untested in international environmental agreements; mechanisms that currently
fundamentally change the landscape of national and international climate politics.
This is no small achievement in light of the 189 Parties involved and the central
role emissions-generating activities play in industrial economies.
In light of inertia of the negotiation process, the fact that post-2012 commitments
actually became a part of the agenda in Buenos Aires—one year ahead of what was
scheduled in the Kyoto Protocol1—can be seen as a promising sign. However, this
does not mean that future negotiations will be easy. On the contrary, in order to
establish a truly effective framework for reducing global emissions, the negotia-
tions will have to overcome significant barriers.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss what will be fruitful strategies to overcome
the barriers and move toward an effective global framework. We argue that the
core of the Kyoto Protocol (binding targets and timetables, and the flexibility
mechanisms) represents a sensible and, so far, the only credible framework for
moving in that direction. Hence, the question boils down to: how do we modify
the Kyoto framework in order to make it broader and more effective?
This question is addressed by looking at four major obstacles:
• The world’s largest emitter, the U.S., refuses to discuss future targets and time-
lines for emission reductions, and it is evident that the current administration
is actively trying to convince other countries not to take on future commit-
ments. How might the Kyoto framework be modified in order to increase the
chances for constructive engagement with the U.S.?
• The developing countries have, so far, rightly insisted that the industralized
countries bear the responsibility for the climate change problem and should
lead the way in terms of reducing emissions before developing countries take
on emission targets. However, developing countries are not a monolithic
block and in terms of per capita income, as well as per capita emissions, a sig-
nificant number of developing countries have already risen above the level of
the less prosperous industrialized countries. As for the period after 2012, one
key question is: how can the Kyoto framework be modified to strengthen the
commitments for the developing countries?
• At the core of the negotiations of a “Kyoto-style” agreement is the allocation
of emission allowances (Assigned Amount Units, or AAUs). The allocation of
AAUs was a fairly arbitrary process under Kyoto. How should the allocation
be done under future agreements and how can it be better structured?
• Concluding an agreement means getting consensus among the more than 190
Parties that participate in the negotiations, and for whom priorities, knowledge
and preferences vary considerably. Hence, the risk of stalemate is imminent. In
light of this, how should the negotiations be organized in order to press forward?
1 The Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.9.
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We try to shed light on how to overcome these barriers from four strands of
insights. First, to the extent it is relevant, we draw lessons from other comparable
international negotiation processes. However, it can be argued that the climate
change problem is so complex, and that the Kyoto Protocol represents such a new
and innovative approach, that the climate negotiations are unprecedented by other
international agreements. Hence, the second strand of insights must be a thorough
understanding of the dynamics of the climate negotiations, past and present.
Third, as noted above, the mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol, i.e., emis-
sions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are
likely to have transformative powers that change the political landscape. Hence,
insight into the development of the carbon market, emerging from the imple-
mentation of the Kyoto Protocol, represents an important input to our discussion
of negotiation strategies.
Fourth, and finally, the policy scenarios developed earlier under the project that
led to this book, represent a wealth of innovative ideas (Sugiyama 2005). We draw
on the insights from developing these policy scenarios, to the extent we believe
they are relevant for the main issue in this chapter: how to modify the Kyoto
framework in order to move towards a broader framework.
This paper is structured in six sections. First, we discuss the Kyoto Protocol and
the Marrakech Accords and argue that they represent a sensible long-term
approach for establishing a framework for controlling and reducing global green-
house gas emissions. Second, we review the current development of the carbon
market and speculate what it might mean for future policy-making. Third, the
paper assesses how the Kyoto framework might be modified in order to foster con-
structive engagement with the U.S. Fourth, we discuss how the commitments for
developing countries might be expanded. Fifth, we discuss how the allocation
under future agreements might be made more predictable and fair. Sixth, we dis-
cuss how future negotiations should be organized in order to move forward. To
conclude, we draw main policy implications from the analysis.
2. The Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords
The UNFCCC was established in 1992, with the overriding goal of preventing
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. There was wide
agreement on the convention, but it did not set specific targets and timelines for
when countries should reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. At the
Third Meeting of Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was
agreed to in the Japanese city that bears its name. The KP set clear targets and
timelines for industrialized countries, requiring them to reduce their emissions by
5.2 per cent by the 2008–2012 period, compared to 1990 levels. The most impor-
tant part of the KP was the introduction of the flexibility mechanisms;
International Emissions Trading (IET) for trade of Assigned Amount Units
(AAUs) between countries; the Joint Implementation (JI) procedure for creating
tradable credits from emission reductions projects in industrialized countries; and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for credits from reduction projects in
developing countries. However, the procedures for making the KP and the flexi-
bility mechanisms operational were still missing, and these came first in 2001,
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when the so-called Marrakech Accords were agreed. These were the final pieces
that were needed in order to start the ratification process, and countries started
approving the KP. With Russia’s ratification in 2004, the KP entered into force in
February 2005.
A number of developments have left the KP very different than what was intended
at the outset. First of all, the withdrawal of the United States means that the world’s
largest national emitter remains on the outside of the agreement. Australia has also
decided not to adhere to the agreement, but that is not as important as the
American abandonment of the process. The inclusion of significant forestry-related
reductions for a number of countries, together with the option for some countries
to change their base-year, means that the reductions that will take place under the
KP are significantly less than the 5.2 per cent first agreed.
Nevertheless, in our view, the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords repre-
sent the most sensible approach to dealing with an issue as complex and multifac-
eted as international climate change. There are several reasons for this. First, the
use of targets and timelines is the best way of imposing limits on emissions.
Experiences with carbon taxes in European countries suggest that, although they
have been reasonably successful in reducing the rate of emissions growth, they
have not been able to halt the growth. In fact, in some European countries the car-
bon taxes play a more important role as revenue raiser for the government than an
environmental policy instrument. Second, the use of the flexibility mechanisms
ensures that emission reductions will, at least in theory, take place where the costs
are least, thus ensuring that the overall costs for the system as a whole will be
optimized. Finally, the fact that the combined efforts of a multitude of countries
have gone into the negotiation process, and the high number of countries that
have actually ratified the agreement (150 states as of April 29, 2005), means that
the majority of the countries in the world will find at least some aspects of the
agreement that they would also like to maintain in the future.
3. The birth of a global carbon market
The international market for sale and purchase of GHG emission allowances and
credits from GHG emission reduction projects has been in operation since the late
1990s. While the carbon market in the early days was dominated by transactions
in the North American market, the focus quickly changed to Europe as domestic
emissions trading markets were developed in Denmark and the U.K. The EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) came into operation on January 1, 2005, but for-
ward trading in the market had taken place since May 2003. Figure 1 shows the
financial size of the different segments of the carbon market, and Point Carbon
forecasts for the development of the market in 2005. Figure 2 shows the historical
and forecasted development of the physical size of the market.
As shown by the figures, there has been substantial growth in the carbon market
in recent years. While 2003 saw 27.8 Mt traded in all market segments, correspon-
ding to a financial value of €83 million, volumes in 2004 had more than tripled,
with 94 Mt, or €377 million trading throughout the year. Point Carbon’s forecast
for 2005 suggests that volumes in all market segments could reach as high as 380
Mt, with the financial size increasing to about €2.1 billion.
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Figure 1. Financial size of the international carbon markets, million €
Point Carbon 2:2005
In brief, the data show that a substantial new market is developing. Ensuring the
effective operation of these mechanisms will be instrumental in achieving the
goals of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the European Union Greenhouse Gas
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is by far the largest and most active of the dif-
ferent market segments, the market is very much an international effort. The
CDM ensures that developing countries can participate in the marketplace, bring-
ing a potential 148 host countries into the cooperative effort. Other industrialized
countries are also increasingly involved in the market. Canada plans to have a
domestic emissions trading system in place by 2008, and Japanese companies are
actively pursuing CDM and JI opportunities.
However, we are still a long way from the seamless, global market that was envis-
aged when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed. The market is still fragmented, and the
prices for the different commodities are very different. The lack of one interna-
tional price for CO2 is primarily due to the early stage the carbon market is in, and
this is expected to change once more market participants trade actively and, equally
important, once current delays at the international decision-making level are
removed. While the price in the EU ETS has skyrocketed since February 2005, the
market breached €20/t in June 2005, there has not been a similar development in
the prices for JI and CDM projects. This can be explained by CDM and JI prices
reflecting the various risk aspects surrounding such projects. EU Allowances
(EUAs) have, in most cases, been issued to the European companies’ registry
accounts, and the commodity can be bought or sold directly in the market.
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from CDM projects and Emission
Reduction Units (ERUs) from JI projects can only be sold directly once they’ve
been issued, expected in late 2005 for CERs and 2008 for ERUs. Until this has taken
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(forecast)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
CDM EU ETSJI Other
€
 m
ill
io
n
Cap-and-Trade
17
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 17
place, the investments in CDM and JI will reflect the risks that the project might
not result in the required emission reductions after all. At the time of writing, early
summer 2005, companies in the EU were paying €6–7 per CER if the seller took
most of the performance/delivery risk, while governments and Japanese firms paid
€4–6/CER. Sellers that could guarantee delivery of the CERs were reportedly
struggling to get €8/CER and tended to hold out for higher bids. Figure 3 shows
the daily bid-offer closing price development and the volumes traded for EUAs
with delivery in December 2005.
Figure 2. Physical size of the international carbon market, million tonnes CO2
equivalents
Point Carbon 2:2005
While the carbon market has come about as a result of the international climate
change policy development, it is likely that the market will play an important role
when it comes to setting the policy agenda in the years to come. As more and more
companies and governments throughout the world gain experience from the use
of the market, and share their lessons with others that have so far stayed out, it will
be easier to develop a market and a policy framework that can aid countries’
towards reaching their targets. However, we are not there yet. In order for the mar-
ket to set the political agenda, it is essential that it operates smoothly and effectively.
The project market, in particular, is likely to be prone to politicking also in the
years ahead, and thus expected to remain a much smaller segment of the market
than the obligatory domestic and regional trading systems. Although the number
of emission reduction projects has increased rapidly over the past years, the delays
at the international approval levels, where the CDM Executive Board (EB) is the
primary entity, means that only a handful of projects have been approved and no
CERs have been issued. Figure 4 shows the growth in CDM projects in the most
active host countries in 2004. The graph shows that the number of projects grew
significantly throughout 2004 in several countries. The growth has continued also
in 2005. Point Carbon has a total of 1,293 CDM projects in its database of proj-
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ects, 297 of these at Project Design Document (PDD) level. However, only seven
projects have been registered at the CDM EB to date. For JI projects, the total num-
ber of projects is 261, with 108 at PDD level, but the JI Supervisory Committee
that will oversee the process has yet to be established.
Figure 3. EU prices 2005, €/t
For EU Allowances with delivery in December 2005. Daily bid-offer closing. Volumes reported for the bro-
kered market only.
Source: Point Carbon’s Carbon Market Trader
Figure 4. Growth in CDM projects
Number of projects in Point Carbon’s database prior to 2004, and total number of projects at end of 2004.
(Point Carbon, 1:2005)
Source: Point Carbon’s Project Database
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While many observers have interpreted the delay of registering projects and issu-
ing credits as a sign that the EB does not function, we feel that this is primarily due
to lack of sufficient funding from UNFCCC Member States. In fact, despite the
difficulties, we feel that the EB has done an impressive job in creating an intricate
market regulator authority. Nevertheless, discussions surrounding the role of
CDM in a future climate agreement, and the function of its decision-making body,
have the potential to keep potential investors away from the market, thus limiting
the use of the project-based flexibility mechanisms in the 2008 to 2012 period.
4. Re-engaging the USA
The opposition from the current U.S. administration to binding emission targets
and timetables represents a major obstacle to a broadening of the Kyoto frame-
work. The U.S. is by far the largest emitter in the world and will probably remain
on the top at least to 2020.2 Of course, including the U.S. in a constructive man-
ner is crucial for getting a truly global and efficient mitigation framework in place.
The opposition to the Kyoto Protocol by the Bush administration is partly ideo-
logical, but also has to be seen in the light of the tight connections between the
administration and the U.S. oil and coal lobby. It is, for example, quite telling that
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC)—one of the most vocal groups in the 1990s,
lobbying against the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the U.S. oil and coal industry—
disbanded itself in early 2002, after endorsing President Bush’s climate policy and
praising its focus on technology development and voluntary action.3
Also when it comes to the strategy towards the developing world, there is a strong
resemblance between the positions of the Bush administration and the U.S. oil and
coal industry. President Bush has repeatedly stated that he opposes the Kyoto
Protocol because “it exempts 80 per cent of the world.”4 This strange argument,
i.e., measuring the climate problem as size of population and not emissions, is a
carbon copy of statements previously made by the GCC. Moreover, the strategy of
the current U.S. administration is the same as the one employed by the GCC: argu-
ing domestically that the U.S. cannot take on commitments as long as developing
countries do not and, at the same time, telling developing countries that they
should not take on commitments as this would be crippling to their economic
development. Thus, any meaningful action would be prevented. Moreover, in the
recent negotiations, the U.S. delegation has consistently opposed suggestions of a
negotiation schedule beyond six months ahead, and supported the most watered-
down version of official declarations such as the Delhi Declaration, etc.5
These findings, in combination with reports of U.S. researchers being harassed by
White House representatives for participating in projects looking at long-term cli-
mate policy regimes6—as well as the lack of a credible U.S. plan for bringing down 
2 According to the World Energy Production System (WEPS), available at the website of U.S. DOE/EIA.
3 Press releases from the Global Climate Coalition, quoted by PRwatch.org.
4 See, for example, President Bush’s letter to Senator Hagel March 13, 2001, available at the Web site
of the White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov.
5 This negotiation strategy was, for example, employed by the current administration at COP-8,
COP-9 and COP-10, according to private communications with negotiators.
6 Private communication with U.S. researchers.
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domestic emissions—leads to one conclusion: the current U.S. administration is
not serious about tackling climate change. Rather, the balance of evidence indi-
cates that the administration has sided with the U.S. industry lobby and is actively
trying to fend off future emission targets, not only for the USA, but also for other
countries. In light of this, how should countries that are serious about tackling cli-
mate change proceed?
It is reasonable to assume that ,at one point in the future, the U.S. government will
change and there will be a U.S. administration that is serious about climate change.
When this happens, the U.S. is likely to seek international cooperation. After all,
global warming is a truly global problem that has to be tackled through international
cooperation. Moreover, it is likely that a U.S. administration that is serious about cli-
mate change will embrace the core of the Kyoto Protocol; binding targets and emis-
sions trading. These instruments are deeply rooted in the U.S. regulative culture, and
key U.S. constituencies (including industry) prefer market-based instruments over
other types of environmental instruments, such as direct regulations and taxes.
Indeed, in the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. was pushing
some of its most innovative elements such as the Kyoto Mechanisms and a strong
compliance regime; the Protocol thus reflects U.S. interests to a large extent. Hence,
there are good chances that a U.S. administration that wants to take action on cli-
mate change will favour an agreement that is quite similar to the Kyoto Protocol.
Of course, until the U.S. joins a target-based agreement it is unlikely that other
countries will agree to very strong future commitments and thus the emission
reductions that are achievable will be limited as long as the U.S. does not have
commitments. Nevertheless, in order to gain experience, initiate reduction efforts
and prepare the scene for a U.S. re-entry, active use and refinement of the Kyoto
instruments will be key. If the world can show that the market limits reduction
costs, then the U.S. will be more likely to come on board, especially as it can then
say that the successful approach was chosen only due to their insistence.
The Kyoto Protocol is by no means the first international treaty that has been rejected
by the U.S. Famous victims of the past include the treaty on the League of Nations
after the First World War and the International Trade Organization after the Second
World War. However, history shows us that these rejections never persisted if there
was a clear benefit to the U.S. from an international agreement. The development of
the international trade negotiations deserves to be looked at in more detail as it pro-
vides an excellent roadmap for the post-2012 climate negotiations.
When the Second World War had ended, there was a consensus that the high trade
barriers of the pre-war period had exacerbated the economic depression and led to
tensions between nations. Thus, negotiations began quickly with the target to set up
an international body to oversee international trade. At Havana in 1947, the charter
of the International Trade Organization (ITO) was signed; the proposal to set up the
ITO had emanated from the U.S. government. The ITO would have had far-reach-
ing power to oversee violations of the principle of the most-favoured nation clause,
coordinate negotiations about tariff reductions and declare when competition
would be unfair. Given the U.S.’s economic weight compared to the rest of the world,
the isolationist mood in the U.S. after the successful war and the feeling that there
was no threat to U.S. supremacy, the ITO treaty failed in the Senate.
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The historical analogue fits nicely into the climate negotiations: we have an inter-
national problem which is seen as a serious issue and an international treaty is
negotiated to address this issue. The U.S. is enjoying unchallenged supremacy and
domestic interests manage to convince policy-makers that U.S. freedom to act is
impaired by the treaty. Now we can look at the further development of interna-
tional trade policy.
After ITO had been rejected, the ascendance of Soviet power and the beginning of
the Cold War convinced the U.S. that a multilateral strategy was necessary to contain
the Soviet Union. Thus, the rapid economic development of the war-ravaged
European countries became a priority and ushered in the Marshall Plan. In 1950, the
Korean War started and the U.S. was in need of raw material imports. So interna-
tional trade liberalization became important for the U.S. Quietly, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 7 which had survived the ITO disaster, set
up a secretariat in Geneva and the first round to negotiate tariff reductions was final-
ized in the small French resort Annecy in 1949, followed by the second round in the
English holiday resort Torquay in 1951. The locations clearly show the low-key
nature of the activity. The resounding success of this endeavour led to the emergence
of a regime with recurrent multi-year negotiation rounds with an increasingly uni-
versal participation. However, only in 1995, was the historical circle closed with the
agreement to set up the World Trade Organization (WTO).
What lessons can be drawn from the ITO/GATT story for the international climate
regime? First, a U.S. rejection does not mean that the issue is closed forever. If the
U.S. perceives its interests are served by international action, it will reconsider its
stance fairly quickly. Second, relabelling of an issue is helpful even if contents do
not change. Third, a bottom-up approach with trust-building can restore the orig-
inal top-down approach but this can take decades. Fourth, the principle of multi-
year negotiation and commitment rounds is a robust means to address a long-
term issue.
The above analysis has implications for how to proceed in the negotiations in the
short term, and also some bearings for the design of a post-2012 agreement.
However, it is also important to take into account the U.S. behaviour in the previous
Kyoto negotiations. Following the withdrawal from the agreement by President
Bush, many observers have noted what they have described as the U.S. “sabotaging”
the negotiation process. Although much of this has taken place behind closed doors,
there are a number of reports substantiating this. In light of this, we’d recommend
negotiators to consider the following in the future climate talk rounds:
1. Be skeptical of any official U.S. proposals;
2. To avoid U.S. sabotage, negotiations should take place at COP/MOP, where
the U.S. does not have access, and not under the UNFCCC;
3. There should be a new protocol, i.e., not an amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol, in order to avoid the negative connotations of the Kyoto Protocol in
the U.S. It would be ideal to give the impression that there is a fresh start to
international action.
7 Note the absence of any terms denoting a global or international agreement.
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4. Cooperate with U.S. researchers who can provide input to what kind of pro-
tocol might be palatable to the U.S. in the future to open informal ways of
gauging the mood in the U.S.
5. The protocol should be open to using non-party allowances for compliance
through a COP/MOP decision. This would strengthen interests within the
U.S. that profit from emission reductions and show U.S. constituencies that
market mechanisms really work and reduce emissions at low costs.
Regarding the last point, even if the U.S. administration is positive towards an
international agreement, it is still questionable whether the U.S. Senate will ratify.
This was the case during the Clinton period, where the Kyoto Protocol was first
signed by the White House, only to later be turned down by the Senate, as it did
not adhere to the principles set out in the Byrd-Hagel resolution, requiring the
participation of key developing countries in an agreement. In order to allow for
active participation in the event that the U.S. Senate does not ratify, there might be
a for the U.S. to participate:
• the COP/MOP can permit allowances from non-parties’ trading schemes to
be used for compliance; and
• the COP/MOP can allow non-parties to participate in the governing institu-
tions of the protocol, e.g., the CDM EB.
This will make it possible for a future U.S. president to link a domestic U.S. trading
scheme to the international one, despite the protocol not being ratified by the U.S.
Senate. Hence, the USA would be able to comply with its obligations under a proto-
col with the full use of the flexibility mechanisms, even if it has not ratified. This is
fairly similar to some other international agreements, e.g., Law of the Sea where the
U.S. followed much of the content of the law without ever ratifying it.
5. Commitments for developing countries
In the international climate negotiations, the developing countries usually act as
one block, the G77/China group. The G77/China will normally take a common
position and so far they have strongly resisted commitments for developing coun-
tries. Although they have been able to speak with one unified voice in the negoti-
ations, a closer look reveals striking differences among the members of the group.
Some “developing countries” are actually far more developed than many industri-
alized countries both in terms of per capita income and greenhouse gas emissions.
Table 1 shows these countries that are starting to be called “advanced developing
countries” in the context of negotiations.
One sees that countries above the average of Annex II (i.e., all OECD countries giv-
ing development assistance) combined annual emissions of 0.5 billion t CO2, a con-
siderable amount but still accounting for only 3.4 per cent of Annex B emissions. If
one includes all countries with a per capita income above the level of the poorest
Annex B country, expansion would cover 28 per cent of Annex B emissions. Please
note that the large emitters, China and India, that have the same emissions level (29
per cent) as all the countries listed in Table 1 have per capita incomes and emissions
(2.4 and 0.9 t, respectively) that are much below the lowest Annex B country levels.
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Table 1. Income and emissions of advanced developing countries compared to
Annex B levels
GDP/capita t CO2/ capita Emissions Emissions
(million t CO2) change (%)
1990–2000
Qatar 26,051 60.0 35.1 +150.4
Singapore 22,716 10.5 42.0 +46.0
Average Annex B 20,218 11.2 77.1 +80.2
Cyprus 19,197 8.4 6.3 +63.1
Taiwan 18,547 9.7 215.3 +88.9
Israel 18,454 10.0 62.4 +85.8
United Arab Emirates 18,182 23.7 68.7 +68.0
Oman 17,667 9.8 23.5 +120.1
Brunei 16,264 15.0 5.1 +57.8
Malta 15,333 5.8 2.3 -0.9
Lowest Annex II 15,019 3.4 460.7 +83.3
Bahamas1 15,000 7.5 1.9 NA
Kuwait 14,833 31.5 62.6 +213.12
Barbados1 14,500 8.2 2.2 NA
Bahrain 14,203 20.4 14.1 +20.7
Korea 13,790 9.2 433.6 +91.7
Argentina 11,506 3.5 130.2 +33.1
Saudi Arabia 10,452 12.6 260.6 +54.1
Mauritius3 9,940 NA 1.8 NA
Chile 8,898 3.2 48.1 +58.9
South Africa 8,754 6.9 295.8 +16.2
Uruguay 8,452 <2.8 5.3 +25.4
Trinidad and Tobago 8,446 11.6 15.1 +38.7
Mexico 8,358 2.6 359.6 +23.1
Malaysia 8,195 4.6 106.1 +123.9
Costa Rica 7,630 <2.8 4.6 +74.3
Botswana3 7,170 <2.8 3.1 NA
Brazil 6,949 <2.8 303.3 +57.0
Turkey 6,299 3.1 204.1 +58.4
Thailand 6,020 <2.8 147.2 +89.0
Tunisia 5,986 <2.8 17.8 +45.4
Gabon 5,878 <2.8 1.4 +32.0
Colombia 5,843 <2.8 57.2 +27.8
Namibia 5,744 <2.8 1.9 +55.84
Dominican Republic 5,728 <2.8 17.8 +132.6
Equatorial Guinea3 5,600 <2.8 NA NA
Panama 5,580 <2.8 4.9 +98.8
Iran 5,567 4.6 292.1 +83.7
Venezuela 5,518 5.3 128.6 +25.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5,452 3.9 15.4 -21.65
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GDP/capita t CO2/ capita Emissions Emissions
(million t CO2) change (%)
1990–2000
Kazakhstan 5,194 8.3 122.8 -50.75
Peru 4,518 <2.8 26.4 +37.7
Macedonia 4,729 4.1 8.4 -8.1
El Salvador 4,177 <2.8 5.2 +141.7
Paraguay 4,115 <2.8 3.3 +70.6
Philippines 3,845 <2.8 68.9 +91.4
Guatemala 3,577 <2.8 8.8 +166.5
Turkmenistan 3,548 6.6 34.3 +17.65
Lowest Annex B 3,528 2.8 3,766.2 +49.6
1 Data from national communication and World Bank
2 Very low 1990 level due to Iraqi occupation; compared to 1989 level, the increase is only 22.7 per cent
3 Philibert and Pershing (2002) and respective national communications
4 Compared to 1991
5 Compared to 1992
Source: IEA (2002)
As these differences reveal, there is unlikely to be “one-size-fits-all” when it comes
to commitments for developing countries. As a consequence, several methodolo-
gies have been proposed to differentiate their commitments. One example of such a
methodology is the one proposed in the Graduation and Deepening scenario
(Michaelowa et al. 2005) that builds on a considerable strengthening of Annex B
emission targets. Targets for Non-Annex B countries are defined on the base of a
concentric ring structure where a graduation index consisting of per capita emis-
sions and per capita GDP is calculated for all Non-Annex B countries. The countries
in the inner rings take on more stringent targets than those in the outer rings: coun-
tries whose index level is above the Annex B average get Annex B average targets,
albeit with a base year of 2012. Countries with an index above the lowest Annex II
level get a target which corresponds to the lowest Annex B level, and those above the
lowest Annex B level have to stabilize their emissions. Large emitters below this
threshold are exempt.
However, as long as the G77/China negotiates as one bloc, they tend to end up with
the minimal common denominator: rejection of future commitments. Hence, from
a negotiation perspective a main question is how to set up a negotiating process that
will end with such differentiation along the lines suggested above. And, what kind of
leverage will the Annex I countries have; what are their bargaining chips?
Earlier, the main bargaining chip of the Annex I countries has been the various funds
established under the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., the Special Climate Change Fund). These
were established in order to persuade the developing countries to accept the proto-
col. However, the introduction of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may
shift the balance of power. As illustrated in Figure 4, there is now a substantial num-
ber of CDM projects taking place in key developing countries. Moreover, particular-
ly in India and Brazil, a large CDM business community has developed related to
development of CDM projects, consulting, etc. These business groups will have an
interest in continuation of the CDM, and they are normally well represented in the
national delegations to the climate negotiations. Hence, threats of stopping CDM
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investments are likely to have some leverage. It appears that the EU has been think-
ing along these lines and is considering terminating the CDM after 2012, depending
on what kind of commitments developing countries are willing to take on.
Threatening the discontinuation of the CDM would jeopardize CDM investments
in a critical period of the market. However, the EU Directive on Emissions Trading
does not have a defined end date, and signals from the European Commission sug-
gest that the Linking Directive, governing the use of CDM and JI, will remain oper-
ational also in a subsequent commitment period.
The negotiations on the continuation of the CDM (and the various funds estab-
lished under the Kyoto Protocol) could, for example, be traded against an opening
for developing countries to take on commitments on an individual basis, and
some common minimum requirements when it comes to reporting. Introducing
a more comprehensive and complex graduation scheme, or even better, emission
targets for all developing countries, would of course be desirable, but it is proba-
bly overly ambitious for the first commitment period after 2012.
There have been several suggestions for what kind of targets developing countries
could take on. Several authors have suggested dynamic, or intensity-based targets,
where emissions are measured in relation to another variable, e.g., GDP. Other and
more innovative means have also been suggested. For example, Kim and Baumert
(2002) suggest a dual-intensity target, where two different targets are set for a
country. Reductions below the lower intensity target will allow the country to sell
allowances, while emissions will have to be above the upper intensity for the coun-
try to be in non-compliance. Emissions between the two targets would have no
implications, positive or negative, for the country.
Tangen and Hasselknippe (2005) suggest sector targets for developing countries,
i.e., that developing countries will not have to take on targets for the whole econ-
omy, but could choose to include a limited number of sectors, or even single
installations. This suggestion is partly practically motivated: for many developing
countries emissions data are of poor quality, and meeting the eligibility require-
ments for participating in emissions trading might require substantial investments.
Hence, limiting the number of sectors that are covered by emissions trading might
lower the entry costs. The suggestion of sector targets is also partly politically
motivated. By limiting the number coverage of the scheme to a few sectors, the
country will avoid massive expenses if the emissions increase faster than first
anticipated but, at the same time, allow for substantial learning-by-doing for the
sectors that are covered, and for the country as a whole.
Investor countries also have the opportunity to put pressure on developing coun-
tries in order for them to take on reduction targets, as well as providing financial
incentives for doing so. In total, industrialized countries have plans to purchase
credits from CDM and JI projects for €4.2 billion to 2012 (Point Carbon 3:2005).
However, this will not meet more than about 10 per cent of these countries’ Kyoto
requirements, and additional investments are expected to increase. Using this
money as leverage to get developing countries to take on targets, for instance by
stating that future investments will only be made in countries that enter into some
sort of agreement on reporting and capping of emissions in different sectors,
could be an option to broaden the climate agreement. By providing guaranteed
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investments to sectors that will take on targets it will be easier for the developing
countries to agree to enhance their participation. Such pressure could be applied
either through statements by buyer countries on their future purchase plans, or
through bilateral agreements guaranteeing future investments.
6. Acceptable and predictable targets
In terms of targets, the KP has two major problems: the target-setting was arbi-
trary and unpredictable, and the targets turned out to be immensely skewed, e.g.,
Russia versus USA. Targets were the outcome of a bazaar-like negotiation proce-
dure without any underlying rationale. This compares unfavourably with the bur-
den-sharing negotiations in the EU that were done on the basis of the Triptych
approach that had been developed by the University of Utrecht. The negotiations
about the LRTAP Convention were even more based on a rational approach—the
RAINS model developed by the international think tank IIASA. In the post-2012
negotiations, enhanced predictability along such lines is preferable to the Kyoto
bazaar in order to make for more effective goal-achievement. A methodology or
model to guide target-setting would allow a much more targeted negotiation
although the targets are still likely to be set by political negotiations in the end.
Table 2 shows the path from Triptych to actual EU burden-sharing targets.
Table 2. Path from Triptych to actual EU burden sharing targets (reductions
from 1990 in %)
Country National Original Dutch 1997  U.K. 1998 
CO2 targets triptych proposal agreement* proposal agreement*
for 2000 1997** 1997 1998 
Austria 20 (2005) 1 to 25 25 25 20.5 13
Belgium 5 12 to15 15 10 9 7.5
Denmark 5 12 to 25 25 25 22.5 21
Finland 0 4 to 7 10 0 0 0
France +13 4 to 12 5 0 0 0
Germany 25 (2005) 17 to 30 30 25 22.5 21
Greece +25 2 to +2 +5 +30 +23 +25
Ireland +20 2 to 5 +15 +15 +11 +13
Italy 0 5 to 9 10 7 7 6.5
Luxembourg 0 17 to 20 40 30 30 28
Netherlands 3 to 5 6 to 9 10 10 8 6
Portugal +40 +16 to +21 +25 +40 +24 +27
Spain +25 +6 to +11 +14 +17 +15 +15
Sweden 0 +5 to +26 +5 +5 +5 +4
U.K. 0 17 to 20 20 10 12 12.5
EU 0 9 to 17 15 9.2 8.5 8
* Three gas basket in 1997 burden sharing, six gas (Kyoto) basket in 1998 burden sharing
** Range of results among the four scenarios analyzed by the triptych approach
Sources: EU Council (1997), European Commission (1994), Anonymous (1997, 1998), Ringius (1999)
One could call on University of Utrecht again and use their numbers on global
Triptych developed during the last years (Groenenberg et al. 2000) as a starting
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point for the international negotiations. If the Triptych route is found to be too
complex, a model that has clear assumptions and whose output is understood by
policy-makers and negotiating officials could help to make target-setting more
acceptable to use reductions from baseline for guiding the establishment of
Assigned Amounts. Like in the RAINS case, such a model could again be devel-
oped by IIASA building on the results of many modelling exercises worldwide,
particularly those collaborating in the Stanford Energy Modelling Forum.
Still it seems likely that baselines will be inflated, such as was the case in the devel-
opment of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) under the EU ETS by EU Member
States, and this will have to be factored in. However, the process within the EU
showed that the EU Commission was able to develop considerable clout in rejecting
overly generous NAPs. Even in those cases where NAPs were not formally rejected,
negotiations behind the scenes were able to reduce allocation levels compared to the
earlier drafts. While a body with the formal powers of the EU Commission does not
exist on an international level, the CDM Executive Board and its methodology panel
have shown a surprisingly high willingness to safeguard the environmental integri-
ty of the CDM without being reined in by the COP. This lesson would suggest that
in the post-2012 system, an international body could be charged with the evaluation
of baseline projections. Such an “emission projection board” would issue emissions
projections for all countries. It could be supported by a panel of modelling experts.
Establishing baselines for countries will be much easier than in Kyoto as the trans-
formation of Eastern Europe has largely been accomplished and the KP will pro-
vide for much better emissions data. Moreover, the choice of 2012 as a base year
for graduating countries would allow enough time to collect data while also allow-
ing independent checks before the end of the commitment period.
7. Pressing forward
During the Kyoto negotiations, the U.S. was instrumental in terms of providing inno-
vative solutions and pressing the negotiations forward, while the EU, to a large extent,
was locked into internal discussions. Also, at some of the conferences after the Kyoto
Conference, particularly at COP-6 in The Hague, the EU appears to have spent as
much time on negotiating with itself as it did with other Parties. As the U.S. is likely
to be out of the substantial negotiations over the post-2012 framework, there is need
for another Party that can press the process forward much in the same way as the U.S.
did in Kyoto. The EU is currently the only party that has the necessary weight, and the
ambition, for playing such a leadership role—but will it be up to the task?
In has been feared that the expansion of the EU by another 10 members would
increase its coordination problems. There are, however, few signs of this actually
happening. Rather, at COP-9 and COP-10, EU appeared less constrained by its
internal coordination than what was the case on the previous conferences. Rather,
according to non-EU negotiators, the EU was surprisingly effective in formulating
positions due to more centralized decision-making.8 Hence, it looks that, in face
of the immeasurable challenges of coordinating the positions of 25 members, the 
8 Personal communication.
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EU reformulated its (informal) negotiation structure and accepted the fact that in
order to be effective, more decision-making power had to be given to the EU
Presidency. This has been supported by more effective “Troika” procedures involv-
ing previous and future presidencies.
The EU is also the only party with real experience of using the Kyoto mechanisms.
While the so-called Umbrella members (e.g., Japan and Canada) have been caught
up in domestic policy battles, the EU has managed to establish the world’s largest
trading scheme, by far. And, as elaborated above, this scheme is, at the time of writ-
ing, the “motor” of the global carbon market (see Figures 1 and 2). Unlike what
many feared—and anticipated—the EU got the scheme in place according to its
original schedule. Nor has the price collapsed because of a lax allocation. Rather,
currently the EU scheme is quite a success; it will probably deliver reductions of
the scale of 100–200 Mt and the liquidity increases by the day. Obviously, this gives
the EU some authority when it comes to discussing and negotiating targets and
market mechanisms under a future climate regime. Moreover, the painstaking
allocation process has probably given the EU a more realistic picture of what can
be achieved in the short term. This was already visible in the ministerial discus-
sions on the target level to be aimed at by the EU in the negotiations. After lengthy
exchanges, the EU announced a target range of -15 to -30 per cent for 2020 com-
pared to 1990.9
The 30 per cent was a formal reference to the German government’s coalition
agreement of 2002. Experience from the pre-Kyoto negotiations show that setting
a range has been useful in signalling environmental ambition to voters while
showing realism to seasoned negotiators. The -15 per cent would mean a reduc-
tion of seven per cent from the first commitment period—not an overly difficult
task given the remaining low-cost potential in the new Member States.
Hence, it could be argued that the EU is currently in a much better position to
exercise leadership in the international climate negotiations than what was the
case a few years ago. The decision-making has been improved; it has more experi-
ence and authority but also a sufficient dose of realism. In order for the EU to fully
realize this potential, we find that before the next round of climate talks it is
important that the EU:
• does its homework and prepares well before going to the negotiations;
• shows developing countries that it takes the CDM seriously by implementing
liberal interpretations of the linking directive on a Member State level. This
would mean that no burdensome additional requirements for CDM projects
are set up such as envisaged by some Member States. This also reduces costs
for the emitters covered by the EU trading scheme and reduces pressure to set
a weak target;
• uses bilateral channels. This could lead to the development of a “Beyond 2012
group” consisting of EU and other progressive industrialized countries such
as Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand. This group could link with 
9 The German government was reported to be in favour of not setting a target level at the Council
meeting.
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progressive forces in Canada and Japan, and develop a joint target proposal.
Moreover, trust-building with progressive advanced developing countries
should be started. The European Capacity Building Initiative supported by a
number of EU governments and launched at the climate negotiations in May
2005 would be a useful platform for such an endeavour (Mueller 2005); and
• suggests a targeted CDM program for OPEC and advanced developing coun-
tries. This could help to dispel the notion that climate policy blocks growth
and would also show long-term alternatives to fossil fuels. Moreover, con-
stituencies in those countries favouring emission reductions would be built.
At COP-11, the EU should:
• state that it is willing to take on a unilateral target in any case (e.g., three per
cent from baseline), but that it is prepared to take on stronger targets if other
Annex I countries take on targets, or developing countries take on sector tar-
gets. This would be similar to the successful approach on tariff reduction in
the trade negotiations that reduced tariffs substantially during three decades;
and
• present a draft mandate for the process that will lead to a new protocol under
the UNFCCC for the period after 2012.
The EU’s unilateral target would be enough to keep the Kyoto institutions (barely)
alive without hurting national competitiveness if they have to go alone, but will
make it difficult for other countries not to put a target on the table. When other
countries propose targets, EU should increase its own target, and hence create a
“race to the top.”
8. Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter does not leave much hope for a constructive climate
dialogue with the U.S. under its current administration. This poses a huge barrier
to getting an ambitious international climate agreement in place. Although the EU
seems better fit for playing a leadership role in the negotiations than was the case
only a few years ago, expectations for the post-2012 regime have to be modest. The
best the EU can hope for is probably to further develop the Kyoto framework,
establish modest targets and involve some advanced developing countries. The
resulting emission reductions will probably be a far cry from what is needed in
order to seriously slow down climate change. We are heading for a warmer world.
Then what is the use of spending time and energy on negotiating a post-2012
agreement which will probably have limited effect anyway on the rate of global
warming? The main reason is that it will be important to continue to learn how to
reduce emissions effectively. A new U.S. administration that is serious about cli-
mate change will probably return to the international negotiation in a construc-
tive manner and prefer an agreement that has many of the same characteristics as
the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., binding targets and market-based mechanisms). With a
constructive U.S., there is likely to be a wide scope of solutions, besides the few dis-
cussed in this chapter.
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Although the analysis is pessimistic about including the U.S. in a target and
timetable agreement under the current administration, it does not suggest that the
rest of the world should not move. On the contrary, experience over the last decade
has shown how painfully slow the negotiation process can be. Moreover, the prac-
tical implementation of market-based mechanisms is a time-consuming learning
process. It is now, eight years after the Kyoto Protocol was signed, that we are able
to start learning from practical experience. Consequently, even with limited par-
ticipation and unilateral targets, it will be important that the EU and other coun-
tries that are serious about tackling climate change maintain the flexibility mech-
anisms, so that the world will not have to start from scratch when the U.S. is ready
to join.
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Part 2: Technology
Technology
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Abstract
This paper describes the “Coalition for Climate Technology” scenario for the
future of the international climate regime in which like-minded countries cooper-
ate on technology development and diffusion, while the Kyoto-style binding cap
regime receives less attention. In this scenario, technology is not only instrumen-
tal to prevent climate change, but also provides an opportunity to change the game
structure of climate negotiation from conflict over cap allocation to cooperation
on national interests, thereby enabling countries to mobilize resources necessary
to mitigate climate change. Key events in the scenario include: weakening of the
binding cap regime after the first commitment period (2008–2012) of the Kyoto
Protocol, development of cooperation among like-minded countries, technology
areas in particular, e.g., renewable energy (EU and others), energy conservation
(Japan and others) and geological carbon sequestration (U.S. and others). The
countries shift away from the binding cap regime and pursue technology cooper-
ation for some years, and then come back to the binding cap regime in the future,
when technology options for mitigation are more affordable and strong con-
stituencies have developed to support the technologies. Technological dynamics
and alternative futures are discussed in detail.
1. Introduction
This scenario is presented as one plausible future for the post-Kyoto regime. There
are several intentions behind developing this scenario. The first is to present the
key ideas in a reader-friendly manner. For this purpose, we have tried to make the
narration simple and bold, and have illustrated it with hypothetical events and
agreements.
The second intention is to challenge the conventional wisdom. In this case, the con-
ventional wisdom is that the future climate regime must be a continuation of a bind-
ing cap regime and emissions trading systems. This is often viewed as a “natural”
development, since they are regarded as the major characteristics of the existing
Kyoto regime. However, upon closer examination, a very different path could natu-
Technology
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rally develop from the current set of circumstances. Both the binding cap regime and
the emissions trading system are still subject to testing in practice and they may not
turn out to be environmentally effective in the end. On the other hand, there are
signs suggesting that activities among like-minded parties on technological devel-
opment and diffusion may become key pillars of the post-Kyoto regime.1
In Sections 2 through 5 below, we narrate the emergence of this scenario, from the
stagnation of current negotiations to emergence, regionalization and institutionaliza-
tion of technology-centred agreements, to eventual reunifications of the technology-
centred and the cap-centred approaches. Section 6 summarizes this progression in
diagrammatic form. Possible bifurcations of the scenario are assessed in Section 7,
followed by a concluding discussion in Section 8.
2. Stagnation of UNFCCC negotiations in the post-Kyoto
period and emergence of activities among like-minded
parties (up to 2005)
Our scenario begins with the description of two past trends that serve as precursors
to future changes. The first is the continued difficulty in achieving global consensus
on the best approach to mitigation, embodied in the stalemate at COP-10 over the
UNFCCC negotiations for the post-Kyoto Period. The second trend is the emer-
gence of activities among like-minded countries for development and diffusion of
renewable energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and energy conservation tech-
nologies.
2.1 Stagnation of negotiations for the post-Kyoto period in the
UNFCCC 
COP-10, held in Buenos Aires in 2005, exemplified how difficult the post-Kyoto
negotiation process under the UNFCCC has become. While the EU and Japan
tried to create an arena for the post-Kyoto negotiations with full participation, the
U.S. refused to join. The consequent decision on the post-Kyoto framework was
very weak and meant little. The decision, titled Seminar of Governmental Experts
(SOGE), reads: “Without prejudices to any future negotiations, commitments,
process, framework or mandate under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the
Conference of the Parties requests the secretariat to convene a seminar of
Governmental Experts (SOGE) in order to promote an informal exchange of
information on a) Actions relating to mitigation and adaptation to assist Parties to
continue to develop effective and appropriate responses to climate change; and b)
Policies and measures adopted by their respective governments that support
implementation of their existing commitments under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.”2 The nego-
tiation intended to begin the process of the U.S. participation under UNFCCC
revealed that it was hampered from the very first step.
1 This paper is the elaboration of the Orchestra of Treaties Scenario (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005)
with a focus on the technology cooperation.
2 The decision is available at http://www.unfccc.int.
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Major developing countries, as usual, did not show any sign of willingness to take
on binding caps in the near future. They argued that developed countries bear
responsibility for their past emissions, and their current per capita emissions are
much higher than those of developing countries. Developed countries argued that
emissions from developing countries will make up half of global emissions in the
near future, hence developing countries have to take on caps. Developing coun-
tries have been increasingly careful and uncooperative in negotiating any issues,
such as submission of national communications and implementing CDM at a sec-
tor level, that developed countries might take advantage of to bring developing
countries into the binding cap regime.
2.2 European activities for renewable energy
On the other hand, there have been activities among like-minded countries for key
climate technologies without official legal linkages to the UNFCCC.
As a first example, European countries have been promoting renewable energy
technologies, particularly wind power, since the 1990s. There have been institu-
tional arrangements to create niche markets collectively, including EU directives
with targets and timetables3 and the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition
(JREC) for cooperation with developing countries.4
The key drivers of this political development include rich wind resources, land
availability, popular political support, and support by domestic manufacturers of
wind turbines. Coalitions among socialist and green governments were supportive
of wind energy in 1990s. They have successfully fostered the growth of wind turbine
manufacturers and operators. Once domestic manufacturers were established, it was
possible for governments to argue that the costs for the new technologies were not
necessarily burdensome to their economies because the manufacturers con-
tributed to job creation (Michaelowa 2005b).
While the consequences of European wind power development remain to be seen,
we argue that this is at least a good trial. If successful, the costs of wind power will
be brought down and the technology will be readily marketable to any country. The
rest of the world will benefit enormously by installing low-cost, clean and proven
technology. Even if not successful, it provides important lessons to the rest of the
world. What have the barriers been? Are the costs of the technology intrinsically
high, after all these efforts? Are there formidable “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” problems
with wind turbines, as it was heatedly debated in the journal Der Spiegel in 2004 in
Germany? Are the windmills not socially acceptable since they disturb the landscape,
create noise, and kill birds? Is intermittence the problem? Is the lack of wind
resources a problem? If some countries are confident that they can overcome 
3 It seems that the target and timetable approach is more popular in European environmental policy-
making than in the rest of the world. Targets for renewables are examples, and there have been
binding caps for SOx, NOx, and other air pollutants in the acid rain regime, not to mention the
binding cap for greenhouse gas emissions.
4 EU countries are not the only ones promoting wind power. For example, the U.S. is the third biggest
country in terms of megawatts installed. In the U.S., support for wind power began earlier (in the
1970s), but has been unstable at both the federal and state levels leading to stagnation in deploy-
ment. The narration here is simplified for readability.
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the key barriers, they can launch their own new programs. If, unfortunately, it
turns out that one of the barriers is too high and not possible to overcome, the rest
of the world, particularly developing countries, will not have to repeat the test by
themselves, and can change their focus to other technologies.
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg,
European countries tried to extend their target-and-timetable approach to the rest of
the world, but the proposal was not accepted by other countries. The European con-
tingent changed their “one-size-fits-all” approach at the subsequent Renewables 2004
conference hosted by the German government at Bonn. The Bonn conference has
been successful in facilitating dialogue among developed and developing countries on
renewable energy, but there has been no sign that the target-and-timetable approach
will be accepted by the rest of the world in the foreseeable future.
However, from the technological development perspective, global coherence in
policy is perhaps neither necessary nor productive. European countries can pro-
vide a sufficiently large niche market for technology by themselves. Expanding the
size to the global scale is neither politically infeasible nor significantly beneficial to
the technological development of nascent technologies. The lessons of case stud-
ies on environmental technology policies indicate that one big country is usually
enough to provide a niche market in which technologies can be nurtured from
laboratory curiosity to marketable product. See the appendix for further details of
this line of reasoning.
2.3 Initiatives for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies
In the U.S. and other countries, research, development and demonstration of carbon
capture and storage technologies (CCS) have been promoted first by the IEA-
GHG program, and then by the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF).
Also, the IPCC has been working on a special report concerning CCS to be pub-
lished by the end of 2005.
CCS provides another interesting opportunity to create niche markets for one of
the key nascent climate technologies. Big fossil fuel producers, companies and
countries alike, are becoming aware that they face the risk of not being able to con-
tinue fossil fuel production without CCS technologies that recover CO2 from
emissions and store them underground in geological reservoirs.
Having common ground, the actions taken by countries are various. In Norway,
carbon taxes motivated Statoil to capture CO2 at Sleipner gas field (Sæverud and
Moe 2005). In the U.S., enhanced oil recovery (EOR) technology contributed to
the development of CCS technologies, and the Bush administration has launched
the FutureGen program to cut the costs down to a level acceptable to markets. The
international extension of this activity is named the Carbon Sequestration
Leadership Forum (CSLF), and more than 20 parties have signed on to this non-
binding information exchange body. Australia, with rich coal resources, has also
been interested in this technology and has hosted a series of international work-
shops, including the IEA Zero Emission Technologies (ZETS) conference in 2004.
Saudi Arabia, on behalf of OPEC countries, has repeatedly supported collective
efforts to develop this technology in plenary speeches at UNFCCC conferences.
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The key political characteristic of this technology is that it enables the world to pre-
vent climate change without changing the current fossil-fuel-dependent industrial
structure and lifestyle. While this feature is recognized as a merit by CCS propo-
nents, it is also a source of irritation for those who believe that changing current
industrial structure and lifestyle should be the key part of climate change preven-
tion (Sugiyama 2000; Anderson 2004).
Potential barriers to CCS technology include high costs and a large energy penalty,
as well as possible leakage of stored CO2, and acidification of the local environ-
ment. Typical estimates show that current costs are typically US$20–70 per tonne
of CO2 with 20 per cent to 30 per cent of total energy output required to capture
the CO2 from flue gases (IEA GHG 2003; IEG GHG 2004). It remains to be seen
if the barriers can be successfully overcome by significantly changing the design of
facilities. Candidates include Integrated Gasified Combined Cycle (IGCC) tech-
nology, which separates CO2 at the pre-combustion stage.
It makes sense for the U.S., Australia, Germany, China, India and other fossil-fuel-
rich countries—particularly those with high dependence on coal—to develop
CCS technologies because their fossil fuel producing industries are facing the risk
of losing their lucrative businesses if climate change is strongly addressed in the
future. Fossil fuel resources are estimated to be abundant to the extent that the
atmospheric concentration of CO2 could be raised far beyond 1,000 ppm.5 Similar
to the wind power case in Europe, framing the issue as the matter of CCS techno-
logical development would make it possible to mobilize resources in these coun-
tries because the policy would be perceived as making their national economy
robust—not as a mere burden to their economy, as emission caps are often per-
ceived.
2.4 International cooperation for energy conservation
In Asia, there have been many technology cooperation activities aimed at energy
conservation. For example, Japan has programs to exchange personnel and infor-
mation and to demonstrate technologies with China and other Asian countries
through government-affiliated organizations such as the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development Organization (NEDO), the Energy Conservation Center of Japan,
and others. Also, there have been other international activities intended to pro-
mote energy conservation in Asia and other countries, as well as funding from
multilateral agencies for efficiency policies, programs and investments. While not
all of them have been successful, important lessons have been accumulated.
Most countries have developed energy efficiency policies since the 1970s, and
many have constantly strengthened them. They did this because the policies were
perceived to contribute to their energy security. Later, climate change was added as
another reason to further strengthen such activities. However, the major drivers
for energy efficiency policy remained energy security and domestic economic con-
cerns, not climate change.
5 See (Metz et al. 2001) for example for the estimates of the fossil fuel resources.
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The range of successful policies and programs is broad. Energy efficiency stan-
dards and labelling for electric appliances and automobiles have proven to be
effective in eliminating poor performance equipment out of the markets.
Standards for buildings, while more difficult to implement, have also proven
worthwhile. Governmental procurement programs have helped to create markets
for high-performance equipment. Demand-side management programs and fiscal
and tax measures have been used, often with significant results.
Having recognized the effectiveness of such policies, there have been many inter-
national activities that aim at facilitating their design and implementation in
developing countries. Examples include the Collaborative Labeling and Appliance
Standards Program (CLASP) network that provides information, expertise and
technical assistance to governments that are interested in establishing efficiency
standards and labelling systems. Their success has been remarkable, and indicates
one way in which international society can effectively address energy efficiency.
For example, CLASP contributed to the implementation of efficiency standards
for 11 appliances and efficiency labels for eight appliances in China. The energy
savings accrued from these activities are estimated to be equivalent to nine per
cent of projected residential consumption in China in 2010.6 The cost effective-
ness, in terms of energy saving per unit of external funding for the activity, is esti-
mated to be roughly as low as several per cent of the CDM credit price.
Recent development in Chinese automobile fuel-economy (efficiency) regulation
is another impressive example. In China, fuel-economy standards have been set for
the target years 2005 and 2008. The 2008 standards are slightly more stringent
than those of the U.S. Furthermore, the 2008 standard for sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) is more stringent than that of Japan, and probably anywhere else in the
world (China Automotive Technology & Research Center 2003; Sauer and
Wellington 2004). The key driver is the concern over increasing oil imports, or
energy security in short. The U.S.-based Energy Foundation (EF) provided part of
the funding for the technical work necessary for developing the regulation. This
case illustrates clearly that (1) there are strong incentives for energy conservation
in key developing countries; (2) international cooperation is important for devel-
oping countries to implement policy and measures; and (3) there is no need to
mention climate change in order to cut emissions arising from energy use.
In principle, most governments understand that energy efficiency improvement
contributes to multiple benefits, ranging from energy security to economic effi-
ciency, pollution reduction and climate change prevention. However, political
attention and resource allocation have rarely been enough to consistently imple-
ment energy efficiency policies on the ground. Many countries lack dedicated
institutions with the scientific expertise and industrial participation that are nec-
essary to regularly update standards and labels and monitor compliance. Often,
there is only a handful of staff in charge of the whole of energy efficiency policy
for a developing country. It will be important to draw attention to the need to
strengthen the institutions of energy efficiency policy and to enhance their activi-
ties through international cooperation.
6 See the CLASP Web site (http://www.clasponline.org) for further information.
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Other modes of technology cooperation will be important, but their roles will be
complementary to the policy assistance above. There have been many cases of tech-
nology demonstration projects that have not resulted in the diffusion of the targeted
technologies, due to lack of appropriate market analysis or appropriate environ-
mental regulation (Ohshita 2002). Personnel training and exchange programs have
generally met their own internal goals, but their effectiveness is generally difficult to
measure in quantitative terms such as energy or CO2 reductions. For an interna-
tional framework to be widely supported, it seems important that both actions (e.g.,
persons trained, standards set) and outcomes (energy reductions, CO2 reductions)
are measurable. Assisting the implementation of policies and measures, particularly
energy efficiency standards, has a good record in this regard.
3. Regionalization of the Kyoto Protocol and institutional-
ization of like-minded activities (2005–2008)
Our scenario now enters the future, which we illustrate with hypothetical, but
plausible events. This stage is characterized by two key events:
1. Post-Kyoto negotiations under the UNFCCC become radicalized under the
Montreal Mandate and the Bonn Protocol, which are concluded with strong
binding targets that apply to developed countries alone.
2. Non-EU countries, after opting out of the Montreal Mandate process, begin
institutionalizing their own international activities. Japan and Asian develop-
ing countries conclude an “Energy Conservation Agreement,” and the U.S.
and several fossil-fuel-rich countries conclude a “Carbon Capture and Storage
Agreement.” These agreements are mutually recognized under the overarch-
ing “General Agreement on Climate Technology (GACT).”
3.1 Montreal Mandate: Radical greening of post-Kyoto negotiation
In November 2005, negotiation on the post-Kyoto regime begins among the sig-
natories to the Kyoto Protocol at COP/MOP-1 held in Montreal, Canada. The
negotiation is mostly led by the EU in the absence of the U.S. With increasing pres-
sure from Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), the negotiation becomes radically in
favour of strong unilateral actions by developed countries to cut emissions quickly.
Finally, two decisions are adopted:
a) The Montreal Mandate: Developed countries will take binding caps in the
commitment period from 2013 to 2017. The caps will be negotiated and
adopted at COP/MOP-3 in 2007. Developing countries will not be required to
take on binding caps.
b) The binding caps in item (a) will be negotiated in accordance with the target
of stabilizing global atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450 ppm in order
to limit global average temperature increase to less than 2°C.
Items (a) and (b) have the potential to be adopted since they reflect the positions
of some key actors at recent negotiations. Item (a) is a replica of what was adopted
at Berlin in 1995. It was named the Berlin Mandate, which set the key structures,
i.e., targets and timetable for developed countries alone, of the Kyoto Protocol
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adopted in 1997. Many developing countries made it clear at COP-10 that such a
clear safeguard at the beginning of the negotiation is the prerequisite to begin the
negotiation on any future binding caps. Item (b), the ambitious global concentra-
tion target, was the position expressed by several European institutions, including
the European Council (1996) and the WBGU (2003). ENGOs widely celebrated
the decisions because items (a) and (b) are basically copies of proposals put for-
ward to date by many ENGOs.
3.2 Bonn Protocol: Regionalization of the Kyoto Protocol
The negotiation under the Montreal Mandate begins, but it immediately turns out
to be very difficult. With the 450 ppm ceiling, the binding caps required for devel-
oped countries are very ambitious. For developing countries, it is obvious that the
caps will be tightened up in the near future once they join the group with binding
caps. Against this backdrop, developing countries become much more careful in
negotiating any issues that might be taken advantage of by the developed countries
to bring developing countries to the binding cap regime.
Canada and Australia hope to secure extremely loose accounting rules for terres-
trial sinks. However, the prospects turn hopeless in the face of strong pressures
from the EU, supported by ENGOs. Eventually, the two countries opt out of the
negotiation, citing many reasons such as the non-participation of the U.S. and
developing countries. Japan also feels uncomfortable negotiating what seems
infeasible in her eyes, and she opts out. The new protocol is concluded at Bonn in
COP/MOP-3, but the membership for the binding cap regime is limited to
European countries, Russia and Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine exert strong leverage
in the negotiations as the last non-EU developed country members and succeed in
securing another round of hot air under the new protocol. Critics declare that the
shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol are aggravated in the new protocol.
3.3 Energy Conservation Agreement
In parallel with the negotiations under the Montreal Mandate, there are two nego-
tiations on like-minded activities emerging. Japan, with skepticism of the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the process under the Montreal Mandate, announces
that she will begin negotiation on an “Energy Conservation Agreement” that aims
at strengthening the policies and measures of participating East Asian countries.
They conclude an agreement in 2007:
a) [Commitment of Actions] Countries commit to stipulate, monitor and peri-
odically revise energy conservation policies and measures such as laws and
standards.
b) [Commitment of Outcomes] Countries set quantitative targets as a measure of
the actions in the item (a) above. The targets can be sector- or technology-spe-
cific. The nature of targets are voluntary and complementary to item (a) above.
c) [Pledge and Review] The policies and measures, as well as the complementary
targets of (a) and (b) above are subject to a voluntary pledge and review system.
d) [Fund] The “Energy Conservation Fund” is established to assist the imple-
mentation of policies and measures in item (a) above.
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e) [Contributions] Payments into the fund are voluntary, but Japan announces
it will pay US$50 million annually for the coming several years.
The agreement is based upon the increasing understanding of the national inter-
ests detailed below.
For Japan, there are six national interests in promoting energy efficiency policies
and measures in East Asia: 1) Energy security. Less energy consumption in devel-
oping countries eases competition for sources of supply; 2) Regional security.
Territorial disputes are often related to mineral resources. Energy conservation
would moderate the potential for such disputes. To cooperate on the common
agenda would contribute to mutual trust; 3) Market development for highly effi-
cient equipment. Japanese manufacturers will benefit; 4) Incentives for more
ambitious efficiency policies in Japan. With the expectation that Asian countries
will follow suit in future, ambitious efficiency policies would be welcomed by pol-
icy-makers and manufacturers; 5) Climate change mitigation; and 6) Trans-bound-
ary air pollution mitigation.
For developing countries, there are at least six national interests. 1) Economic effi-
ciency. Energy efficiency improvement is a key element of productivity and con-
tributes to the economic efficiency of the economy as a whole; 2) Development of
the market for globally-competitive equipment. China and Southeast Asian coun-
tries have used the international system as a vehicle to train and modernize their
industries. A notable example is their willingness to participate in the WTO,
despite the challenges to some domestic economic sectors; 3) Energy security.
China, Korea and some Southeast Asian countries are dependent upon imported
oil; 4) Regional security; 5) Pollution prevention; and 6) Climate change mitigation.
Some of these national interests have been present for decades, but some are new,
and the importance of energy efficiency policy is constantly increasing, given
burgeoning economic development, energy consumption growth, mounting
environmental concerns and territorial tensions in the region. The time seems
ripe for further enhancing regional cooperation on policies and measures for
energy efficiency that fit well with the national interests of all sides.
3.4 Carbon Capture and Storage Agreement 
Another activity is spurred with the approval of the IPCC’s special report on CCS.
Developed countries with rich fossil fuel resources, such as the U.S., Australia,
Germany, Norway and Canada, recognize the approval as a “green light” for the
technology, which was sometimes seen as heretical.
Increasing numbers of countries begin supporting CCS technology by treating it
on par with renewable energy resources. By 2008, some governments introduce
feed-in-tariff or subsidies for CCS at the same levels as those afforded to renew-
able energy supplies, while other governments credit CCS under zero-emission
portfolio standard (ZPS) regulations, which is an expansion of renewable energy
portfolio standard (RPS) regulations.
Several groups promote this institutionalization. The first group is power produc-
ers and consumers who think the supporting measures for renewable energy are
very costly and who are looking for cheaper alternatives. The second group is
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composed of fossil fuel energy producers that want to sell more fuel. The third one
includes equipment manufacturers that want to sell CCS facilities. The fourth group
is made up of those environmental NGOs that view CCS technology positively.7
Such a coalition of actors promotes institutionalization of CCS activities at both
domestic and international levels in cooperation with existing international net-
works such as the CSLF and the IEA-GHG programs. The activities culminate in
the conclusion of the “Carbon Capture and Storage Agreement” at Queensland in
Australia in 2008.8
3.5 General agreements for climate technologies (GACT)
Japan, after opting out of the Montreal Mandate process, immediately wants inter-
national legitimacy for her like-minded activities for energy conservation. Canada
and Australia aspire to the same, and they have become active promoters of CCS
technologies. In 2006, they will jointly announce to intensively negotiate and con-
clude an alternative global framework which, they think, is more environmentally
effective than the Montreal Mandate process.
They first seek recognition under the UNFCCC, but it turns out not to be feasible.
Their activities are critically perceived as being out of malintention to avoid bind-
ing caps. Then, they choose to create another global umbrella treaty under which
they mutually recognize their activities. The pact, the “General Agreement for
Climate Technology (GACT),” is concluded in 2008 among the non-EU developed
countries. China and India join it, attracted by the assistance to the energy effi-
ciency policy.
The key elements of the GACT include:
• [Ministerial meetings] Keep political salience of climate technology. For this
purpose, periodical gatherings of ministers are to be held.
• [Get the signals rights to the players] Instead of articulating the goal in terms
of temperature and concentrations, concerning which high scientific uncer-
tainty remains, countries articulate the need for technological innovation and
diffusion to prevent climate change. Signatories share the common goal to
shift to “near-zero CO2” energy systems that consist of renewable, CCS and
nuclear technologies on the supply side and high energy efficiency equipment
and systems on the demand side.
• [Pledge and review of the commitments] Countries, or groups of like-minded
countries, pledge the commitments. They can be legally binding, or negotiated
among a group of countries if its members agree. Periodic reviews of the
commitments help keep countries on the track whether they are on the track.
7 The current views of environmental NGOs regarding CCS technology are mixed. For example,
Anderson (2004) provides a cautious view without rejecting it a priori.
8 The author chose Queensland because the Australian government has shown strong interest in the
carbon sequestration technology and invited an IEA conference to Queensland in 2004.
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• [Legitimize like-minded activities] There are many ways to legitimize activi-
ties. Easiest is to register the activity or to prepare a joint international decla-
ration. Further strengthened versions of this would make some key targets
legally-binding.
GACT is not intended to have teeth in its early stages, but rather to increase the
political salience of international climate technology cooperation and legitimize
like-minded activities. Providing legitimacy will help these regional activities to
secure more stable and larger amounts of resources within the region. Any national
or regional technological programs have volatility, since all programs are subject
to constantly changing constellations of domestic political forces. The role of
international agreements is to smooth out this uncertainty by making activities
subject to open and unanimous agreement among signatories. Creating stable
political support is important for any serious technological development invest-
ments from the private sector.
Another key idea of the GACT is that currently commercial technologies alone are
not enough to prevent climate change in the long run. Therefore, parties agree to
develop new technologies and to cut the costs to meet the environmental chal-
lenge. There have been like-minded cooperative activities on technology already
but they are less attended in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, whose major focus
has been the cap-and-trade systems.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the pledge-and-review systems, key
actions and outcomes would have to be measurable. Examples of measurable
actions include enacting laws, adopting standards and labelling programs, and
establishing fiscal incentives to improve energy efficiency. Estimates of reductions
in energy use and CO2 emissions would serve as the quantitative measures of out-
comes. For CCS and renewable energy policies, stipulating laws (such as RPS and
feed-in-tariffs) or amounts of subsidies can be considered a measure of actions,
and installed capacities and unit cost reductions can be a measure of outcomes.
Measuring both actions and outcomes are important for at least two reasons. On
one hand, measuring actions alone makes it difficult to assess whether activities
are effective. On the other hand, putting too much emphasis on outcomes, partic-
ularly emission reductions, is inappropriate since it may limit the scope of eligible
activities, as has been experienced in the development of CDM (Sugiyama,
Yamaguchi and Yamagata 2005). Furthermore, measures of outcomes do not nec-
essarily have to be emission reductions. Technological targets may be more work-
able, depending on the nature of policies.
4. Reunification under the GACT (2008–2012)
The two events characterize this stage:
1. The GACT regime makes steady progress in energy conservation and CCS
activities.
2. The Bonn Protocol fades away. The key EU activities, including the EU
Emissions Trading System and renewable directives, are integrated in the
GACT.
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4.1 Steady progress in like-minded technology activities
In the annual meetings of the GACT, a mounting number of “actions,” which are
new laws, standards and other policies, for energy efficiency are reported. The esti-
mated emission reductions outpace those from the CDM. While total emissions
are increasing in most countries, the development of this institution is welcomed
as a good signal for change. Manufacturers increase their expectations of more-
stringent global energy efficiency regulation in the future. The progress of energy
conservation policy attracts interest from non-member developing countries,
which wish to improve their economic efficiency and global competitiveness, and
membership increases. Attracted by the record of success, increasing numbers of
developed countries with environmental concerns join the funding mechanism.
CCS technologies begin diffusing rapidly once niche markets for renewable energy
are extended to CCS technologies.9 By 2012, the long-term forecast of emission
reductions accrued from planned CCS projects exceeds that for wind and solar
power. Major fossil fuel producers exert their political clout to secure constant
governmental support for the technology, just like the wind-power manufacturers
did in Germany in the 1990s.
In Europe, renewable energy steadily grows despite some disruptions due to high
costs, noise and landscape problems. By 2012, wind power accounts for more than
10 per cent of power production in several countries. Biodiesel also accounts for
more than 10 per cent of fuel in the automobile sector in several countries. While
they still fall short of being the main supply source, their contributions are becom-
ing significant.
4.2 Bonn Protocol fades away – Kyoto Protocol becomes another
UNCTAD
Despite the ambition demonstrated at the conclusion of Montreal Mandate, the
carbon price in the Kyoto regime and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)
remains low for three reasons. First is the additional hot air allocated to Russia
under the Bonn Protocol. Second are the competitiveness concerns of companies
whose emissions are capped in the EU ETS. The price continues to stay under
US$30 per tonne of CO2, a price level too low to induce significant technological
change. The final reason is that the binding cap regime itself is unlikely to cover
the rest of the world after the Bonn Protocol. As a consequence, emissions do not
significantly decrease in the facilities covered by the EU ETS. The residential and
transport sectors, whose emissions have been increasing much faster than indus-
trial sectors, are not covered by the EU ETS, and they continue rising.
On the other hand, demand from developing countries is mounting. Annual
financial flows from the EU to developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol 
9 Typical cost estimates for CCS technologies range from US$20–70 per tonne of CO2 for power
plants (IEA GHG 2004). This translates to US¢1.70 to 5.94 per kWh for a typical coal power plant,
assuming a net efficiency of 40 per cent and an emissions factor of 1.08 Mt-C/Mtoe (EDMC 2005).
The cost range is below that of renewable energies in many situations and emission reductions
accrued from a single project are typically much more than renewable energy projects.
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increases up to US$1 billion annually by 2010, and is expected to be US$5 billion
annually in the commitment period of the Bonn Protocol.10
The Kyoto and Bonn Protocols become unpopular given the two developments
above. They are recognized as largely ineffective in cutting emissions, and mount-
ing financial flows to developing countries are denounced by EU taxpayers. As a
consequence, negotiations for a further commitment period of the Bonn Protocol,
initiated in 2010, fail to set targets for EU countries, and they become inactive in
the UNFCCC.
There is a precedent for a UN process that faded away through the reluctance of
developed countries after articulating many nice declarations. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established to make the
trade regime more equitable. The activity culminated at the adoption of a “New
International Economic Order” in 1974, where developing countries demanded
that developed countries remove the barriers for commodity imports from devel-
oping countries, and that they increase the share of industrial output by develop-
ing countries to 25 per cent of the global total, and so forth. However, developed
countries have quietly retreated from the activities since then and they successfully
strengthened another trade framework—the GATT and then the WTO, where
developed countries were more comfortable (Nester 2001). Developing countries
had no choice but to join the WTO regime later.
4.3 Reunification under the GACT
Now that the European countries realize that the binding cap is not the only way
forward, they reconsider their policies. The Bonn Protocol is so unpopular that the
global cap-and-trade system seems likely never to continue. Emissions trading sys-
tems seem to have achieved modest, though not remarkable, success. Renewable
policy turns out to be successful in developing technologies. Ironically, it turns out
that the successful elements—policies to promote renewables and emissions trad-
ing—are like-minded-type activities and fit well with the concept of the GACT.
European countries realize that they need to legitimize the regional activities if
they discontinue the Bonn Protocol, just like non-EU countries did after opting out
of the Kyoto Protocol. They choose to join the GACT, so they can explain that their
counterparts around the globe—particularly the U.S.—are making efforts compa-
rable to the EU, hence they can secure support for their domestic policies. EU
emissions trading and renewable policies are welcomed as the part of the GACT,
as policies that address diffusion and demonstration of the technology-deploy-
ment process, respectively.
10 There are two channels of financial flows from developed to developing countries in the Kyoto and
Bonn Protocols, i.e., either direct, or indirect via CDM. Through direct channels, developing coun-
tries requested several billion dollars of funding at COP-7. As a consequence, several developed
countries pledged to finance US$470 million to the three funds established by the Marrakesh
Accord. In this scenario, it increases up to US$1 billion annually under the Bonn Protocol. The
indirect channel can be as much as US$4 billion if countries continue CDM with ambitious bind-
ing targets for developed countries. For example, China emits about four billion tonnes of green-
house gases annually. If 10 per cent of emissions are cut through CDM and the average CO2 price
is US$10, it means US$4 billion dollars annually would be transferred to China alone.
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5. Further development under the GACT (2012 and after)
The main events that characterize this stage are:
1. Some technologies make significant progress, and technology policies are
understood to be not in conflict with economic growth. Successful technolo-
gies and policies diffuse across the world.
2. Commitments by countries under the GACT become more ambitious and
binding. After building confidence in the effectiveness of individual policies
and measures to cut emissions, countries begin agreeing upon ambitious
binding caps at the national level.
5.1 Technology policies are demonstrated and diffused
Development of CCS policies and emissions trading systems in the U.S.
The costs of CCS technology continue to fall, given support comparable to that for
renewable energies. By 2012, half of the planned new power facilities in the U.S.
incorporate CCS technologies.
The diffusion of CCS technologies creates a political atmosphere that enables
reconsideration of domestic energy and environmental policy in the U.S.
Eventually, the emissions trading system is adopted at the federal level for large
power plants and factories in 2012. The story here replicates what happened to
SOx regulatory policy in the U.S. The availability of an affordable SOx scrubber
and centralized monitoring of real-time emissions data from power plant stacks
were the prerequisites for seriously negotiating alternative regulatory frameworks
and eventually led to the SOx emissions trading systems.11
Like the EU, the price level remains as low as US$20 per tonne of CO2 due to com-
petitiveness concerns. With this price level, emissions grow more slowly than in
the past, but they do not decline. More emissions are cut by the “Zero-Emissions
Portfolio Standard (ZEPS),” that mandates power producers to hold certain shares
of zero emissions sources, either renewables or CCS, in their power plant portfo-
lio.12
Internationalization of the U.S. climate policies
The development of domestic regulations described above simultaneously creates
pressure on the U.S. government to push the rest of the world to take on similar 
11 We assume that the development of CCS technologies will lead to cap-and-trade systems, since the
politics would resemble that of SOx regulations once affordable CCS technologies become avail-
able. In the U.S., the discussion of the mandatory installation of SOx scrubbers brought about a
division in the utility industry. Power producers with high-sulfur coal pushed for mandatory instal-
lation so that the costs of SOx regulation would be the same for their competitors. Power producers
with low-sulfur coal opposed the idea. The unified coalition against any regulation was thus bro-
ken, and the cap-and-trade systems were introduced as a consequence (Sugiyama 2000).
12 One should not harbour unrealistic expectations of the environmental effectiveness of the cap-
and-trade system. The record of the SOx emissions trading systems of the U.S. is that the price level
was too low for power producers to equip plants with high-performance (90 per cent or more emis-
sions reduction) SOx scrubbers. Ironically, they are widely installed in Japan under the negotiated
agreement scheme. A novel policy instrument is not necessarily environmentally effective.
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regulations. Cap-and-trade systems are promoted and a “Group of Emission
Markets (GEMs)” system appears (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005). In GEMs, coun-
tries implement emission market systems in each country or region while retain-
ing control over their respective total amounts of emissions as their sovereign
right. Instead of having a unified market across the world with a single emissions
“currency,” which is politically infeasible, they keep their own markets and negotiate
target price levels, and then begin gradual harmonization of the market structures,
such as accounting rules for sinks and project-based activities. Some emissions-
trading companies try to forcefully expand the U.S. system abroad. They succeed
at the NAFTA level, but they fail to expand it to the rest of the world (Vogel
1995).13
Another track of the internationalization of U.S. climate policy is the promotion
of CCS technologies. The manufacturers are interested in selling their CCS facilities
and push the government strongly. The mandatory installation of CCS technologies
expands to NAFTA countries first, then many other countries are mandated to
install CCS equipment. Developing countries are granted a grace period and some
aid is provided by developed countries.
This scenario is a replica of what happened under the Ozone Depleting Substances
(ODS) regime. Under the ODS regime, manufacturers that developed the key sub-
stitutes for ODSs, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), pushed for a global treaty that
would eliminate CFCs in developed countries. Developing countries were granted
a grace period and some aid was provided by developed countries through a ded-
icated fund. This precedent demonstrates that once a couple of strong companies
find special interest in promoting environmental equipment, they can mobilize
governments in coalition with environmental groups.
With the development of CCS technologies, hydrogen becomes available at an
affordable cost, and it becomes a policy fashion to introduce Zero Emissions
Vehicle (ZEV) standards.14 While the costs of fuel cells remain very high, hydro-
gen gas engine vehicles begin to diffuse in California and many other U.S. states,
then at the federal level, and in EU countries (U.S. DOE 2004).15
Renewables steadily increase their share and costs are brought down. While their
growth rate is very high, the share of wind, solar and biomass altogether in the
energy supply systems remain less than 10 per cent in most countries. With the cli-
mate benefits recognized, nuclear power revives again and begins increasing its
share in the 2010s in countries where public communication succeeds.16
13 Environmental policies adopted in strong countries tend to be “exported” to the rest of the eco-
nomic community. This tendency, called “trading-up,” is stronger in more integrated communities
(e.g., NAFTA) than in loose ones (e.g., the WTO).
14 Conceptually, ZEV regulation mandates auto makers to produce a certain share of zero emissions
vehicles (electricity or hydrogen) out of their total sales. There have been many variations of ZEV
regulations debated so far.
15 Hydrogen gas engine vehicles are not difficult to develop and are expected be the first generation
of hydrogen vehicles, once hydrogen supply systems become available.
16 An emission scenario in the U.K. white paper illustrated the revival of nuclear power as a major
contributor to a projected 60 per cent GHG emissions reduction by 2050 (UK DTI 2003). Massive
emissions cuts are possible if nuclear revives.
Technology
49
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 49
5.2 Deeper Institutionalization under the GACT
While the GACT began as voluntary in nature, emerging industrial interest groups
change it to become more ambitious and stringent. Most of those who have the
best technologies are giant firms, hence influential when they mobilize their finan-
cial and political clout in domestic policy and international negotiations. They
have direct interests in higher energy efficiency standards, more niche markets for
CCS technologies, and more niche markets for renewable energy. They all have
benefited from policies enhanced under the GACT regime.
By 2018, the GACT mandates installation of CCS in all participating countries.
This affects other technology areas. Renewable and energy efficiency policies are
also becoming binding. Price levels and accounting systems of the GEM are con-
stantly being negotiated too. Many climate technologies become more affordable
under the GACT regime and cutting CO2 emissions becomes an ordinary part of
life. The shadow price implied by technology policies within the GACT and car-
bon prices in the GEMs, which were far apart in 2008, move closer. Eventually, in
2030, key countries—the largest 20 emitters plus like-minded countries—agree
upon binding targets and timetables with strong enforcement systems, which had
been dreamed of when the countries negotiated at COP-3 in Kyoto.
6. Graphical representation of technology policy dynamics
in the scenario
This section provides a summary of the technology policy dynamics in the sce-
nario narrated in the previous sections.
In the scenario, the framing of issues and the policy framework are totally differ-
ent from the Kyoto Protocol (Table 1). Once the issue is framed as technology,
countries perceived agreements serving their own national interests.
Table 1. Reframing the issue and policy from the Kyoto Protocol to the GACT
Kyoto Protocol Future Framework
Framing of the issue Capping total amount of emissions Drastic change of energy system
Policy framework Allocating allowances R&D and diffusion of technology
Consequence Battle over allowances. International cooperation for mutual 
Distrust, inefficiency interests
In our scenario, the turning point of the reframing is the radical decisions known
as the Montreal Mandate. Non-EU countries develop like-minded activities, and
seek an alternative global framework.
The activities would be politically stable since they are identified by the convening
countries to be compatible with their respective national interests and resource
endowments (Figure 1).
For technologies at all stages of development, there are appropriate roles for gov-
ernment (IEA 2000). For prospective technologies, direct funding of R&D and
demonstration projects with public-private partnership for specific technologies
are appropriate. As the technologies mature, niche market creation serves to bring
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costs down and to foster markets. When markets do form, creating fair competi-
tion with internalization of the social costs in the market is appropriate. Political
support and feedback from market stakeholders are important for efficient tech-
nology policy-making. (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of like-minded technology activities under the GACT
JREC: Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition, CSLF: Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum,
APEC: Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Figure 2. Dynamics of technology policies 
PPP: public-private partnership VA: voluntary agreement ETS: emissions trading systems
The stages addressed by each agreement under the GACT differ depending on the
nature and stage of the technology. Agreements on nascent technologies like
renewables and CCS technologies would focus more on R&D and demonstration.
NuclearStage
Government
role
Policy
instruments
Price
level
Scope
R&D
Subsidies,
PPP
Regulation,
subsidies
Deployment
Niche market
creation
High (>US$30/tCO2)
Scale of activities
Market
transformation
Specific technology
Regulation,
VA, ETS
Economy
Low
Market signals and political support
Dissemin tion
Subsidies
Carbon Capture Energy Efficiency
Wind rich countries
EU directives, JREC, etc.
Fossil fuel 
rich countries
CSLF, etc.
Countries with fragile 
access to energy
APEC, CLASP, etc.
Wind
European Union United States, Australia Japan, China
Technology
51
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 51
The Energy Conservation Agreement for appliances and boilers would focus more
on diffusion, given the maturity of those technologies and the short lifecycles of
such equipment. Cap-and-trade systems are dedicated to the diffusion stage only.
One aim of the GACT is to create a set of policy incentives at the international level
so that all stages are appropriately addressed.
The technological development envisaged in the GACT enables developing countries
to follow suit. For the time being, developing countries concentrate on no-regrets
policy such as energy conservation. In the future, however, when technologies have
matured and costs are brought down, developing countries will also use those
options (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Schematic diagram for CO2 emissions of a hypothetical developing
country
Such efforts, if successful, can lead to energy systems that are free of carbon emis-
sions. It is possible to create such energy systems with known technologies alone.
It should be remembered that such a change is not possible by shrinking the size
of current energy systems, but is only possible through drastic changes in the energy
systems. A rough illustration of the goal is useful in communicating this view
(Figure 4). On the supply side, renewables, nuclear and fossil fuels with the CCS
technologies would be used. Electricity and hydrogen would be the energy carri-
ers. End uses would be highly efficient electric equipment and hydrogen gas
engines, as well as fuel cells.
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Figure 4. Schematic diagram of a hypothetical zero carbon emission energy 
system
7. Bifurcations of the scenario
There can be several bifurcations to our scenario. In this section, we discuss their
plausibility, political feasibility and environmental effectiveness.
7.1 Graduation and deepening
This scenario describes the future in which the binding cap regime will be steadily
strengthened after 2012. The binding caps get stronger (“deepening”) for devel-
oped countries and developing countries join the binding cap regime as they eco-
nomically develop (“graduation”) (Michaelowa et al. 2005). It might emerge if,
and only if, countries perceive climate change as having utmost importance and
put it high on the policy agenda—that is very far from the current political reality.
An unprecedented big event, such as catastrophe in the climate system in the U.S.,
would be necessary for such a scenario to emerge in the near future. As such, we
argue that the chances are low for the scenario.
7.2 Successful emissions trading systems 
The European Union’s emissions trading system (EU ETS) created a political fever
and attracted wide attention in the past couple of years. If the EU ETS is success-
ful in making massive emission cuts at a low cost as promised, the policy will be
copied by the rest of the developed world in the near future. An optimistic view in
this direction is provided by the Converging Market Scenario (Tangen and
Hasselknippe 2005).
However, there are caveats. First, the emissions trading systems need to be tested
in the real world to see whether they can actually deliver on the theoretical bene-
fits. Second, the lessons from precedence are mixed at best. There is no convincing
evidence that the SOx emissions trading system in the U.S. performed better than
Japanese regulatory systems that relied upon direct regulations and voluntary
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agreement. Third, it seems difficult to keep the price high due to competitiveness
concerns. If the price is not high, the impacts are limited. The emissions trading
systems may contribute to marginal emission cuts—some energy saving or fuel
switching in the industrial sector—but not further. The low price signal does not
have any impact in the residential and transport sectors in which emissions are ris-
ing much faster than in the industrial sector.
Nor does the low price lead to technological innovation. In order to develop the nas-
cent technologies, a high shadow price has to be attached by a dedicated policy.
There is a trade-off between the coverage of the policy instrument and the level of
shadow price created by it when the policy is put in practice. A high price signal
can be created if the target technology area is specified (e.g., the CCS, wind
power), but it is not possible if a wide range of economic activities are targeted
(e.g., ETS).
In summary, emissions trading systems could play some role, but overall effective-
ness is unknown and needs to be tested in the real world. Furthermore, while
emissions trading systems might be effective for large power plants and factories,
they cannot cut emissions from residential and transport sectors whose emissions
are rapidly rising.
7.3 Flexible UNFCCC negotiation
In our scenario, the radical turn of the negotiation by the Montreal Mandate was
the point of departure from the Kyoto Style regime. On this basis, we purposely
made the drastic assumption so that the storyline impresses readers. Alternatively,
the real world may be more subtle—and boring.
One can imagine a more “flexible” negotiation in the UNFCCC. In fact, there has
been some “flexibility” suggested by the EU already, including a sector-based cap,
non-binding cap, intensity-based cap, lax sink accounting rules and so on.
However, it seems that the EU is not yet ready to reconsider the key structure—
emphasis on binding caps—of the Kyoto regime. This attitude is seen in the latest
publication by the EU on the period after Kyoto (Commission of the European
Communities 2005).
Such a negotiation stance might secure some more participation, like Korea and
Turkey with loose targets, for example, but not major emitters such as the U.S.,
China and India. As such, what the critics describe as the shortcomings of the
Kyoto Protocol—limited coverage of global emissions and low carbon price—will
not disappear. There is a certain possibility that the post-Kyoto world may evolve
in this way. However, it will be far from promising since it will not fix any essen-
tial problems that the current Kyoto regime is facing. An irony of this bifurcation
is that without a clear departure point such as the Montreal Mandate in our sce-
nario, non-EU countries, such as Canada and Japan, may lose the reason to inno-
vate a new global framework. In this sub-scenario, a weak cap-and-trade regime
survives, but with little success in cutting emissions and technological develop-
ment, and with no hope for the future.
Alternatively, the continuation of the binding cap regime, despite all these short-
comings, could increase the awareness of climate change, promote policy and
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measures, and nurture the industrial interest groups. The question here is whether
the regime can survive until the moment when these activities mature and the
countries commit to ambitious targets with full participation. Binding caps could,
theoretically, foster all the changes. However, we do not think the chances are high
since weak targets mean low prices, hence it is doubtful that it will be a strong driver
for ambitious policy and measures. It would be better for a weak binding cap
regime to be flanked by strong like-minded technology activities. Then, the entire
regime looks similar to the GACT.
Such “flanking” activities could take place either within or outside of the UNFCCC.
The authors are pessimistic with the first approach since no progress has been
made in the past. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol was supposed to serve the pur-
pose of implementation of policy and measures (often referred to as PAMs)
including technology policies. However, there was simply a stalemate in the nego-
tiations. We understand that there was a problem with the institutional arrange-
ment. In the negotiation under the UNFCCC, cap-and-trade was the major focus
and then the negotiating style was hostile. This atmosphere contaminated all the
negotiation items through “package deal” practices at each conference. If a coun-
try had made a commitment out of good will on PAM, it would have been taken
as hostage at a later stage of negotiation. It was impossible to negotiate any ambi-
tious policy and measure in this atmosphere.
The negotiations outside the UNFCCC, such as the GACT negotiation in the sce-
nario, will have more chances to foster truly constructive international coopera-
tion. It can be negotiated among a limited number of like-minded countries at
first. Two levels of efforts seem necessary. The lower level is the development of a
like-minded (or regional) base, cooperation to develop the climate technologies
compatible with their national interests. The upper level is the development of the
global treaty to legitimize these activities. It is important to keep the upper level
cooperative—not adversarial. For this reason, it will be necessary to keep the struc-
ture non-binding at first, and make it gradually binding once countries can com-
fortably commit themselves.
There may be another sub-scenario. Once the GACT systems begin to grow out-
side the UNFCCC, the atmosphere of UNFCCC negotiations will also be affected.
The process may restructure itself to accommodate the technology activities.
There may be a chance then that the UNFCCC will be more flexible. A change
from inside would be more difficult given the institutional memory—but the
change may come from outside.
7.4 Lost political momentum or new green and greedy coalition
Environmental groups may be concerned that the political momentum will be lost
once the global binding cap regime is lost. However, it does not necessarily have to
be. The environmental movements will not disappear, but they will change their
style in the GACT.
Historically, environmental groups had a coalition with chemical manufacturers in
the ozone regime and it was successful in forging regulation. They formed a coali-
tion with windmill manufacturers and succeeded in setting targets and timetables
for the renewable share, and implementing a feed-in-tariff policy in Europe.
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In the GACT regime, there are three key coalitions formed by environmental con-
stituency—with renewable, energy conservation and the CCS industries. Such a
coalition is nothing new—actually, there have been a lot of precedent in environ-
mental policies. Furthermore, if certain environmental groups could work posi-
tively with nuclear industries, that would contribute much to mitigation.
In a nutshell, changing the regime structure certainly means a re-alignment of the
stakeholders for the environment, but it does not necessarily mean that the polit-
ical momentum to mitigate climate change will be lost. Continuation of the Kyoto
Protocol may be much easier to envisage, but choosing the right structure would
be more important in the long run. The scenario suggests possible re-alignment of
environmental groups for the technologies that were not their fancy so far.
8. Concluding remarks
Technology has a critical role to play in preventing climate change. The most
important technological developments have taken place, and will continue to do
so, at the national level for security and many reasons other than climate change.
The role of an international climate framework would be to encourage such activ-
ities as much as possible. Because resource endowment, history and national inter-
ests differ across countries, it is unlikely that countries will cooperate seriously on
the minutiae of technology policy on the global scale. Like-minded activities with
shared national interests will present greater opportunities for serious coopera-
tion. The global framework will have to play a role in legitimizing these activities.
If successful, stakeholders, particularly industries, would be nurtured in each
country under the GACT regime. Their political support would be translated into
government actions to seek legitimacy at the global level for industrial technology
policies. This would provide an opportunity for players in different sectors and
different regions to work together for mutual benefit. For example, it may be pos-
sible for promoters of renewable policy in Europe to secure more budgetary sup-
port for their domestic feed-in-tariff policies by negotiating with proponents of
U.S. carbon capture technology and with Japanese energy conservation policy sup-
porters to mutually recognize their respective commitments in an international
forum. The possibility for this kind of cooperation has been rarely noted—and is
worth the attention of policy-makers.
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Appendix 
Niche market and institutional interplay: Lessons from successful
“global” environmental policies 
This appendix summarizes our case studies on the environmental technology pol-
icy. Case studies include regulation of automobile pollutant emission in the 1970s;
zero-emission vehicles (ZEV) in 1990; SOx at stationary sources, 1970s–2000s;
wind power deployment in the 1990s; and ozone layer protection in the 1980s.17
We have learned four lessons. First, technology matters. Technological develop-
ments were closely associated with the successful environmental policies in all
cases. Second, country-level activities matter for technological development.
Important technological innovations take place at the national level in most cases,
not through formal global coordination. It reflects the diversity of resource
endowment and different political priorities and situations across countries.
Third, creation of niche markets for nascent technology has been the key for inno-
vation, and one big country is usually enough to create critical mass. The niche
market was created by various modes—direct regulation and negotiated agree-
ments in stationary SOx regulation in Japan, feed-in-tariff subsidies in German
wind power, and a state-level direct regulation in California for ZEV.
Fourth, countries learn from each other and develop their own regulatory institu-
tions. The development of environmental technology in one country is the key for
others to follow suit. In all cases, once the technology had been marketable in a
country, it was diffused to the rest of the world. SOx scrubbers diffused in Japan at
first, and then diffused to Europe, the U.S. and China a couple of decades later.
Hybrid cars were first invented in Japan to comply with expected Californian regu-
lation, then deployment policies were implemented in Japan followed by the U.S.18
Fifth, a formal treaty was not necessary for the global implementation of such envi-
ronmental policies. A formal treaty was useful in the ozone regime, but it was excep-
tional, and closely linked with the domestic politics and national interests of the U.S.
In many cases, the key environmental technologies diffused without formal treaties.
Studies of political science suggest that international interplay of institutions is driven
by international exchange of ideas among policy-makers (called elite-networking) and
by the interests of manufacturers to improve their competitive advantage and expand
their business opportunities. With the two drivers combined, the environmental regu-
lation tends to “race to the top” instead of “race to the bottom” in many cases (Vogel
1995; Drezner 2001; DeSombre 2000).
The findings led us to the idea of the GACT, which puts emphasis on encouraging
domestic technology policies. Creation of niche markets helps the technology mature
and reduce costs. The private firms are empowered and acquire vested interests in the
technologies. Once the technology is affordable for the national economy, the firms,
in coalition with environmentalists, push for diffusion policies. Such policies are
copied in the rest of the world in the “race to the top.” The entire development creates
a strong constituency for a more ambitious and binding international regime.
17 Details of the case studies are available in Japanese (Sugiyama 2003; Ueno 2001).
18 (Shiroyama 2002) provides an analysis of the drivers for R&D of hybrid cars.
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The German wind energy lobby
How to successfully promote costly technological change
Axel Michaelowa1
Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Germany
Abstract
German wind power development is a technological success story but has involved
very high subsidies. Germany was a latecomer to wind power but specific political
conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s allowed the implementation of the
feed-in-tariff regime which has characterized Germany ever since. The wind lobby
managed to constitute itself at an early stage and to develop stable alliances with
farmers and regional policy-makers. The concentration of the wind industry in
structurally-weak regions reinforced these links. With an increased visibility of the
subsidies and saturation of onshore sites in the early 2000s, the lobby has been less
successful in retaining support. The current attempt to develop offshore projects
may suffer from less favourable interest constellations.
1. Introduction
A very effective, but not cost-efficient, policy has boosted renewable energies in
Germany throughout the last decade. It started with investment subsidies such as
the program “250 MW Wind” and continued with guaranteed feed-in tariffs set
out in the “Energy Feed-In Law” of 1991 to be paid by regional utilities. Wind
energy in particular grew with double-digit rates that surprised even its hardiest
proponents. In February 2002, the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein
generated more than 50 per cent of its electricity from wind (for Germany’s
installed capacity and electricity generation see Table 1). The sector quickly
became a powerful lobby and managed to retain the law despite forceful opposi-
tion from energy companies operating in areas with a high potential for renewable
energies. Their pressure led to a hardship clause according to which the feed-in-
tariff was not applicable if the sale of regenerative electricity to the grid was more
than five per cent of total sales of the respective energy company. In the revamped
Renewable Energy Law (EEG), all types of renewable energy receive differentiated
feed-in-tariffs that make them economically attractive for investors. Here, a com-
pensation model was introduced that evenly distributes the burden among the
energy companies. These pass on the extra costs to the consumers, since electricity
prices are no longer regulated by the Länder authorities.
Moreover, after the change of government in 1998 new highly-symbolic invest-
ment subsidies were set up such as the 100,000 roof program for PV. The overall
amount of subsidies is shown in Table 2.
1 This paper has been written in the framework of the project “Developing a post-2012 climate policy
architecture” financed by the Government of Japan and the Government of Norway. Taishi Sugiyama
from the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (Tokyo) and Kristian Tangen and
Henrik Hasselknippe from Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Oslo) have provided valuable comments.
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Table 1. Renewable energy in Germany 2003
Type of renewable energy Feed-in-tariff Installed capacity end 2003 Electricity production 2003 
(ct/kWh) (MW) (TWh, % of total)
Wind 6.2–9.1 14,700 18.5 (3.1)
Biomass 8.7–10.2 1,000 5.1 (1.2)
PV 50.6 400 0.3 (0.06)
Small hydro (<5 MW) 6.7–7.6 NA NA
Geothermal 7.1–8.9 0.25 0
Source: BMU (2004a)
Table 2. Subsidies for renewable energy in Germany (million €)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Feed-in-law/EEG 301 403 551 639 1,136 1,540 2,212 2,618 3,363 3,760
Investment subsidy 9 9 9 102 153 102 200 190 200 215
100,000 roofs PV - - - 92 113 113 113 69 70 70
Biofuels - - - - 3 5 10 10 512 512
Sum 310 412 560 833 1,405 1,800 2,535 2,887 4,145 4,567
Source: Ministry of Environment (2002, 2004b), VDN (2003), for biofuels from 2004 own calculations from
UFOP (2004 a,b). All figures for 2003 onwards are estimates
2. Starting with a failure
Germans, in general, have a strong environmental attitude and are willing to invest
(at least moderately) in a clean environment. Just one example: Germany is today
by far the most important donor of funds to Greenpeace. On the other hand, there
is quite some ambivalence in their relationship to technology. They seem to be
both technophile and technophobe at the same time. The more transparent, open
and understandable technology is, the more it will be appreciated. Hard-to-under-
stand technologies with unknown consequences are less accepted or even violently
refused. Renewable energies, because they are open and transparent, will benefit
from that attitude (Welle 1997). Compared to the United States and Denmark,
Germany was a latecomer in wind technology. This was due to the utter failure of the
technology top-down approach pursued in the late 1970s that culminated in the
multi-million Euro 3 MW “GROWIAN” (badly chosen acronym signifying “large
wind energy plant” but rhymes with the German word for rowdy) built in 1983. This
100 m giant faced severe technological problems and was operational just about 500
hours. It failed due to an unmanageable leap-frog approach (everything in one step),
half-hearted political support, resistance of utilities and the absence of interest by
Germany’s high tech industry. GROWIAN was unceremoniously dismantled.
Nobody spoke of wind power for many years afterwards but without much public-
ity, small turbines coming from Denmark were adopted by some farmers.
In the late 1980s, Germany was one of the first countries to seriously discuss cli-
mate policy and thus all forms of renewable energy were revived. In 1988, the
Ministry of Research and Technology started a large-scale research program that
included an investment subsidies program to install 100 MW of wind power
capacity. By 1989, it was already scaled up to 250 MW. Under the 250 MW pro-
gram, two options existed: either investment subsidies, which were calculated as
Technology
61
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 61
“hub height [m] x rotor radius [m] x 400” (maximum amount 46.016 Euro2 and
60 per cent of total building cost), or operation subsidies of 3.1 ct/kWh. This pro-
gram was complemented by additional programs in many of the German federal
states. The decisive element of this program was that it gave enough long-term
security to enable banks to lend money to small operators. Moreover, without gov-
ernment support and unnoticed by the public, environmentally-oriented individ-
uals had started to develop small wind turbines.
3. The roaring nineties
The decisive step for the rapid expansion of wind power to levels that had not even
been considered feasible by the wildest wind enthusiasts was the Electricity Feed-
In Law (EFL) of 1991 which gave, for the first time, every private operator a reli-
able financial base. Under this law, utilities are obliged to accept power from inde-
pendent producers of renewable energy. The feed-in tariff was set at 90 per cent of
the average retail electricity rate (about nine ct/kWh). The law was supported by
all parties. Müller (2000) explains the support of the conservative Christian
Democrats that were in power and traditionally not very environmentally-minded
by the pressure of small hydro producers from Bavaria.
Thus, despite the Danish technological advance, German manufacturers were able
to exploit the incentives and dominated the market, followed by Danish manufac-
turers, which partly produce in Germany. Between 1982 and 1996, German man-
ufacturers had installed 76 per cent of total capacity. Market leaders were Enercon
(29.1 per cent) and Tacke (17.3 per cent); the companies Nordex, Nordtank,
Lagerwey and Husumer Schiffswerft all had less than eight per cent. The average
capacity per turbine grew from 175 kW in 1991 to 380 kW in 1994 and 510 kW in
1996 (Welle 1997). Initially, most of the German manufacturers were small engi-
neering outfits that profited from the availability of highly skilled engineers that
were no longer needed in the economically depressed shipbuilding industry. All
companies were set up near the coast, Husumer Schiffswerft originally was a ship-
yard. Later, production plants in East Germany were added where qualified labour
was available and infrastructure was cheap. Political support in these locations was
extremely strong, as wind energy enabled diversification in the economy.
A decisive element of the wind expansion drive in Germany was the alliance that
formed between several interest groups at a very early stage. Wind plants were
planned and financed by small associations, predominantly farmers initially.
Farming has long been heavily subsidized in Germany but nevertheless declines
consistently. Seeing the possibility of additional revenue from using a tiny portion
of their grazing land, dairy farmers near the coast embraced wind eagerly. The
farmers dominated local policy-making and thus were able to get wind projects
approved quickly. Ninety-five per cent of wind plants in Germany have utility-
independent private ownership (Scheer 2004b). The lack of involvement of large
banks or companies from the cities prevented a not-in-my-back-yard-(NIMBY)-
type backlash that was prevailing in the U.K. at the same time. This group was
strengthened by parliamentarians that saw renewables as salvation to a 
2 All values of the DM era are converted into Euros to facilitate comparison.
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world crisis. As a social democrat Scheer is known for his strong views that equate
fossil power with suppression of labour interests (Scheer 2004a). Quickly, wind
energy got the same planning rights as large fossil power stations.
In the mid 1990s, the explosive growth of wind capacity made some politicians
uneasy about the swelling volume of subsidies. Utilities stepped up their pressure
and business reporters criticized the system (e.g., Lampe 1998). The EFL was
retained in 1997 only after a great effort by the German Wind Energy Association
(Bundesverband Windenergie, BWE) which argued that the abolition of the sub-
sidy would lead to job losses of several thousand located in structurally-weak
regions. Welle (1997) estimated that, at that time, the German wind industry
employed about 5,000 people directly and that some 5,000 additional indirect jobs
had been created. With growth rates of about 80 per cent per year it was one of the
fastest growing segments in mechanical engineering. BWE joined forces with trade
unions (metal workers have traditionally been well organized) and the agricultur-
al lobby and managed to get 4,000 people to Bonn for a protest march. The suc-
cess made BWE a strong lobby with 40 regional groups. In 2003, it had 16,000
members (BWE 2003a).
In the second half of the 1990s, the financing structure of wind projects changed.
Now the tax-saving funds came to the fore. They collected money from many peo-
ple that formerly became shareholders in the wind projects. For example, the com-
pany Energiekontor collected 120 million Euro and built 57 wind projects within
10 years (Asendorpf and Rauner 2004). As the expenses could be fully deducted
from income tax and the EFL allowed to project double-digit rates of return, this
vehicle was very powerful. However, the ever larger projects started to mobilize the
first NIMBY protests.
Another important fight was waged by the German wind lobby on the EU level. It
opposed a directive by the EU of doubling the renewable energy production of
member countries by 2010 and was based on a quota system. Christophe
Bourillion, executive director of the EWEA, criticized the BWE, citing liberaliza-
tion of the European energy market as inevitable. The directive would give wind a
level playing field while we develop to full maturity and become more competitive.
He noted that Germany would have had until 2010 to reform its current fixed-
price wind power program (Asmus 1999). In the end, the German position pre-
vailed and the directive allowed all types of national incentives. A European Court
case against the EFL was also dismissed in 2001.
The EFL did not provide an incentive to reduce costs of wind power as the guar-
anteed price level made it more profitable to churn out a maximum of turbines
than to focus on cost-saving innovation. Therefore, the producers concentrated on
offering ever bigger turbines without lowering the costs. Actually, in the second
half of the 1990s, costs rose when the MW barrier was breached (see Morthorst
and Chandler 2004, p. 1303).
3 The data relate to Denmark, but in Germany the average size of plants has even been bigger
(Langniß and Neij, 2004, p. 179).
Technology
63
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 63
4. The Renewable Energy Law
Due to the liberalization of the electricity markets, retail prices started to plummet
in 1998. Therefore, the wind lobby called for a legal basis that would abolish the
link to retail prices. They argued that banks were stopping lending to wind power
projects (Müller 2000). Parliament started to debate a successor, the Renewable
Energy Law (REL) that entered into force in 2000. A new element was that utilities
could also get the feed-in-tariffs.
In 2001, economics minister Müller launched an outright attack against the REL.
BWE hurriedly commissioned a study to prove that the average cost of the REL
amounted to just 0.1 ct/kWh and would only rise to 0.2 ct in 2010 (Krzikalla 2001)
Müller’s successor Clement stepped up that fight and called for a quota system.
The Ministry of Environment wanted to decrease the feed-in-rates by 1.5 per cent
per year. Clement called for a 15 per cent decrease outright and then an annual
rate of five per cent.
Utilities joined the fight arguing that they would have to use up to seven per cent
of energy produced as “buffer energy” to cover short-term variability of wind
(Asendorpf 2002). The wind lobby fought back by stressing that it had created
35,000 jobs and was adding 3,000 more each year, particularly in economically-
weak regions (BWE 2002). All major turbine manufacturers were indeed using the
subsidies provided for industries in East Germany to build up production plants
there. Moreover, it was stressed that wind power manufacturers had become the
second most important customer in the German steel industry, after automobiles.
The renewables lobby organized a large demonstration in Berlin (Bundesverband
Erneuerbare Energien et al. 2003). Interestingly, the powerful metal workers’ trade
union joined. Utilities counteracted by raising electricity prices using the addi-
tional costs from the REL as main argument. BWE (2003b) tried to refute their
argument but had to concede that the cost of the REL now amounted to 0.4
ct/kWh, double the level that Krzikalla (2001) had forecast for 2010 on its behalf.
BWE tried to circumvent this issue by arguing that “10 years from now, renewable
energy will be cheaper than fossil fuels,” without corroborating this. Nitschke
(2003), still with very favourable assumptions for renewables, says that it will be 16
years before wind power becomes competitive. BEE (2003) now says that the max-
imum of 0.5 ct/kWh would be reached in 2006. This reminds of the classical posi-
tion in climate policy: “nowadays we have problems in achieving our targets but
10 years from now, everything will be easy.”
Clement continued to fight against renewables and got a supporting study by the
social democrat-leaning Bremen Energy Institute (Bremer Energie-Institut 2004)
that argues that, macro-economically, wind energy had a negative employment
impact. Immediately, BWE launched a counter-offensive now claiming that 50,000
jobs had been created through wind energy and that the externalities of fossil fuels
had been underestimated by the Bremen Energy Institute study (BWE 2004).
5. The NIMBY backlash
In the early 2000s, the NIMBY wave has increased even if the general population
largely remained in favour of wind power (for a nice overview of their arguments
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from a wind power advocate, see Scheer 2004b). It consists of many local groups
with a loose coordination by the Bundesverband Landschaftsschutz; its roots had
been set in the late 1990s (Wolfrum 1997). Moreover, the media which had earlier
overwhelmingly supported wind power, have turned against it. The popular mag-
azine Spiegel in early 2004 titled its cover story “The windmill craze” (Spiegel
2004). The story was well-timed with the parliamentary discussions about the
extension of the REL. Nevertheless, wind power supporters rallied, denounced the
editor-in-chief for waging a personal crusade against windmills in his backyard.
Even within the Spiegel editorial office emotions ran high. A senior editor quit
(Seel 2004); already in October a draft article on the role of the utilities in fighting
against renewables had been turned down by the editor-in-chief.
The NIMBY wave led to a change in the REL that reduced support of less attrac-
tive locations that so far had received higher subsidies. The REL revision reduces
the feed-in-tariff to 5.5 ct/kWh for plants that do not achieve a certain yield. Plants
that achieve less than 44 per cent of that yield do not get any subsidy at all (v.
Hammerstein 2004).
In 2002 and 2003, changes in the tax law made wind power funds less attractive for
investors and, therefore, the inflow of money was considerably reduced.
6. Emissions trading against feed-in tariffs
In early 2004, the economics and environment ministers engaged in a bitter and
publicly visible fight about the allocation of CO2 emission allowances under the
trading system to be introduced in 2005. In the end, the economics minister pre-
vailed and the allocation was set in a very lenient way. Only a few days later, the
revised REL was adopted; it contained more generous tariffs than the earlier draft
and fixed the annual decrease at two per cent. Media reported that the renewables
lobby managed to trade the allocation issue against the tariffs. Anyway, the renew-
ables industry sees emissions trading as a threat to the REL.
7. Salvation by offshore?
Due to the NIMBY movement and the objective exhaustion of attractive onshore
sites, for the last three years the wind lobby has tried to promote offshore projects
(for a detailed analysis of the discussion see Bartolomäus 2002). It argues mainly
that the capacity factor is 50 per cent higher than onshore. The government was
convinced very quickly and visions took gigantic proportions. The Ministry of
Environment aims at 25 GW offshore capacity by 2030 and the REL provides size-
able subsidies. The hope was to induce the large utilities to invest in such projects
but so far they have not been eager to do so (Netzeitung 2004). Initially, the feed-
in tariffs of 9.1 ct/kWh were only limited to plants operating by 2006; they are
granted for 12 years and then reduced to 6.2 ct. However, only few projects, if any,
are likely to be operational by that time. Project opposition has been stiff from
coastal communities that fear impacts on their tourism industry. Therefore, the
distance to shore has to be very big which increases costs considerably. Likewise,
environmental NGOs fear impacts on maritime biodiversity which leads to costly
environmental impact assessments. Asendorpf and Rauner (2004) estimate total
costs at least as double of those onshore, not least due to the need to get approvals
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from more than 20 different institutions, which takes about five years. Any project
has to be very big to exploit scale effects—several hundred million Euro per proj-
ect are expected. Nevertheless, 14 requests have been lodged with the authorities.
Many port cities are trying to become the base for offshore operations. The race
for the first offshore projects has provided an incentive for the turbine manufac-
turers to offer five MW plants. Enercon has already reached 4.5 MW, Repower and
Multibrid wanted to unveil their five MW prototypes in 2004. But whether off-
shore will offer the salvation that the wind lobby hopes for remains to be seen. The
first licence for an offshore site, Butendiek near the island of Sylt, gives them some
hope. But the Butendiek consortium uses Danish three MW turbines that have
been tested in the first large-scale offshore plant there. Allnoch (2004) sees the first
project coming online in 2006. The government reacted and, in the REL overhaul,
shifted the cut-off date to 2010. However, an annual decrease of two per cent will
apply for projects coming on stream after 2007. As the legal framework is now
more conducive to investments, the utility E.ON has invested in two offshore proj-
ects, one of which has recently been approved. The utility Vattenfall Europe is dis-
cussing similar investments (Gassmann and Gammelin 2004; Anonymous 2004).
8. Conclusions
The German wind lobby has shown that clever utilization of a window of oppor-
tunity can lead to a positive feedback loop to implement a costly renewable energy
technology. The window of opportunity was provided by the early German enthu-
siasm about climate policy coupled with euphoria about reunification. Moreover,
renewable energy was seen as a chance to reinvigorate regions that had suffered
from industrial decline. Once the wind turbine manufacturers got hold there, they
were able to mobilize a coalition of local politicians, farmers and trade unions that
became stronger, the higher the share of wind in the job market and farmer rev-
enue became. The construction of the subsidy regime was very successful because
it distributed the costs to the entire population where they were diluted so strongly
that no opposition could be organized. The only threat to wind power is the
increasing NIMBY movement that has led to the strategy to develop offshore proj-
ects. However, the success factors that were prevalent concerning onshore projects
are absent offshore. These projects need large-scale financing and thus do not gen-
erate local benefits. It is no surprise that they have already generated substantial
opposition.
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Carbon capture and geological 
storage research – a capture by 
fossil fuel interests?
Axel Michaelowa
Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Germany
1. Introduction
For a long time, carbon capture and geological storage (CCS) has been seen as an
expensive, unproven technology that would not play a major role in mitigation of
climate change in the near term (Kallbekken and Torvanger 2004). However, in the
last three years, this perception has changed considerably. Now CCS is seen by
many as a cheap backstop technology of choice that will become relevant in less
than a decade (Gibbins 2005; but also in a relatively balanced discussion in U.K.
Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (2005)). What are the reasons for
this shift and what role did interest groups play?
2. Forerunners of the CCS movement
In the early 1990s, CCS was seen as a purely academic exercise. But in 1991, the IEA
Greenhouse Gas R&D Program (GHG R&D) was established. Despite its generic title,
it concentrated on bundling research to promote CCS. Initially, only 16 IEA countries
supported this initiative as most national climate policy programs assumed it would
be fairly easy to mobilize energy efficiency improvement potential. Moreover, two
companies (electric utilities) financed the program. Nevertheless, the GHG R&D
Program slowly managed to create a group of CCS adepts and facilitated networking,
particularly through biannual conferences from 1993. They alternated with the aca-
demic “International Conference on Carbon Dioxide Removal,” a series that started
in 1992. Countries like Norway, Australia and Japan that felt that mitigation would be
costly, co-organized workshops with the GHG R&D Program. In 1996, the two con-
ference series were combined under the new title “International Conference on
Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies.” Initially, the focus was on ocean sequestra-
tion which was immediately attacked by environmental NGOs. Interestingly, the term
“disposal” was initially used and only later substituted by the much more positively
connoted “storage.” Despite these activities, neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto
Protocol explicitly mentions CCS. Despite that, a few pioneering projects in CCS were
started in the second half of the 1990s—all of them with concrete incentives. The
Norwegian Sleipner project sequestering one million t CO2 per year was driven by a
carbon tax of 45 €/t CO2 which led to a payback period of the project of just 18
months (Herzog et al. 2000). The Weyburn project in Canada that became opera-
tional in 2000 uses CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), essentially increasing
greenhouse gas emissions as more oil is made available.
From 1995 onwards, company participation in the GHG R&D initiative slowly
increased (see Figure 1). Several oil companies and a coal-mining technology
provider joined. Country participation fluctuated with countries joining (Belgium,
Korea); leaving (Italy, Spain); and even leaving and coming back (Finland).
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Figure 1. Participation in the IEA GHG R&D Program
3. CCS interests coming of age
The first big upswing for CCS came with U.S. President Bush’s rejection of the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001 and the development of a technology-oriented obfuscation
initiative of the U.S. government’s inaction. This was the continuation of a vigor-
ous, multi-disciplinary CCS research program already started in 1998 by the
Clinton administration. By then the target of CCS costs of <3$/t CO2 by 2015 had
been set. The first “National Conference on Carbon Sequestration” was held in
May 2001 with 370 participants. In 2003, the Department of Energy launched the
plan to develop a zero-emission 275 MW coal power plant called “FutureGen.”
The U.S. did an active outreach through bilateral agreements and set up the
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum in 2003 with 14 countries as members.
The number of CCS conferences and their attendance had a strong increase
between 1997 and 2002 (see Figure 2).
The second boost for CCS came with the growing realization that EU countries
will face problems in reaching their Kyoto targets due to the generous allocation of
emission allowances to the large emitters. To soothe them to the prospect of long-
term carbon control, in many EU countries national CCS programs were
launched—the largest initiatives being undertaken in the Netherlands, the U.K.
and Germany. In 2000–2001, four large EU research projects on mapping of reser-
voirs in the EU; reservoir stability; enhanced coal bed methane recovery; and
monitoring of EOR carbon sequestration—as well as a network for CCS technol-
ogy development—started. The Netherlands began a project aimed at a demon-
stration storage facility and in 2004 started a 25 million € national CCS research
program, including nine research institutes; eight companies and—a rare fea-
ture—three environmental NGOs. Denmark launched research on EOR in the
North Sea. However, opposition of environmental NGOs led to the stop of an
ocean sequestration project in Norway in 2002. Further EU research on storage
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sites in Denmark, Germany, Norway and the U.K. started in 2003. Four concrete
storage facilities in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain and a capture
facility in a Danish power plant are developed by a consortium of 12 research insti-
tutes, six electric utilities, five oil and gas companies and five technology providers
with a budget of 15.8 million €. A storage site in Germany brings together eight
research institutions and five companies. Most EU projects involving industry have
a cost-sharing between the EU and industry partners of 1:1 (EC 2000).
Figure 2. CCS conferences and participation
Source: Conference announcements and reports in “Greenhouse Issues”
In 2002, Japan drew hitherto dispersed initiatives together in the “CO2 Fixation
and Utilization Programme.” Australia set up a “Cooperative Research Centre for
GHG Technologies” while Canada opened its “International Test Centre for CO2
Capture.” Even renewable energy pioneer Germany has set up a “COORETEC”
program with strong input from coal companies and electric utilities
(COORETEC 2004).
BP and six other oil companies ran a three-year “CO2 capture project” with a cost
of US$20 million from 2001 (IEA Working Party 2003). The absence of
ExxonMobil was notable.
In 2002, the IPCC was charged with writing a special report on CCS which saw a
strong involvement of authors from industry. The draft report was released for
expert review in early 2005; it stresses the low costs of CCS.
Country participation of the GHG R&D continued to fluctuate with countries
joining (France, Italy) and leaving (Belgium, Poland). Other oil and power com-
panies entered while the coal technology company left.
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Figure 3. CCS research projects worldwide 2005
Source: http://www.co2captureandstorage.info, accessed March 28, 2005
4 Development of interest group positions
Emitters are currently dominating the discussion on CCS since they have con-
cluded that it could become a quick fix once government subsidies for its intro-
duction are harnessed. Doucet (2003), Secretary General of the energy utility
lobby organization World Energy Council (WEC), stresses that before 2002 “WEC
has not treated it [CCS] as a best practice or cleaner system technology because
[…] it was not seen as commercially viable in a short enough timeframe to gain
political support. […] Basic research in this area is the joint responsibility of gov-
ernment and industry. The objective of this research should be to bring down the
total system costs per tonne of carbon to about $40/tc [$11/t CO2] by 2010.” The
emitters’ long-term vision is nicely summarized in IPIECA (2003, p. 4): “In sce-
narios where CO2 concentration is stabilized over the next century, CCS can play
a primary role in controlling global CO2 emissions. Such scenarios entail added
CCS infrastructure rivalling that of the current global energy system, with its con-
struction extending over decades due to its massive capital requirements.” Or,
more bluntly phrased by Doucet (2003): “If you can capture the carbon and
sequester it, you can continue to use fossil fuels in the sustainable global energy
mix for much longer in the 21st century than heretofore assumed.” The World
Coal Institute (2002) states, relatively cautiously: “Technologies exist and are being
developed that can prevent emissions from the production and use of coal reach-
ing the atmosphere. In the long-term, the capture and storage of CO2 offers one
of the most promising routes to zero emissions.”
Industry representatives argue that CCS is an emission reduction under the Kyoto
Protocol. They are influencing the definition of IPCC good inventory practice due
in 2006 in that direction. The argument of researchers (Bode and Jung 2004) that
CCS should be treated analogously to terrestrial sequestration through LULUCF
and thus only generate temporary credits drew a lot of criticism from industry.
Industry positions also pervade politicians’ views. Norwegian politicians try to
water down the rules of the OSPAR treaty prohibiting dumping of wastes under
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the seabed arguing that “a successful development of sequestration technologies
could prove to be of vital importance for further use of fossil fuels as an energy
source. […] CO2 is likely to be stored in geological structures that have contained
oil and gas securely for millions of years” (Håbrekke 2004).
Consultancies have only recently started to see the revenue potential of this field.
The Dutch company Ecofys sees CCS as a “new and potentially very powerful solu-
tion to strongly reduce carbon dioxide emissions,” uncritically taking the emitters’
perspective.
Duckat et al. (2004) sum up the environmental NGO perspective on CCS: it
should only be used as “bridging technology.” The energy penalty due to capture
increases the exploitation need for fossil fuels and the cost intensity of the tech-
nology makes it only feasible in large, centralized power plants. CCS could crowd
out renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Non-permanence and
ecological risks of ocean storage would be unacceptably high; a clear liability for
reversal of storage should be defined. Voicing the same concerns, CAN Europe
(2004) sees benefit in CCS if it leads to reduced air pollution from vehicles and
more modern fossil power plants or is linked to the use of biomass fuel.
Astonishingly, most other NGOs have remained silent on CCS so far. Norwegian
Bellona even strongly supports CCS “as a key measure for creating a bridge to a
society powered by hydrogen from renewables” (Bellona 2003).
5 Conclusion
The CCS community acted very cautiously in the beginning of the 1990s, using
terms that could be seen as encompassing all types of mitigation and trying to
avoid sparking of public interest. The IEA played a catalytic role in this endeavour.
From the mid-1990s, CCS programs have become increasingly bold and interest-
group driven. Greenhouse gas-emitting companies have played a growing role in
defining directions of CCS programs as well as working in concrete research proj-
ects. This is the case both within and outside of the EU. Countries that were earlier
focused on renewable energy programs only (Germany and Denmark) are now
embarking on large CCS research. Policy-makers are generally uncritically repeat-
ing the arguments of the emitters concerning continuation of fossil fuel use and
the accounting of CCS as an emission reduction. NGOs are not able to effectively
oppose this trend but have been able to stop experiments in ocean sequestration.
However, as general public acceptance and support is of great importance for CCS
and the public is largely unaware of CCS (IPIECA 2003; Shackley et al. 2004), the
outcome of the debate is by no means assured. A backlash compared to the debate
about nuclear waste storage is possible as feared by WWF representative Singer
(quoted in Bellona 2003). However, Shackley’s et al. (2004) finding that initial
scepticism is substituted by slight support “once information is provided on the
role of carbon storage in reducing CO2 emissions to the atmosphere” (sic, again
the industry wording1) indicates that this is not guaranteed.
1 This may be due to the fact that the study was commissioned as part of the U.K. Department of
Trade and Industry’s Cleaner Coal Technology Transfer Programme which means that the indus-
try perspective played a role.
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Carbon storage and climate change –
the case of Norway 
Ingvild Andreassen Sæverud and Arild Moe
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway
1. Introduction 
The possibility of extracting and storing CO2 in a safe place to avoid emissions has
for many years been considered a future remedy to the climate problem. Earlier
referred to as one of several forms of CO2 sequestration, it is now more commonly
referred to as CO2 capture and storage, leaving sequestration to only refer to terres-
trial (biological) storage of CO2. The attractiveness of CO2 storage, and also its weak-
ness in the eyes of its opponents, is that it offers a method to reduce emissions that
does not require major changes in the energy supply system, at least for some time.
Storage of CO2 in structures under the ocean floor has for several years been con-
sidered a promising option for handling CO2. Norway has taken a particular inter-
est in this theme, due to its position as a CO2 emitter connected to offshore oil and
gas production, as well as to the existence of geological formations suitable for
storage. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the challenges related
to carbon storage as a climate policy measure, exemplified by the case of Norway.
Based on the experience of Norway, we wind up the paper by discussing implica-
tions for the climate regime of bringing the issue into the formal channels of the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
2. Carbon storage as a climate policy measure – an overview
CO2 capture and storage embraces three steps. The first step is capture or separa-
tion of the CO2. Capture of CO2 generally refers to a process of capturing the CO2
released from large emission sources like power generation. Separation of CO2
refers to the process of separating CO2 from a gas stream. While technologies for
both capture and separation of CO2 are available, there are significant cost differ-
ences. As will be discussed in the following sections, the cost of capturing CO2
from power generation is a major challenge facing carbon capture and storage as
a climate policy measure. There is also a cost issue with separation, but of a much
smaller magnitude. Because of the different economic challenges concerning han-
dling CO2 from power generation and gas streams respectively, we find it useful to
distinguish between capture and separation, but will include separation as part of
the more general concept “carbon capture and storage.”
The second step of carbon capture and storage is transportation of the CO2 to the
storage location. Pipelines and ship transport are the alternatives. The final step of
carbon capture and storage is long-term disposal of the CO2. Several options are
available. Pure storage solutions include disposing of the CO2 underground or in
the ocean. Other options of long-term disposal are using the CO2 as input in
industrial processes or injecting the CO2 in producing petroleum reservoirs to
improve the recovery of oil. Pure storage and injection to improve oil recovery are
the two disposal options today that can handle substantial volumes of CO2, and
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we will hence limit the discussion to those alternatives (Norwegian Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy 2003).
Pure storage of CO2 can take place in the ocean or in geological formations.1 Due
to uncertainty about the permanency of ocean storage, this method has so far not
been tried out, and following the present policy debate and technical R&D efforts
we will focus on geological storage in this paper. Geological formations with
potential for storage of CO2 are aquifers (water reservoirs in the subsoil), produc-
ing and non-producing petroleum reservoirs, and non-mineable coal formations
(NOU 2002, 7). Large-scale storage in aquifers is currently only taking place on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf, but several small- as well as large-scale projects are
in the pipeline in other countries, notably the In Salah gas project in Algeria which
started in 2004, and the proposed development of the Gorgon offshore gas field in
Australia (U.K. Department of Trade and Industry 2004). Note that these three
projects all regard storage of CO2 separated from the gas stream. Technology for
storage of CO2 in non-mineable coal formations is demonstrated at installations
in the U.S.
Injection of CO2 in producing oil reservoirs to improve oil recovery has been used
onshore in the U.S. and Canada for more than 30 years. A Canadian oil and gas
company, Encana, has been operating a major CO2 injection facility in their
Weyburn, Saskatchewan, oil field for a number of years. The CO2 is pipelined to
the oil field from a syngas facility in the northern U.S. While this is a commercial,
enhanced oil recovery operation, it has also been the subject of a monitoring
research study conducted with the support of the International Energy Agency
Greenhouse Gas Research and Development Programme (IEA GHG). The IEA
Weyburn Monitoring and Storage Project is an international research project
intended to establish the degree of security with which greenhouse gases, particu-
larly carbon dioxide, can be sequestered in geological formations during large-
scale, commercial, enhanced oil recovery operations. This will be accomplished
through the scientific mapping of the movement of CO2 in the reservoir, and tech-
nical prediction of the future long-term storage and migration characteristics of
the CO2. This monitoring project is managed by the Petroleum Technology
Research Centre.2
According to the IEA greenhouse gas R&D program, the global storage potential
in exploited oil and gas formations is about half of global emissions to 2050 (920
Gt CO2) and 150 per cent of emissions to 2050 in deep saline aquifers (3,000 Gt
CO2).3 Due to uncertainty about emission projections and varying safety of stor-
age locations, these figures should be treated with care and understood as a rough
indication of the huge potential of carbon storage sites actually existing. The tech-
nology applied for injection is well developed as numerous sites have been used for
the temporary storage of natural gas for decades.
1 It is also a possibility to store mineralized CO2 as a solid substance, but this option is presently not
high on the agenda of carbon capture and storage as a climate policy measure, and we will hence
not include it in the further analysis.
2 http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/es/etb/cetc/combustion/co2trm/pdfs/co2trm1_cpreston.pdf
3 “Technical options for placement of CO2 in the maritime area.” Presentation by Paul Freund, the
IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, at Ospar workshop, October 27, 2004.
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3. Environmental challenges 
There are two main environmental challenges facing carbon capture and storage:
the first is, of course, whether it is possible to store the CO2 safely in the geologi-
cal formation in the long term—i.e., the technical risk. The second question is
political: will investments in carbon storage replace investments in renewable
energy and conservation, and accordingly be a barrier to de-carbonization of the
energy systems? This last question seems to be the main reason why some envi-
ronmental NGOs have taken a negative stand on carbon storage.4 With respect to
the technical risk, a conclusion from a workshop of the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) on carbon capture and storage in 2002 was that the envi-
ronmental impacts of geological storage are likely to be small, but are not well
characterized.5 If huge amounts of CO2 are stored, the release rates must be very
low in order to prevent them from becoming a large source of future emissions
(Bode and Jung 2004).
An underground deposit must display certain characteristics to be suitable for
CO2 storage. It has to be deep under the ocean surface to have high enough pres-
sure, and the species of rock must be sufficiently porous to permit the gas to be
pumped in. And of course, it is essential that the geological formation is stable and
not earthquake prone. With reference to natural CO2 fields6 and studies of natural
analogues, geologists conclude that, under favourable circumstances, geological for-
mations with certain characteristics can hold CO2 for millions of years.7
Establishment of procedures for risk assessment when selecting storage sites and
monitoring systems are necessary both in order to ensure environmental per-
formance and to build stakeholder confidence. The methods for risk assessment
and monitoring are available: reservoir behaviour can be predicted with simula-
tion tools based on reservoir information, and seismic and sediment samples are
some of the available methods for monitoring.8 There is extensive national and
international research going on covering both risk assessments of leakage from
geological formations and monitoring issues.9
In addition to the environmental challenges in the storage phase, there is also an
environmental issue related to the capturing of CO2, often referred to as the energy
penalty. Capturing CO2 requires energy, and according to the IEA Greenhouse Gas
R&D Program, capturing CO2 reduces the energy efficiency in a power plant by as
much as 10–15 per cent.
4 http://www.cslforum.org/documents/von_Goerne_Gabriella_mon_Pal_AB_1330.pdf
5 Presentation by Heleen de Coninck with the IPCC on an OSPAR workshop, October 26, 2004.
6 Workshop report: Ospar workshop on the environmental impact of placement of carbon dioxide
in geological structures in the maritime area, October 26–27, 2004.
7 Workshop report: Ospar workshop on the environmental impact of placement of carbon dioxide
in geological structures in the maritime area, October 26–27, 2004.
8 “Safe storage of CO2.” Presentation by Erik Lindeberg, Sintef, at Ospar workshop October 27, 2004.
“How can injected CO2 be monitored?” Presentation by Barthold Schroot, TNO’s Institute of
Applied Geoscience, at Ospar workshop October 27, 2004.
9 An updated overview of projects can be accessed via the IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme’s
Web site: http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/
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4. Economic challenges 
The IPCC estimates the costs of carbon capture and storage to be approximately
US$40–60 per tonne of CO2 (IPCC 2001), while the International Energy
Association estimates that capturing and storing CO2 would cost from $50 to $100
per tonne (Carbon Market News, December 15, 2004). Several other studies estimate
the total costs to range from about $20 per tonne of CO2 up to about $100, depend-
ing on the capture source, modes of transportation and types of reservoirs
(Torvanger, Kalbekken and Rypdal 2004). Compared to current prices in the
European emissions trading market of about 8.5 Euro, or about US$11, it is fair to
conclude that the cost obstacle is at present significant, but there is probably scope
for reduction of costs in the future through technical developments and wider appli-
cation (IPCC 2001).
Of the total costs, the capture costs are expected to constitute a much larger share
than transport and storage, about 70–80 per cent according to some sources.
Reducing capture costs is hence identified as the major economic challenge. But as
noted above, this is only relevant with regard to CO2 from large emission sources
like power generation and not CO2 separated from the gas stream.
5. Political and legal challenges 
There are also legal barriers and potential political barriers on the international level
with regard to disposal of CO2. There is a need for clarification of the legal status of
carbon storage in international conventions; simply because carbon capture and
storage was not foreseen as a climate policy measure at the time the conventions
were developed. Because of scepticism among several environmental NGOs and
some states towards the measure as a climate policy measure, ongoing international
processes aimed at solving the legal challenges might meet political barriers.
The first set of legal, and potential political, challenges stems from conventions
developed to protect the marine environment. It has been maintained that injec-
tion of CO2 is in conflict with the OSPAR convention, which was established to
protect the marine environment in the northeast Atlantic area. This convention is
far more concrete and operative than the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which also has provisions to protect the environment. The issue is whether injec-
tion of CO2 can be considered dumping of a toxic. And since this process was not
foreseen when both conventions were developed, there is scope for discussion and
interpretation (Brubaker and Christiansen 2001). Dumping, which is defined as
the discharge of waste or other substances into the ocean or the underground from
ships, airplanes or offshore installations, is prohibited. But there are clauses that
permit discharges from sources onshore as well as offshore if the precautionary
principle and best available technology were employed.
A process, which might lead to the necessary revision of OSPAR, was started only
recently within committees of the convention. There is also a need for clarification
with regard to the London Convention on dumping (Gran 2004). To some extent
these legal problems must be regarded as technicalities and, whereas they form
obstacles to CO2 injection today, the conventions can be adapted if consensus on
the environmental safety issue can be established.
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The other set of legal and political challenges at the international level comes from
the treatment of the issue in the climate convention and the Kyoto Protocol, or the
lack thereof. Carbon storage is not discussed directly and can only be inferred from
general provisions about sequestration.10 In the IPCC Third Assessment Report
from 2001, CO2 capture and storage is mentioned as a serious mitigation option
alongside the more established options, but safety and verification are noted as prob-
lems. The IPCC is presently working on a report on carbon capture and storage to
be finished during 2005. The report will include environmental, geological, techni-
cal as well as economic issues. The adoption of the report can become an important
step towards clarification of the status of carbon storage as a climate policy instru-
ment, but as will be discussed in the last section of the paper, it could also be
another complicating factor in the international climate negotiations.
How the issue is handled with respect to the EU emissions trading scheme (EU
ETS) will also be important for the acceptance of the measure within the future
climate regime, since the EU ETS has become somewhat of a benchmark for
potential future GHG emissions trading schemes. According to the EU regulations
on reporting and monitoring, the member states are allowed to report storage
projects upon approval by the EU Commission, until permanent regulations have
been developed.11
The major environmental, economic and legal/political challenges are summa-
rized in Table 1.
Table 1. Carbon capture and storage as a climate policy measure – major challenges 
CHALLENGE 
STEP Environmental Economic Legal Political 
Capture Investments in  Capture technology 
capture technology is not commercial 
replacing at present.
investments in 
renewables?
Transportation Establishment of 
new infrastructure
Storage Investments in Clarifications of the Building confidence 
storage technology legal status of in storage as a safe 
replacing carbon storage as a and sound 
investments in climate policy environmental  
renewables? measure in OSPAR, measure.
Developing the London 
procedures for risk Convention, under 
assessment and the UNFCCC and in 
monitoring of the EU ETS.
storage sites to 
ensure safe storage.
10 The issues related to the Convention, as well as key technological challenges are discussed in
(Torvanger, Kallbekken and Rypdal 2004).
11 Commission decision of January 29, 2004, establishing guidelines for the monitoring and report-
ing of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council.
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6. The case of Norway 
Norway has no suitable structures for CO2 storage on land, but storage in geolog-
ical formations like aquifers and producing and non-producing petroleum reser-
voirs offshore is applicable in Norway.12 Utsira alone, the aquifer where CO2 from
the gas field Sleipner is presently stored, has been estimated to have a capacity of
600 billion cubic meters of CO2. The second storage option applicable in Norway
is to inject CO2 into non-producing and producing petroleum reservoirs. CO2 can
be stored in either oil or gas fields after production has ceased. About 20 fields on
the Norwegian Continental Shelf with an estimated storage potential of just over
1,000 million tonnes of carbon dioxide have either ceased production or are due
to cease within the next 10 years (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
2003).
Since 1996, the partly state-owned Norwegian oil company Statoil has injected
more than five million tonnes of CO2 into a sandstone formation at the huge off-
shore gas field Sleipner—the so-called Utsira formation. This is considered to be
the first full-scale project of its kind. The CO2 has been separated out from natu-
ral gas produced at the Sleipner fields. To market the Sleipner gas, the high CO2
content (nine per cent) must be drastically reduced. Thus, the separation of CO2
is part of the industrial/commercial solution for Sleipner. The separated CO2
could have been emitted, but this would have incurred costs in the form of the
Norwegian CO2 tax. Consequently, injection of the gas becomes economically
more attractive. The second major storage project on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf is planned at the Snøhvit gas field in the Barents Sea. Production start at the
field is scheduled for early 2006. Like at Sleipner, CO2 from the gas stream will be
separated and injected into a sandstone formation at the field. The annual storage
volume will be 700,000 tonnes of CO2.
It is also possible to inject CO2 into producing petroleum fields to enhance oil or
gas recovery by increasing the pressure in the reservoir. Injection of CO2 will then
normally replace injection of water or natural gas. Since CO2 injection offers the
added advantage of storing CO2, the method should also be discussed in a climate
policy context. CO2 for enhanced oil recovery has so far not been applied offshore,
and based on 30 years of experience from the U.S. and Canada, onshore cannot be
transferred directly to the petroleum fields offshore Norway. Nevertheless,
Norwegian authorities as well as oil companies have been assessing the potential
for injecting CO2 for enhanced oil recovery in various fields on the continental
shelf. According to those assessments, both technological and economic challenges
remain to be solved before the option can be realized in Norway.13
12 Storage of CO2 in the ocean is also a theoretical possibility, but due to scientific uncertainty about
the permanency of such storage, the method is controversial and has so far not been tried out. The
Norwegian Ministry of Environment stopped an experiment of releasing about five tonnes of CO2
in deep water in the Norwegian Sea in 2002. The Norwegian Institute for Water Research had first
been admitted a permit to carry through the experiment from the Norwegian Pollution Control
Authority, but Greenpeace and WWF submitted a complaint of the decision to the Ministry of the
Environment, which consequently altered the decision.
13 Report No 38 to the Storting (2003–2004).
Technology
81
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 81
6.1 Norway in the international setting 
The Norwegian government seems to increasingly arrange for CO2 storage to become
an accepted climate measure internationally. Norway’s positive position on carbon
storage has most strongly been expressed in the form of participation in international
technological cooperation. The Norwegian companies Statoil and Hydro are partici-
pating in the technological cooperation that was established by the CO2 Capture
project (CCP) in 2000. The CCP is directed towards technology developments for all
aspects of capture and geological storage of greenhouse gases, and comprises eight
international energy companies.14 Norwegian authorities provide some funding
through the Research Council of Norway, and there has also been financial support
for research from the European Union and the U.S. Department of Energy.
Another international cooperative effort, with stronger political overtones, was
launched in 2003 with the establishment of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum (CSLF). This was an American initiative and has 16 countries as members,
as well as the EU. The Forum is “an international climate change initiative that is
focused on development of improved cost-effective technologies for the separa-
tion and capture of carbon dioxide for its transport and long-term safe storage.
The purpose of the CSLF is to make these technologies broadly available interna-
tionally; and to identify and address wider issues relating to carbon capture and
storage. This could include promoting the appropriate technical, political, and reg-
ulatory environments for the development of such technology.”15 The Forum
holds meetings on a minister or deputy minister level and can be regarded as a
framework for international cooperation in research and an effort to focus public
support to technology development.
Norway’s support for the initiative can be understood both on the background of
the country’s natural conditions for CO2 storage, but also as a way to find some
common ground with the U.S. in climate politics and a forum for climate dia-
logue. Norwegian authorities are anxious to stress though, that “it is a precondi-
tion that the cooperation is not presented as an alternative to the Kyoto protocol
or other international climate agreements with binding emission commitments.”
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2004). The other pro-Kyoto mem-
bers of the forum probably share this concern.
Norway has also developed a more pro-active policy within the climate negotia-
tions, seeking to reduce or lift the barriers discussed above. The Norwegian
Minister of Environment at COP-9 in Milan in 2003 highlighted the success of the
Sleipner experience in order to promote the idea of carbon storage as a climate
policy measure in a bridging period from fossil fuel-based economies to
economies based on renewable energy (ENB 2003; Norwegian News Agency,
December 11, 2003). At COP-10 in 2004, the minister also stressed technologies to
capture and store CO2 and pointed to the possibility of storing CO2 from other
European countries on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.16
14 BP, Chevron, Eni, Hydro, Suncor, ConocoPhillips, Shell, Petrobras.
http://www.CO2captureproject.com/index.htm
15 http://www.cslforum.org/intro.htm
16 Statement by Mr. Knut Arild Hareide, Minister of the Environment, Norway, Panel Discussion,
COP-10, Buenos Aires, December 16, 2004.
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Even though official pronouncements have been more supportive lately, Norway
has been careful not to tout carbon storage as an established climate policy meas-
ure. Nevertheless, the main carbon capture or, more precisely, separation and stor-
age project in Norway is clearly connected to the climate regime. As described
above, the economic stimulus for the injection of Sleipner gas into the Utsira for-
mation is caused by the Norwegian CO2 tax. By injecting the gas, companies avoid
the tax. But if this procedure is to make sense in Norway’s overall emissions
accounting, the injected volumes must be subtracted from the country’s CO2
emissions when they are reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Thus, Norway pre-
supposes that carbon storage will be recognized under the UNFCCC.
The idea of Norway offering a solution to CO2 emissions from other European
countries by injecting the gas for enhanced oil recovery in Norwegian oil fields has
also recently been communicated to the European Union by the Norwegian gov-
ernment. An expert group consisting of representatives of various European coun-
tries has been set up.17
7. Carbon storage and the international climate negotiations
So far, international processes on carbon storage have been developing separately
from the negotiations on the climate regime, and the processes have mainly taken
place in technical, not political arenas. Even so, some countries, i.e., Norway, and
also Canada, have brought the issue to attention in the climate negotiations from
time to time unilaterally. Carbon storage has, however, not been on the official
agenda. Thus, the status of the measure in relation to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol has not been clarified. With the launching of the IPCC report on the issue
in autumn 2005, carbon storage will formally be brought into the international cli-
mate regime. This does not necessarily mean that the issue will be high on the
political agenda in the international negotiations. The report as an input to policy-
makers will probably first be discussed at a SBSTA meeting, which attracts much
less political attention than the Conferences of the Parties do. Whether the IPCC
report will contribute to clarification of the status of carbon storage within the cli-
mate regime, will hence depend on how the process develops from the initial
SBSTA discussions, and also on whether actors within the climate regime see it in
their interest to obtain guidelines.
If, as a consequence of the IPCC report and increasing international attention, the
issue is put high on the agenda in the international climate negotiations in the near
future, it is possible to outline at least two opposite scenarios. One possibility is
that this will advance the international negotiations one step further; the other is
the opposite, namely that international climate diplomacy will be further compli-
cated.
It seems possible that carbon storage might constitute some common ground
between the parties on the Kyoto track and the U.S. It is an option compatible with
the U.S. emphasis on technology development and a measure that does not threaten
the fundamental interests of important domestic actors within the U.S., i.e., the
coal and oil industries. It is also important that the U.S. was the initiator of the 
17 Press release from the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, May 23, 2004.
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Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. The EU, also a member of the CSLF, is
like the U.S. in emphasizing research and development on carbon capture and
storage, and several R&D programs are ongoing or in the pipeline.
Unfortunately, the scenario of carbon storage complicating the climate negotia-
tions seems more realistic. As has been stated above, there are still many unre-
solved questions regarding the overall feasibility of carbon storage as a measure to
combat climate change on a large scale. There is also a list of more specific issues,
which will have to be solved if carbon storage should be accepted as a climate
measure. One such issue is whether it should be treated as a sink, with all that
implies in the climate regime, or whether it should be counted as emission reduc-
tions (Bode and Jung 2004). Another set of problems will be connected to certifi-
cation and verification procedures for storage sites.18 And third, as would be highly
relevant for Norway, it is necessary to determine how to share credits for CO2
reductions in situations where capture and storage are taking place in different
countries.
What will be the consequences of bringing these issues into the climate negotia-
tions in the near future? Carbon storage is still very uncertain, and a lot of new
controversies are likely to erupt. Furthermore, if carbon storage is brought into the
negotiations, the discussions will have a conditional character since there are still
fundamental technical uncertainties. To clarify and develop the option, consider-
able economic resources are needed. It is easy to imagine that these efforts will be
at the expense of other options that are already at hand, i.e., energy conservation
and renewable energy. This will create tension in the negotiations.
We will argue that bringing the issue of carbon capture and storage into the cli-
mate negotiations at this time will probably do more bad than good. The questions
of monitoring, verification, selection of storage sites and public confidence should
be allowed to mature outside the climate negotiations before the issue is fully dis-
cussed within the framework of the UNFCCC. Also, the potential to constitute
common ground between the U.S. and the Kyoto Parties would probably be higher
if these issues are allowed to develop further outside the climate negotiations.
This argument does not disregard carbon storage as a possible future option.
According to the most optimistic analyses, carbon storage offers a possibility to
deal with a substantial share of the world’s CO2 emissions over many years. This
“service” can, in principle, be made available to many emitters and many coun-
tries. But there are a limited number of countries where the required geological
structures can be found. These countries, which include Norway, will have an
additional interest in developing carbon capture and storage as a feasible technol-
ogy. They will be able to charge customers for the use of storage capacity. Thus, it
can be argued that they will have a strong economic self-interest in developing
solutions for carbon capture and storage, and that it should not be necessary to use
mechanisms negotiated at the global level to support research and development
for this purpose. In other words, the collective action problem associated with sev-
eral forms of development and transfer of technology will be much less pro-
nounced in the case of carbon capture and storage, since the number of users
18 Some of those issues are discussed in Torvanger, Kalbekken and Rypdal 2004.
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will be limited by the natural distribution of storage sites. Nevertheless, the need
for international cooperation—among storage “owners” to reduce costs is there,
and also to develop environmentally-solid methods for selection of storage sites
and monitoring.
To a large extent, such a “regionalization” of carbon capture and storage develop-
ment outside the global climate negotiations is actually what has happened, with
the establishment of various fora, as mentioned above. The argument here is that
the development should continue along these lines until sufficient certainty about
environmental as well as economic aspects of carbon storage has been reached.
The prospects for realization of carbon storage as a climate policy measure might,
in fact, be better if the issue is not brought into the framework of COPs/MOPs for
the time being. In other words, carbon capture and storage belongs in the debate
and research efforts about future climate policy measures, but not yet in the nego-
tiations about a post-Kyoto climate regime.
Technology
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Fulfilling basic development needs 
with low emissions1
China’s challenges and opportunities for building a 
post-2012 climate regime
Jiahua Pan, Xianli Zhu and Ying Chen
Research Centre for Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Abstract
Fulfilling multi-dimensional basic needs is an essential element of human rights.
Economic development builds up the material basis for satisfying basic needs, but
pursuit of a low-emissions path is a substantial challenge for a developing country
like China. Large amounts of energy-intensive investment has to be made to accu-
mulate fixed stocks of physical infrastructure, capital and durable goods. High levels
of energy flows are also required to meet daily needs such as cooking, lighting,
heating and cooling, in addition to the maintenance, operation and renewal of the
fixed stocks. Compared to developed countries, where fixed stocks have already
been built up, a rapidly industrializing China is at the stage of increasing both
stocks and flows of carbon. However, there exist many opportunities for China to
contribute positively to building a post-2012 climate regime through no-regrets
commitments to greenhouse gas emission reductions.
1. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, and the post-2012 inter-
national negotiations are set to begin at the end of 2005. With the major parties
having significant disputes about some key issues, the process of building an inter-
national climate regime has reached an important crossroads. Ever since the Kyoto
Protocol was negotiated in 1997, increasing attention has been paid to the archi-
tecture of post-2012 commitment frameworks.
One fundamental issue for emission reductions is baseline setting. In the Kyoto
Protocol, the baselines for industrialized countries are their respective 1990 emis-
sions levels. This choice of base year is reasonable, as these countries had already
built up fixed stocks of carbon and emissions-intensive infrastructure and reached
a relatively high level of carbon and emission flows in both the residential and
public sectors. Both fixed stocks and flows of carbon and emissions were sufficient
to meet basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, mobility and the like in these coun-
tries. Although a few Annex I Parties did require a change of the base year, such
1 The authors acknowledge the kind assistance from other staff members at the Research Centre for
Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in the process of preparing this
paper. Comments and suggestions were also received from the participants at the Workshop on a
Post-Kyoto Policy Regime in Beijing, January 19–20, 2005. The members of the South-North
Dialogue team provided valuable input for further work on the idea of emissions for human devel-
opment at a Workshop in Capetown, South Africa, January 22–25, 2004. However, the views are
those of the authors and the authors bear responsibility for any errors.
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changes are in general close to the baseline. The United States withdrew from the
Protocol, but it has never protested against the setting of the base year.
Developing country Parties are not required to make any commitment to emission
reductions under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. Instead, development is
acknowledged as a priority over emission reductions in these countries. Evidently,
not a single developing country would accept as a baseline the levels of emissions
in a past year, since both stocks and flows of carbon have been associated with eco-
nomic activity too low to meet basic needs. An alternative would be to set a
dynamic baseline some distant time in the future, but the development process in
many developing countries is so uncertain that no one can say for sure when and
how basic needs will be met. Moreover, there is a methodological issue of how to
understand and evaluate basic needs and how demand for emissions is linked to
or embedded in basic needs.
In this paper, an attempt is made to understand and define basic needs and their
relationship to GHG emissions. Fulfillment of basic needs has to be through a
development process that builds up energy-intensive stocks and energy flows to
levels sufficient to satisfy basic needs. As China is in the process of rapid industrial-
ization and urbanization, energy consumption and emissions have been increasing
quickly to build energy-intensive, man-made capital stocks and to raise energy
flows. We assume that for a given level of stocks and flows of energy, an alternative
low-emissions path is possible. The challenges China faces in its development can
be overwhelming, but there exist opportunities for its participation in building an
international climate regime. In the final section, we discuss methodological issues
and draw conclusions about China’s potential to mitigate global climate change.
2. Basic needs and their implications for welfare and 
emissions 
Fulfillment of basic needs is ethically well-grounded and politically undisputed, as
this is an essential part of human rights. Basic needs are finite from a biological
perspective, but are also subject to environmental and physical constraints.
Elements of basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter are not measured in
terms of carbon, but they are linked to carbon and energy consumption, and con-
sequently to emissions as well.
2.1 Basic needs as an issue of rights and limits
Human welfare is multi-dimensional and the satisfaction of basic needs is an
immediate and imperative goal for human development (Sen 1985). However,
human development is not a process associated with unlimited resource demand.
In terms of material consumption, there is a biological limit. Furthermore, there
are physical and environmental limits as well due to the finite nature of the Earth.
In fact, basic needs satisfaction is the foundation for conceptualizing sustainable
development (WCED 1987, p. 43), which requires meeting the basic needs of both
current and future generations. Therefore, human welfare is a function of basic
needs but subject to biological and physical constraints (Pan 2003).
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Individuals and communities of a society are entitled to development rights,
including social, economic and political liberties (Dasgupta 1993, p. 40).
Communities are highlighted here because individual human beings are organized
into social entities with demands for consumption of public goods and services.
Some basic needs are required to make survival possible, while others are identi-
fied with “positive freedom,” i.e., with the ability “to be somebody, not nobody; a
doer-deciding, not being decided for” (Berlin 1969, p. 131).
From a biological perspective, elements such as nutrition, shelter, sanitation,
health care and primary education are essential for the continuation and func-
tioning of individuals and communities. Positive freedom often refers to civil and
political rights that are non-material and non-physiological, such as the right to
vote and to be elected, freedom of speech, protection of individual dignity, and
security of legitimately-acquired private properties (Sen 1985; Dasgupta 1993).
Given the discussion above, the satisfaction of basic needs is an essential part of
human rights that individual human beings are entitled to have, but there are dif-
ferences in the level of basic needs satisfaction among individuals, groups and
regions.
Unlike basic needs, which are subject to certain biological limits, luxury and waste-
ful demands tend to be unlimited. For instance, nutritional needs for growth and
daily activities are in the range of 2,500 to 3,200 calories per day per person.
Excessive nutritional intake actually causes harm to health, such as obesity, high
blood pressure and hyperglycemia. These harms would require consumption of
more resources (including time, financial and material resources) in order to
reduce damages. Since land resources are fixed, “the bigger the better” is not an
appropriate standard to apply to house construction. Only one bed is needed for
sleep no matter how big a house one has. Few people can live a life longer than 100
years despite continuous efforts to increase life expectancy.
Due to biological and physical limits, basic needs satisfaction should take priority
over luxury and wasteful consumption. Efficient allocation of resources can lead
to profit maximization, but development rights should be respected to guarantee
the satisfaction of basic needs and the political and economic interests of individ-
uals, especially the most disadvantaged.
2.2 Matrix of basic needs 
Basic needs are multi-dimensional, but they fall into two broad categories: physi-
cal and spiritual needs. Physical needs have to be satisfied through material
resource consumption. Spiritual needs, to a large extent, also have to be met with
the support of material conditions. For instance, a concert is basically for spiritual
enjoyment, but a concert hall is needed to make it possible. A tour to see beautiful
landscapes does not “consume” the landscape, but to realize it, transport, food,
accommodation and other material support is necessary. Spiritual satisfaction
itself is not necessarily measured by material consumption, but material needs are
required to support non-material consumption. Therefore, in Table 1, only mate-
rial needs with direct physical measurements are given for understanding the
nature of different types of basic needs.
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Stocks are capital goods and durable consumption products that last a relatively
long time. Physical infrastructure is a typical example of capital goods that once
built is not replaced every year. Both private housing and public buildings are con-
structed for useful lives of decades. Many durable goods are also in this category,
such as cars and electric appliances. By contrast, flows are normally for instant
consumption, such as food, clothing, energy for cooking and heating. Nothing is
left after consumption, except perhaps waste. Nevertheless, it is not easy to draw a
clear line between stocks and flows. Some temporary buildings and some clothing
are designed for short-term use but can last years.
Table 1. Matrix of basic needs
Fixed stocks Variable flows
Private needs Clothes NA Decent seasonal clothes
Food NA Variety of food products, cooking
Shelter Housing Maintenance, lighting
Mobility Cars/bicycles Fuel and maintenance
Utilities Electric appliances Heating, air-conditioning, use of appliances
Public needs Clothes NA NA
Food NA NA
Shelter Government Maintenance, lighting
offices, educational,
cultural and sports 
facilities, hospitals,
etc.
Mobility Infrastructure Maintenance and daily operation
(railways, roads,
airports) and 
vehicles
Utilities/ Public utilities  Maintenance and daily operation
infrastructure (water supply,
electricity, gas 
pipelines, etc.) 
and urban 
infrastructure  
(roads, subways,
wastewater 
treatment, etc.)
Note: NA: not applicable 
From a biological and socio-cultural perspective, elements of basic needs must
include clothing, food, shelter, mobility, utility and institutional services such as
public security, law and order, education, health care and cultural events. Some of
the needs are for individual or private purposes only, such as food and clothing,
while others are of a public nature, such as government buildings and infrastructure.
Some elements can serve both public and private purposes, e.g., shelter. Residential
housing is for individual consumption, while public buildings are constructed for
collective or public needs. As for mobility, there are private vehicles and public trans-
port facilities and services. With respect to utilities, lighting, cooking and household
appliance use are in the category of individual needs; but equipment and construc-
tion of infrastructure facilities are in general for collective or public needs.
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For collective needs, fixed stock goods include public buildings, public vehicles,
physical infrastructure, utilities and durable goods consumed for public services.
By contrast, many material needs have to be met on a regular basis. Examples
include food and clothing for individuals, energy consumption for heating and
cooling buildings, fuel consumption by vehicles, and energy consumption by pub-
lic buildings and infrastructure.
In summary, basic needs can be fulfilled by both goods intended for private con-
sumption and by goods and services intended for public and collective consump-
tion. In addition to a flow of consumables, a certain amount of stock of capital and
durable goods is required to meet basic needs.
2.3 Carbon requirement for basic needs
In Table 1, basic needs do not include carbon, but all the elements of basic needs
imply the consumption of carbon-containing resources. Although the carbon con-
tent of agricultural products comes from the atmosphere through photosynthesis
and is, therefore, carbon neutral, agricultural production consumes carbon-
intensive industrial products such as inorganic fertilizers and energy for machinery
and irrigation. Furthermore, food processing and cooking in much of the world also
consumes commercial energy. Similar logic holds true for all the other elements of
basic needs. In a way, capital stocks and durables are a kind of carbon stock for basic
needs. Construction materials for buildings are highly energy-intensive, so a build-
ing represents a certain fixed carbon stock. Even after the lifetime of the building
expires, much of the stored carbon can be reused or disposed of with limited emis-
sions of carbon. For instance, steel recovered from dismantled buildings can be recy-
cled without going through the energy-intensive process of mining iron ore and
making iron in a blast furnace.
Nevertheless, carbon itself is not a necessity for human welfare. For instance, steel-
making requires electricity. If electricity is generated from fossil fuel combustion,
carbon emissions are unavoidable, but little carbon would be emitted if the elec-
tricity were from hydropower or wind turbines. This would suggest that develop-
ment for fulfillment of basic needs could be de-carbonized.
In practice, it may not be easy to set a universal quantitative definition of basic
needs. However, the level of consumption across countries can give some indica-
tion on the fulfillment of basic needs. In the next section, we examine cross-sec-
tional data and make some empirical estimates for China as a possible baseline for
participation in building a post-2012 climate regime.
3. Assessment of basic needs satisfaction in context
Basic needs have to be understood in context. Fulfillment of basic needs can be a
long process, like economic development. It may not be easy to arrive at a criterion
with consensus, but the numbers should fall within a certain range. Therefore, it is
useful to look at current levels of consumption in different countries and observe
the gaps. After examination of individual indicators, overall levels of development
among countries are compared to show that development represents the means to
meet basic needs.
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3.1 Clothing and food
Clothing and food are essential biological needs, although the former can vary
greatly depending on quality of life. However, the primary function of clothing is
simply to keep warm and look decent. Fashion does not represent an essential com-
ponent of basic needs. In 2000, world fibre consumption was 53.1 million tonnes
and per capita consumption was 8.7 kg. Per capita consumption in North American
was 36.1 kg, while in China it was only 6.6 kg per person. China is below the world
average in terms of per capita consumption, but the gap is relatively small.
Nutrition is essential for survival and normal life. UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) statistics indicate that food consumption by the average
Chinese person is slightly higher than the world average and about 10 per cent
higher than the average for developing countries, suggesting that nutritional
intake in China is close to and has probably reached the level of basic needs.
3.2 Buildings
Buildings are stocks that have to be accumulated to fulfill both private and public
needs. They provide shelters for family life and public services and have to reach a
certain level of quality for long-time use and be equipped with necessary facilities
to provide a particular level of comfort.
Building stocks for urban residents in China in 2003 are close to the median world
level according to a 1990 survey, but in rural areas only a small proportion of
housing is made of steel and concrete. Furthermore, many rural houses suffer
from poor heat insulation and lack necessary sanitation facilities.
In addition to private housing, collective or public buildings are also an essential
part of basic needs. Under this category are buildings for commercial interests,
services, offices, education, research, culture and entertainment. In developing
countries, the commercial and service sectors are underdeveloped, and education,
research, medical, culture and entertainment facilities are far from satisfying social
development needs.
3.3 Transport
Car ownership among the Chinese urban population was 1.36 cars per 100 families
in 2003. This is much lower than the 40 to 90 cars per 100 families in developed
countries.
Transport infrastructure constitutes one of the largest capital stocks in an economy.
As industrialization and urbanization proceed, accumulation of transport infra-
structure accelerates and reaches a level sufficient to support basic needs. The
stocks include urban infrastructure, roads, railways, airports and harbours.
Developed countries have passed this period of physical expansion and their
transport systems have generally reached saturation. Developing countries’ trans-
port network densities are far lower than those of developed countries.
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3.4 Utilities 
Public utility infrastructure facilities include heat supply, gas supply, water supply,
electricity supply, telecommunications, solid waste disposal, wastewater treatment,
etc. In the past few years, with economic development, public utility infrastructure
facilities have attracted investors. In the course of rapid urbanization, much more
needs to be built. For instance, most Chinese cities do not now have adequate facil-
ities for treating municipal solid waste and wastewater.
3.5 Levels of overall development
The underlying causes behind the gaps are the large differences in levels of eco-
nomic development between developed countries and developing countries, rep-
resented by per capita income, urbanization level, economic structure and
employment structure (see Table 2).
Table 2. A comparison of major development indicators among selected countries
Per capita Per capita  Urbanization  Share of agriculture Proportion of labor 
GDP (US$) GDP (PPP) level (%) in GDP (%) employed in 
2001 2001 2001 2002 agriculture (%)
USA 35,277 34,320 77% 2% 2%
U.K. 24,219 24,160 89% 1% 1%
South Korea 8,917 15,090 82% 4% 10%
Japan 32,601 25,130 79% 1% 5%
Russia 2,140 7,100 73% 6% -
China 911 4,020 38% 15% 46%
India 462 2,840 28% 23% 60%
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2003,Tables 5 and 12;World Development Indicators 2004,Table
4.2
The UNDP (2004) Human Development Indicator (HDI) is often used to meas-
ure human development levels for cross-country comparisons (Figure 1). If the
criterion is set at HDI>0.8, per capita GDP should be no less than US$8,000. In
this case, China is half-way to basic needs fulfillment using PPP measurement, but
only one-eighth of the way using exchange rate measurement of GDP.
The above assessment reveals that basic needs for survival, i.e., food and clothing
are close to the level of fulfillment, while stocks like buildings and physical infra-
structure and flows like energy and electricity are well below the world averages.
In the next section, the development stage in China is examined and estimates of
energy and emissions demands for fulfillment of basic needs are made.
Development and Assistance
95
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 95
Figure 1. Human Development Indicator (HDI) and per capita income
4. Challenges for China to realize basic development 
targets
In the development process, survival needs in China do not pose a challenge, as
they do in the least developed nations. The major challenge for China is to con-
solidate the necessities and increase both the quantity and quality of basic needs
for stocks and utility flows. As clothing and food are close to the levels of basic
needs satisfaction, the analysis here focuses on the stocks of utility flows.
4.1 Transitional stage from labour-intensive to capital-intensive
industrialization
The experience of developed countries shows that basic needs are met to differing
degrees in accordance with stages of development (Chenery 1986). At early stages,
the economy is normally labour-intensive due to a lack of capital and a large
supply of unskilled labour. Later, a transition from labour- to capital-intensive
industrialization takes place, characterized by massive investment in infrastruc-
ture, utilities, buildings for residential and public uses, and heavy machinery and
equipment.
The primary driving force for increase in energy consumption is the growth of the
economy and consumption. During the last two decades of the 20th century, the
Chinese economy more than quadrupled. However, the increase in energy con-
sumption grew at a much slower rate, only doubling during the same period. At
the turn of the century, the Chinese government set the target to quadruple its
GDP again by 2020. Given the experience of a doubling energy consumption to
support quadrupling GDP from 1980 to 2000, the projection made by the Energy
Research Institute in China was very optimistic (Zhou et al. 2003); considering
technological progress and development of renewable energy, the projected
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demand for 2010 was 1.9 billion tce2 and for 2020 around 2.8 billion tce. But in the
last few years, this “authoritative” projection has proved to be too low. The actual
figure increased from 1.30 billion in 2000 to 1.97 billion tce in 2004, exceeding the
projection for 2010 six years earlier than expected.
Industrialization and urbanization are energy-intensive processes and require
large amounts of energy. Energy consumption for industrial production increases
for two reasons: share and size of the industrial sector in the economy. Half a cen-
tury ago, China was primarily an agrarian society. Until the early 1970s, industrial
output accounted only for one third of the national total, but this share exceeded
50 per cent 30 years later. Traditional agriculture requires a very limited amount of
commercial energy. In 2004, the agricultural sector accounted for only 15.2 per
cent of China’s GDP, with that of industry as high as 53 per cent and the service
sector 31.8 per cent. Urban physical infrastructure is currently inadequate and
requires large-scale construction and improvement. Within about 20 years, another
300 million rural people, out of the current 900 million in rural China, will
become urban residents. They will shift from traditional non-commercial, carbon-
neutral biomass to commercial fossil energy, and for these people, energy-intensive
urban infrastructure has to be constructed and kept running.
4.2 Estimated amount of building stocks to meet basic needs 
At the end of the transitional stage from labour- to capital-intensive industrializa-
tion, basic needs for capital stocks and utilities will be fulfilled. To illustrate the
scale of energy demand and a possible baseline for emissions commitments, two
sectors are estimated here: the buildings sector accumulation of capital stocks; and
the utilities sector flows needed to supply buildings. For details of methodological
issues and estimates of other sectors, information is available in Pan et al. (2005).
For calculation of capital stocks for buildings, assumptions of population and per
capita building space have to be made. At the beginning of 2005, China’s popula-
tion reached 1.3 billion. To simplify analysis, this figure is used as the population
in the basic needs projection. The other key factor is the rate of urbanization.
Currently, 40 per cent of the Chinese population is in urban areas and the rest are
rural residents. We assume that at the end of capital-intensive industrialization, 80
per cent of the population will live in cities and 20 per cent in rural areas. This
implies that 585 million rural people will move from rural to urban areas.
Current building space for urban residents is 23.7 m2 per capita and for rural res-
idents it is 27.2 m2 per capita. In rural regions, however, only a quarter of the
building space is constructed with steel and concrete, i.e., 8.53 m2 per capita.
Therefore, the current level of rural housing counts only this latter part towards
meeting basic human needs, since wood and earth houses are not equipped with
running water and flush toilets.
Taking into account the huge population and low per capita land area in China,
we assume that residential area of 25 m2 is needed for each person to satisfy basic
needs. For collective or public needs, we adopt a figure of 15 m2, following urban 
2 One metric ton of standard coal equivalent (tce) equals 29.31 GJ.
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statistics and planning guidelines in China. Adding private housing and public
building areas together, a total of 40 m2 will meet basic needs for urban people. For
rural people, an additional 10 m2 per capita is included in the calculation, as farm-
ers require space for farm animals and agricultural tools.
The results of the estimates are as follows. In total, residential building space and
public service buildings would amount to 35.1 billion m2 and 19.5 billion m2 to
meet basic needs for shelter. Existing stocks of residential housing and public
buildings total 24.7 billion m2, and the additional amount needed to meet basic
needs for residential and public uses is estimated to be 29.9 billion m2.
Current Chinese statistics and design parameters suggest that to build each square
metre of floor space requires 67.5 kg of steel and 142.1 kg of cement. Assuming
steel and cement use in construction remains unchanged in the next few decades,
new building stocks of 29.9 billion m2 would require 2.02 billion tonnes of steel
and 4.25 billion tonnes of cement to be produced.
In 2003, China built 550 million m2 of housing and public buildings, so even with-
out considering depreciation and replacement of existing buildings, it would take
around 30 years to satisfy the basic need for housing and public buildings. In 2004,
China’s total cement output was 0.97 billion tonnes, up 12.5 per cent from the pre-
vious year and its total steel output was 0.297 billion tonnes, up 23.3 per cent—
both record highs. As steel is also used in infrastructure construction and the man-
ufacturing sector, a large proportion of cement is used in road, dam and other
infrastructure construction, their current production levels, if sustained in the
years to come, would also imply that it will take about 30 years before China sat-
isfies the basic housing and public building needs of its population.
4.3 Estimated energy flows in the buildings sector for basic needs
satisfaction
Energy used in the buildings sector accounts for 30 per cent of the world total
energy consumption. Space cooling and heating in the buildings represents
around 60 per cent of energy consumption in the buildings sector, including both
residential housing and public service buildings. Among the energy needs of dif-
ferent countries, basic energy needs for space heating and cooling are closely related
to climate conditions. Due to the influence of the East Asia Continental monsoon,
China is colder in winter and hotter in summer than the average temperatures of
other regions of the same latitudes. This unfavourable climate makes cooling and
heating needs a major source of energy consumption.
According to the engineering designing codes for heating in residential and pub-
lic buildings, five climate regions are delineated with different heating and cooling
requirements.
In calculating energy demand, government standards for heating and cooling are
adopted as the basic needs level. This represents a conservative estimate, since most
buildings in China, including new buildings, are considerably less efficient than
building energy standards call for. In winter, indoor room temperatures are assumed
to be equal to or higher than 16°C while in summer indoor temperatures are assumed
to be kept at 26°C. Total building space follows the analysis above, at 54.6 billion m2.
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Technologies used for heating and cooling in the buildings sector follow building
codes. District heating is assumed in the cold and severe cold regions, while air
conditioners are assumed to be used for cooling in areas of hot summers and cold
winters. Sources of energy for heating include coal, gas and electricity while for
cooling, only electricity is used. In the calculation, heating and cooling are pro-
vided when people are at work or at home, with no cooling or heating during the
rest of the day. National survey data are used to set the hours for daily operation
of heating and cooling.
Energy needs for heating and cooling are closely related to the insulation quality
of houses and buildings. To reduce energy use and GHG emissions, one key meas-
ure is improvement of building insulation. Another measure is changing heat sup-
ply approaches. In areas without built-in central heating systems, people tend to
use electric heaters and air conditioners, which consume more energy than central
heating. In all the calculations, the assumption is to follow national standards,
though many buildings do not comply with standards in order to lower the cost of
building construction.
Table 3. Energy demand for basic needs satisfaction in the buildings sector
Residential buildings Mtce % Commercial, government and service buildings Mtce %
Heating and cooling 610 54 Urban heating and cooling 290 51
Lighting 60 5.3 Urban lighting, appliances and equipment 220 38 
Electric appliances 300 27 Rural heating and cooling 50 8 
Cooking and water heating 140 12 Rural lighting, appliances and equipment 10 1.8 
Water supply 20 1.7
Subtotal 1,130 100 Subtotal 570 100
Grand total 1,700
Energy demand is also estimated in the buildings sector for cooking (households
and restaurants) and electric appliances (household appliances, lighting, ventila-
tion, office equipment). Survey data from national statistics are used to calculate
energy consumption to meet basic needs in the buildings sector.
In the buildings sector, the current stock only meets about 45 per cent of basic
needs. At the current rate of construction, 30 to 50 years would be required to ful-
fill all basic needs. Assuming a lifetime of 50 years for buildings, each year about
one billion m2 of new building space would be required to meet the basic needs
level of 25 m2 per capita residential and 15 m2 public building space. As indicated
in Table 3, total energy flows in the buildings sector would amount to 1,700 Mtce.
In most parts of China, heating is required in winter and cooling is a necessity in
summer. As a result, heating and cooling of buildings account for half of total
energy flows. In fully industrialized economies, energy demand in the buildings
sector is about one-third of total energy use. If this ratio applies, total energy con-
sumption to meet basic needs at a reasonable level of quality of life in China would
reach 5,100 Mtce. This figure is about 2.5 times the current actual consumption
and nearly twice the level of U.S. total energy consumption in 2001. Nevertheless,
per capita energy consumption for fulfillment of basic needs in China would be
only 45 per cent of the U.S. level.
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5. Post-2012 climate regime building
Negotiating the international climate regime is a highly complicated process influ-
enced by multiple factors. The vehicles for post-Kyoto negotiations will not be
confined to the UNFCCC process; bilateral, multilateral and even unilateral com-
mitments outside the UNFCCC are also likely to take place. Furthermore, the con-
tent of agreements may expand to cover not only mitigation, but also adaptation,
technologies and low carbon development. In the end, it is likely that a basket of
agreements will be concluded under the overall framework of sustainable devel-
opment. In the next 20 years or so, China will engage in large-scale and rapid
industrialization and urbanization. When choosing among different climate
agreements, China has to consider the reduction of possible risks, avoid inflexible
restrictions, and actively participate in the negotiation and formulation of inter-
national regimes to safeguard and promote its sustainable development.
5.1 Likely climate regime
Major factors influencing the negotiation progress
Future international climate negotiations are influenced by different factors, of
which the most important ones include political will, economic interests and sci-
entific knowledge. Political will depends in part on international relations, in addi-
tion to domestic factors. The United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is
partially due to economic considerations, but more importantly, due to a lack of
political will and consideration of its global strategies. Russia finally ratified the
Kyoto Protocol because of a combination of many factors, among which political
will is also a key driver. Economic interests are a determinant shaping the various
positions taken by different countries, including the possible domestic economic
losses from negative global climate change impacts and the possible economic
costs of GHG emission reductions. Climate change impacts can be a long-term
issue, while the costs of emission reductions are often immediate. Decision-makers
must rely on comprehensive comparison and analysis. Uncertainties related to sci-
entific knowledge also represent a major factor influencing the process of interna-
tional negotiation. Under scientific uncertainty, international climate policy-mak-
ing is subject to adjustment from time to time and among different regions to
reflect advances in scientific understandings.
Multiple approaches to building up the post-2012 climate regime
There will be three major vehicles for post-2012 climate negotiations: continua-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol by amendment; renegotiation of a new protocol under
the UNFCCC; and initiatives outside of the UNFCCC process. The Kyoto Protocol
has entered into force and its architecture can be a sound basis for the second
commitment period negotiation. The EU is determined to follow this approach,
but the United States is unlikely to go back to the Kyoto design, and large devel-
oping countries like China and India find it difficult to accept emissions caps or
limits. A few Parties explicitly refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but not a single
Party has withdrawn from the UNFCCC. Going back to the Convention for post-
2012 policy negotiation would meet hardly any objection by the Parties. Due to
conflicts of interest and complications of relations among the players, the negoti-
ations will be time-consuming and complex. Therefore, some “like-minded”
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countries may jump out of the UNFCCC process to negotiate treaties for techno-
logical cooperation in the areas of renewable energy development and carbon cap-
ture and storage. Similar to the mechanism of the G20 (Group of 20) Meeting of
Financial Ministers, leaders of the top 20 emitters may agree upon climate change
mitigating actions. Nevertheless, these actions may be linked and fed back to the
UNFCCC process.
A basket of treaties for post-2012 
Any post-2012 climate regime is likely to consist of a basket of treaties. The Kyoto
Protocol aims at emission reductions. Either its amendments or variations will be
included in the basket. Adaptation has been an issue on the agenda and develop-
ing countries are likely to push for an agreement on adaptation. Elements of a
technology treaty are also in their primary shape, covering research, development
and deployment of technologies on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and car-
bon capture and storage. Developing countries have to address climate change
issues in the context of sustainable development and, therefore, a comprehensive
agreement of sustainable development and climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion may also be included in the basket of treaties.
5.2 Opportunities for development with low emissions
Post-2012 climate regime building will be a development-oriented, action-taking
process. Contributing to the process means benefiting from the process. Given the
severe challenges China has to face to fulfil basic needs, active participation in the
climate regime-building process means taking opportunities for development
with low emissions.
Narrowing the technological gaps in energy-intensive industries
Climate change mitigation is not necessarily in conflict with development. As a
developing country Party to the Kyoto Protocol, China is entitled to undertake
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) projects, which would promote sustain-
able development. As China is at the stage of capital-intensive industrialization,
energy and consequently carbon-intensive stocks such as buildings and infra-
structure have to be built up to meet the private and collective basic needs. Table
4 indicates that the gap in energy intensities of important industrial processes
between China and advanced OECD levels falls in the range of 10–30 per cent.
These estimates are conservative as small-scale plants are even less energy efficient.
These gaps represent highly-attractive opportunities for China to cooperate with
the developed nations on technology. As total production and consumption are so
large, energy savings for the four products in 2004 would have been 194 Mtce, if
China had been able to employ the currently available more-efficient technologies.
The energy saving from these four energy intensive products alone would account
for 10 per cent of total energy consumption in China. Reductions of emissions
from these sectors by closing the technological gaps would be as high as 488 mil-
lion tonnes of CO2e.
Potentials in the buildings sector could be even larger if insulation were increased
up to the European level. In rural areas, few have considered insulation. In urban
areas, concrete buildings rarely have insulation either. The heat conducting coeffi-
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cients for roofs and walls in China are normally in the range of 0.6 to 1.5, com-
pared to around 0.3 in Western Europe. As heating and air conditioning are the
most energy-intensive needs, improvement in building insulation would result in
even more energy savings than energy-intensive industrial products.
Table 4. Gaps of energy intensity for selected products between China and the
developed nations
Product Unit China China OECD Gap China  Energy
1990 2002 levels (y-x) output saving 
(x) (y) (2004, Mt) potential
(z) (Mtce)
z*(y-x)
Electricity generation, coal-fired gce/kWh 427 383 316 67 1787.7ba 119.8
Steel (large and medium plants) kgce/t 997 715 646 69 297.23 20.5
Cement (large and medium plants) kgce/t 201.1 172.0 127.7 44.3 970 43.0
Synthetic ammonia (large kgce/t 1343 1215 970 245 45.0 11.0
enterprises using natural gas)
Note: gce = grams of coal equivalent
a  billion kWh. Total output was 2,187 billion kWh; coal-fired electricity accounted for 81.7 per cent
Sources: China Energy Association, Energy Policy Study, 2003. For Output in 2004, China Statistical Bureau,
Statistical Bulletin, 2005
Technological development
Participating in technological cooperation would contribute to emission reduc-
tions and sustainable development in China, and there is potential for technology
transfer to proceed in both directions. For example, there is a lack of certain tech-
nologies for renewable energy development in China, in particular commercial
technologies for large wind turbines and for solar photovoltaic systems. There are,
however, many other renewable technologies in which China is highly competi-
tive, such as solar thermal panels, bio-methane utilization, and small and micro-
hydro power. By 2002, some 40 million m2 of solar water heaters had been
installed, saving the equivalent of 4.86 Mtce in fuel use. Small hydropower pro-
duced some 37.8 Mtce in 2002. Such technologies are fully commercialized and
currently receive no subsidies in China. They can be transferred to other develop-
ing countries as well as developed ones.
Since China is highly dependent on coal, carbon capture and storage would repre-
sent an opportunity to reduce emissions at a later stage when China is able to com-
mit to emission reductions. China can also be a leader in clean coal technologies and
biodiesel, as the market potential is larger than in any other country in the world.
Taking co-benefit into consideration
From a long-term perspective, there are synergies between mitigation and adapta-
tion to climate change. A consortium of experts made a comprehensive assessment
of environmental and climate change in China (Qin et al. 2005). They concluded
that climate change in China follows a pattern and degree similar to the global
trend. Over the past century, the average temperature increased 0.6 to 0.8°C in
China. During the past 50 years, sea levels rose at a rate between 0.10 and 0.25 cm
per year. Global warming will make China more vulnerable to climate-related
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damages, including sea-level rise, drought, flooding, tropical cyclones, sand
storms, heat waves and the like. Many large engineering projects such as irrigation
systems, dams and water diversion are essential for adaptation to climate change,
and they are also subject to possible adverse impacts of climate change. In 2004,
1,282 people died from flooding and coastal storms. Over 37 million hectares of
arable crops suffered flooding and drought, with 4.4 million hectares remaining
unharvested.
There are also many short-term co-benefits from climate change mitigation. Acid
rain is a directly associated with SO2 emissions that come from the burning of
coal. Coal mining is not only dirty but also highly risky to miners. It destroys
underground water systems and leads to ecological damages. On average in China,
each million tonnes of raw coal costs over five lives. In year 2004, some two billion
tonnes of raw coal were produced and more than 10,000 lives were lost. Energy
savings brings about economic gains from an economic viewpoint—in addition
to saved lives. From a strategic perspective, energy efficiency contributes to energy
security.
5.3 Contribution to post-2012 climate regime building
Opportunities do exist for China to contribute to post-2012 climate regime-build-
ing without compromising the goal of satisfying basic needs. In the energy-inten-
sive stage of industrialization, China has to be careful in committing to emission
reductions, but positive no-regrets commitments are consistent with development
goals.
Basic considerations for commitment
As an important player in the global climate regime building, there is no escape for
China. Fulfillment of basic needs is part of human rights that should be protected.
In this regard, some basic considerations have to be taken into account in making
commitments to safeguard development rights and interests, create a climate-
friendly international image and promote sustainable development.
Risks have to be comprehensively assessed. In addition to climate change impacts
and vulnerability, international relations and politics are also worth consideration.
Furthermore, economic implications should be included, too. For instance, out-
side the Kyoto process, a developing country cannot make use of the CDM for
technological and financial sources. If basic needs satisfaction is a fixed target for
China, emissions commitments have to be flexible. Therefore, any definitive and
quantitative targets should be avoided in commitment making.
The post-2012 climate regime will be multi-dimensional. Mitigation is only one
component of the architecture. Adaptation is an issue in China. Technological
cooperation not only contributes to mitigation and adaptation, but also generates
short-term and long-term benefits for China. Short-term benefits include energy
efficiency and commercialization of renewable energy, while long-term ones will
help China tackle the challenges of making quantitative commitments after fulfill-
ment of basic needs in China.
Mitigation and adaptation should not be separated from sustainable development.
Together with many developing country parties, China should take the initiative
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to create a comprehensive framework promoting sustainable development and cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation. Active involvement in the post-2012
negotiation process will generate opportunities for early fulfillment of basic needs
with low emissions.
Voluntary actions
There are many areas in which China has been making contributions to global cli-
mate change mitigation, such as population and social policies, energy efficiency
improvement, renewable energy promotion and greater efforts for environmental
protection. Many climate-friendly energy policies have been under implementation.
With respect to legislation, there have been laws for energy saving and promotion of
renewable energy. In the automobile sector, European emissions standards have
been introduced and enforced, requiring new cars meeting Euro II standards in
2004, while there was virtually no requirement before 2000. Improvement in energy
efficiency has been a primary target in all the “five-year plans.” In the eleventh Five-
Year Plan (2006–2010), aggressive targets are under discussion for energy saving and
efficiency, in line with the “Medium- and Long-Term Goals for Energy Efficiency”
promulgated in 2004. In rural areas, the government allocates 10 billion RMB
(US$1.25 billion) each year to subsidize the use of biogas, thereby reducing the con-
sumption of coal and unsustainably-harvested biofuels.
Conditional initiatives
Taking the opportunity to achieve low-carbon development is also a huge chal-
lenge to China. The potential for energy savings in energy-intensive sectors is sub-
stantial, but an external push may help China to realize reductions without com-
promising development goals. Therefore, emission reductions initiatives have to
be conditional on (1) transfer of technologies or financial assistance by developed
country parties; and (2) fulfillment of basic needs through development. These
conditions also imply that costs of emission reductions in developing countries are
lower than those in investing countries, otherwise there would be no incentives for
such transfers of resources from one party to another.
Behavioural adjustment
In reality, there exist luxurious and wasteful uses of energy and emissions in both
the developed and developing countries. Since luxurious and wasteful consump-
tion can be unlimited, for environmental sustainability and equity considerations
it is necessary to restrict them. Environmental and climate awareness can stimu-
late people to take action, but financial incentives will be essential to discourage
luxury and wasteful emissions. For basic needs satisfaction, a lower rate of tax or
even a subsidy may apply on energy consumption and emissions. However, for
luxury emissions, the tax rate should be high enough to curb wasteful behaviour.
It should be noted that this scheme does not entail eliminating luxury or wasteful
emissions. This is for several reasons: (1) it is against human nature to forbid lux-
ury consumption; (2) as earning power varies widely among individuals, a small
handful of consumer groups or even ordinary consumers may be able or willing
to enjoy some degree of luxury; and (3) the pursuance of luxury is an incentive to
creativity and innovation and also contributes to fiscal revenues for income redis-
tribution.
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6. Discussion and conclusions
The analysis in this paper builds upon the conceptual understanding of basic
needs to demonstrate that they can be fulfilled through development with low
emissions. A methodological framework was established to differentiate types of
basic needs. Basic needs include individual private needs and collective public
needs. Food and clothing are examples of exclusively private basic needs, while
physical infrastructure and public buildings fulfil public needs. Both private and
collective needs at a basic level are essential for survival and decent living. Some of
the basic needs have to be satisfied with capital stocks that are accumulated for
long-term consumption while others are fulfilled with a constant flow of consum-
able goods and services. Physical infrastructure and buildings (both public and
private residential) are typical capital stocks. During construction, large amounts
of energy and carbon intensive materials are required, but their maintenance and
operation require much less annual energy consumption. For elements of basic
needs in the flow category, goods and services are “consumed” to meet human
needs, e.g., electricity consumption in the public and household sectors.
An assessment of the key elements of basic needs reveals that the level of fulfill-
ment between developing and developed countries varies widely. The gaps are
generally smaller for private individual needs, while they can be large for collec-
tive needs. With respect to food and clothing, China is close to fulfillment of
basic needs. In the urban sector, residential housing has also reached a moderate
level. However, urbanization will require additional building space of 29.9 bil-
lion m2 to meet basic needs defined as 25 m2 per capita for private housing and
15 m2 per capita for public and commercial buildings. At the current rate of con-
struction of about one billion m2 a year, this would mean that the capital stock
of buildings would need another 30 years to accumulate. These stocks, once
built, do not need to be replaced every year, but depreciation, maintenance and
operation will demand a flow of energy consumption. In the buildings sector, a
considerable amount of energy is required daily for operation. Due to China’s
unfavourable climate conditions, heating and cooling are needed for buildings
in most parts of the country. Estimates suggest that some 1.7 billion tce would
be required to provide heating, air conditioning, operation of electric appli-
ances, lighting, cooking and water heating. Considering social (population) and
climatic conditions, total energy demand for fulfillment of basic needs in China
would exceed five billion tce, two and a half times the 2004 level and nearly twice
the U.S. level in 2001. Nevertheless, in per capita terms, an average Chinese, for
fulfillment of basic needs, would demand 45 per cent of the American con-
sumption in 2001.
For post-2012 climate regime building, there exist opportunities for China to meet
basic needs with low emissions. Eliminating the technological gaps in four sectors
(steel, electricity, cement and ammonia) alone would save 194 million tce each
year at 2004 production levels, accounting for 10 per cent of total energy con-
sumption in 2004. Associated emission reductions would be as high as 488 million
tCO2. Since a post-2012 climate regime is likely to consist of different treaties,
China can contribute to the building process for all the elements, including miti-
gation, adaptation, technological development, and mitigation and adaptation for
sustainable development. As an important player in climate regime-building,
Development and Assistance
105
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 105
China can lead in taking voluntary actions and joint mitigation initiatives. One
last point to make is that luxurious and wasteful emissions should be restricted.
Although the results in this paper can be illustrative, the analysis is incomplete and
a great deal of work is needed to take advantage of the opportunities China has.
Furthermore, extension of this type of analysis to other countries would generate
a comparative picture that would be useful in guiding concerted global actions.
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The role of development assistance 
and investment flows
John Drexhage
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Canada
1. Introduction
Over the last 10–15 years of negotiations covering both the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol, two things have become increasingly evident. First, development
assistance and overall investment flows to developing countries will play a critical
part in laying the foundation for any active global regime on climate change.
Second, however, there has been very little progress in reaching any satisfactory
agreements on these very same issues, particularly as they relate to technology
transfer and addressing the impacts of and actions on climate change.
The roots of the problem lay in the contradiction between overall levels of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) funds, which have been declining for 20 years,
and rising obligations to provide ODA. The commitments laid out in the
Convention and the Protocol appear to many, particularly in the NGO and devel-
oping country communities, to formally oblige Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries to “bankroll” climate-change-
related activities in addition to the financing they are already providing through
ODA. Moreover, it is unlikely that we will see any strong reversal in the decline in
total ODA funding, even accounting for climate-change-related activities. The
result has been an acrimonious negotiating dynamic with not much hope for
reaching a satisfactory resolution on either side.
This may change over the year, with the strong push by the U.K., as host of this
year’s G-8 summit, for OECD countries to commit to using .7 per cent of their
GDP towards financing ODA activities. But we must be realistic about the
prospects for major donors, particularly the U.S. and Japan, to agree to such an
objective. Up until now, they are adamant in their opposition to formally com-
mitting towards such an objective, and while the jury is still out with respect to
Canada, it is currently far away from reaching such an objective.
Nor has the issue of climate change been effectively integrated in the mainstream
activities of development agencies. Developing countries have, for the most part,
not identified climate change as an issue of concern to development agencies. A
number of analyses have indicated that, while there have been some successful ini-
tiatives, particularly those related to supporting G77 and China in their National
Communications and, to a lesser extent, helping them develop National
Adaptation Strategies, these successes have not spread into “normal” technical
assistance. In other words, the strong linkages that do exist between the threat of
climate change and poverty eradication and development are still not appreciated
at the field level.
A challenge on the donor side is to engage finance and development planners
effectively in the climate policy discussion, whereas recipients have to acknowledge
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that new funds can only be effectively harnessed if their use is likely to be more
effective than in the past. While developing countries have, for the most part, not
identified climate change as an issue of concern to development agencies, in nego-
tiating forums they have been badgering OECD countries for significant new and
additional funds as a quid pro quo for cooperation on climate change. There are
ways to fix these issues in ODA, and they are finally beginning to try and fix them.
For example, there is an increasing number of initiatives looking at the issues of
climate and development together (as the Brundtland report and many others
since have advocated), and looking to engage finance and development planners
in those discussions.
The mainstreaming of climate issues with development priorities means paying
more attention to the “co-benefits” of climate mitigation and local environments,
integration of mitigation and adaptation at project and policy levels, realizing that
in many respects, they can be complementary drivers. It also means broadening
the scope of current market mechanisms, such as Joint Implementation (JI) and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover sectoral, policy and sub-
national initiatives. It could also mean finding ways to include developing coun-
tries in emissions-, or allowance-based, trading.
From the development perspective, this means the climate change issue working
to effectively reflect mainstream priorities in the development of sustainable energy
systems (re: mitigation) and sustainable natural resource management practices
(re: adaptation).
On the energy question, the recently sponsored Energy for Development World
Conference, held in the Netherlands in December 2004, represents an excellent ini-
tiative from which to build. The five action areas it identified in the Chair’s conclu-
sions—widening access to energy services; mainstreaming energy in the development
process; improving/protecting the environment and health impacts to climate
change; enhancing financing options for energy development, covering public and
private sector investments; and a focus on developing a market-based approach,
with special attention paid to removing energy subsidies that distort the market or
inhibit sustainable development—are an excellent “launching pad” for developing
a realistic and integrated future mitigation regime on climate change that seeks to
address both development and global environmental priorities.
It is also clear that any post-2012 climate change regime, in the context of devel-
opment, must also effectively address the issue of impacts and adaptation. There
is a core equity issue here that must be recognized—namely that those sectors of
the world’s population most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (the
poor, particularly in Africa, small island states, Latin America and Asia, along with
indigenous peoples of the Arctic) are the least responsible, in the matter of GHG
emissions, for the impending reality of climate change. And it is in this area, where
the role of the private sector is far from being clearly understood or defined, that
ODA will, at least over the short and medium term, need to play a prominent role.
While understanding this, a realistic approach would recognize the limitations of
addressing adaptation only through the formal UNFCCC negotiating process. A
necessary complement will be bilateral and multilateral aid agencies effectively
integrating climate variability/change considerations in their mainstream natural
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resource management programs and projects in areas such as agriculture and
forestry.
That said, one must be cautious when addressing the challenge of mainstreaming.
On both sides there are concerns that climate-change response is competing with
other development objectives for funding. Recipient nations are worried that
existing aid budgets will be cut in order to fund the solution to a “developed coun-
try” problem, as the argument came to the fore during the negotiation of use of
ODA for CDM. Since current ODA projects are targeted at areas that directly or
indirectly support climate-change response, there could be ways to resolve these
concerns in a constructive manner.
Still, even if these issues are resolved, ODA alone brings a limited benefit in the
end. The opportunities for large-scale activities that will be significant in terms of
mitigating climate change lie with private investment, including the CDM in a
manner that is more effective than its current overly bureaucratic state. Where
progress really has to be made, and where it will make a difference, is in the mat-
uration of these market opportunities and broadening participation through
incentive-based mechanisms. This will not be easy. An immediate barrier is the
limited willingness to pay by the developed countries. Our case studies for the
existing international environmental financial assistance showed that financial
flows of more than a billion dollars have been extremely difficult to agree upon
and to implement. It is not certain that developed countries will agree to and
implement any scheme that finances the “additional” reductions that could easily
add up to several billion dollars annually. Things can move forward, but only if
countries are open to being innovative.
2. The role of leveraging investments 
For the Kyoto Protocol to take hold and effectively establish a future regime that
endures is to recognize that, above all, with this agreement in force, we are actually
establishing a global investment regime. The implications of this for climate
change and international investment rules, therefore, need to be more explicitly
analyzed. Some work on this has already begun, for example, in understanding the
impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism for foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows (Niederberger et al. 2005), the relationship between FDI, ODA and a
climate change regime, and international investment rules (Werksman et al. 2003),
and we will now look at these a bit more closely.
First of all, with respect to FDI and ODA, there has been an increasing focus on
the need for appropriate host country reforms in the developing world, particu-
larly among least developed countries (LDCs), to ensure effective financial flows
that will be of lasting benefit to recipients. It is becoming increasingly apparent
that it is critical to be able to more effectively make use of FDI flows towards envi-
ronmentally sustainable development (French 1998). To not take greater advan-
tage of these opportunities would result in a situation whereby explicit ODA funds
used for environmental purposes would be completely dwarfed by the interna-
tional flow of private capital and investments. To give but one illustration, between
1990 and 1997, funding from the Global Environment Facility to developing
countries, explicitly established to help developing countries address global envi-
Development and Assistance
111
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 111
ronmental issues, amounted to around US$5.25 billion, while FDI investments
between the North and South, during the same period, amounted to US$250 bil-
lion (Forsyth 1998). As another illustration, it has been estimated that Asia (Japan
excepted) would require approximately US$1 trillion in infrastructure, with about
70 per cent of that needed to meet power and transportation needs (Schmidheiny
1996)—clearly FDI would be the major player in such investments.
This is not to say that all of these FDI investments run counter to the objectives of
GEF, but only to point out the need to seek innovative ways for these funding flows
to more effectively complement each other. And in the context of the climate
change negotiations, while technology transfer and capacity building for develop-
ing countries are all too often approached as a public sector issue, the fact is that
North-South investment is increasingly determined by private-sector financial
flows.
ODA and FDI can, and must, work more effectively together. For example, there is a
mutual interest in both the public and private sector that host countries in the
developing world provide an appropriate enabling environment for such financial
investments to be sustainably used. While much attention, such as in the G-8, has
been focused on issues related to governance and corruption, it is also interesting
to note that analysis has seen a real correlation between expected rates of growth
and FDI flows, so that “the extent to which LDCs can raise their overall growth
rates through a variety of efforts not directly associated with FDI, indirectly these
policies would also affect FDI” (Gastanga 1998). One of these “variety of efforts”
could include ODA flows to needy countries—in other words, properly designed
and implemented, ODA directed towards global environmental goods, can serve
as an effective foundation for much higher private investment flows, for example,
through the use of the CDM. (We will return to the issue of FDI, investment rules
and the CDM below.)
A critical component in this area is the behaviour of financial markets—how can
we work to ensure that financial markets begin to more effectively support sus-
tainable development, including helping to address climate change? The Kyoto
Protocol has provided a very important signal in that regard—through emission
limitation, reduction commitments and its recognition of international market
mechanisms, a global price signal is now being established for greenhouse gas
emissions. By providing a price, pension and capital venture funds are now begin-
ning to take into account the “carbon liability” of relevant industrial activities. This
is no small achievement—while the OECD agreed as far back as 1972 to the “pol-
luter pays” principle, it hardly caused a ripple in the environmental behaviour of
FDI flows. Allocating a real price, even at the relatively moderate stage it is now at,
helps to send that message home.
The use of market mechanisms is also generally recognized as a much more cost
effective means of meeting environmental goals. This is particularly important for
developing countries that may not be able to afford the extra costs of a more reg-
ulatory environment (WB 1992). That said, it is the policies of the public sector,
particularly national governments, which play a crucial role in providing substan-
tive direction for FDI flows. For example, if governments become more willing to
use fiscal policies as a way of incenting eco-friendly investments, and also revise
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their national accounting systems to reflect local and global environmental
impacts, financial markets are likely to pursue more appropriate investment direc-
tions.
Another important element in this equation is the role of multilateral financial
institutions and other risk-taking financial institutions, such as Export Credit
Agencies (ECAs), in leveraging substantial private sector investments. ECAs are
uniquely qualified to play a “bridging role” between the private and public sector,
more specifically in working with host country governments, multilateral lending
institutions, private-sector financial and insurance institutions, and project devel-
opers and equity investors. In effect, ECAs invest or indirectly support develop-
ment activities that are regarded as too risky (e.g., investment returns may take
longer than more traditional investors are willing to accept) for the private and/or
public sector. We would argue that climate-change-friendly investments would be
an effective candidate for such investments.
ECAs are, in other words, experts in risk investments, traditionally covering tech-
nology, commercial, political, legal and financial risks. As environmental issues
will increasingly play a role in defining these risks, one would assume that ECAs
should play a much higher profile than they have up until now. Barriers include a
low level of awareness and understanding of alternative investments in traditional
energy and related sectors, a lack of clear policy and legislative signals from gov-
ernments and little quality information available at the project level. What needs
to be appreciated is that ECAs are reactive institutions and respond best to demon-
strated needs of their exporters and instructions from their shareholders, includ-
ing national governments.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-sector investment arm
of the World Bank Group, is another institution that can play a critical role in
leveraging private-sector investments in addressing climate change. Its overall
mandate is to complement the WB’s support for public-sector projects by provid-
ing financing and technical expertise to the private sector in developing countries
to spur further economic growth on a commercial basis. Recognizing the interna-
tional economic value, through the global carbon market, of activities that work
to reduce GHG emissions, the IFC is increasingly occupied in supporting regional
environmental business facilities, particularly small- and medium-sized businesses,
that are active in supporting energy efficiency and cleaner production methods in
industry, local commercial lending opportunities for sustainable energy invest-
ments, renewable energy and other carbon finance opportunities. In doing so, the
IFC is able to send a broader message to the private sector that sustainable invest-
ments, which take into account the value of GHG reductions for the burgeoning
international carbon market, are well worth pursuing.
3. The market mechanisms and FDI
The CDM represents a critical precedent in using market mechanisms to deliver
on international environmental goals (Werksman et al. 2003). As such, its success
or failure will play a large role in determining whether a future regime on climate
change, post-2012, will continue to rely on market mechanisms as a way of imple-
menting international environmental policies. And the extent to which the CDM
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is a success will, to a large degree, be determined by the extent to which the public
and private sector can effectively work together in launching environmentally
credible and cost-effective greenhouse gas reduction projects. While FDI initia-
tives, through brokers, ECAs or other private sector mechanisms, are being seen as
a “natural” entry point for the private sector in climate change-friendly invest-
ments, it is by no means limited to that sector. In fact, we are seeing an increasing
number of OECD countries and Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) funded by
these countries (including the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and the World
Bank’s Carbon Fund), develop and implement public procurement programs for
CDM and JI investments.
That said, one would assume that CDM flows would reflect overall FDI trends.
However, so far, that does not appear to be the case. In fact, it appears that regions
that have not been fully successful in drawing in FDI—India and many Latin
American countries—have shown relatively strong success in attracting CDM
interest because they have a fairly well established reputation for developing sound
projects with clear carbon reduction potential (Niederberger 2005). On the other
hand, other countries with strong FDI flows, primarily China, have not been as
successful in drawing CDM investments due to concerns that such investments
may work to impinge on their domestic development priorities. The one exception
to this rule, unfortunately, is Africa. As with FDI, CDM investments in Africa are
few and far between; according to the WB, only four per cent of all CDM invest-
ments have taken place in Africa up to the year 2003.
Another challenge in implementing CDM projects is the extent to which they con-
flict or complement international investment rules. And where potential for con-
flict exists, where and how should they be addressed—by the institutions govern-
ing international investment and trade, or through the UNFCCC, the body
responsible for implementing international climate change policy? The vast
majority of the literature recommends that nations should clearly designate the
UNFCCC as the ultimate arbiter on all things related to the CDM (Werksman et
al. 2003), but it still begs the question, can and should the international investment
regime change so as to expedite eco-friendly projects? And if it should, what would
be the substance of such changes to international rules? It must be noted that an
agreement on “eco-friendly” initiatives would be very difficult to pass through the
relevant GATT and related processes, since most mainstream trade and investment
negotiators would regard such practices as conflicting with the core principle of
non-discrimination.
One of the most marked differences between the climate change and international
investment regimes is the fact that the former explicitly recognizes the principle of
differentiation, where countries’ obligations are determined by their relative level
of development and consequent differing capacities to deliver on commitments.
Hence Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, have agreed to targets and
timetables for reducing net emissions; Annex II Parties under the UNFCCC are
obliged to finance international initiatives related to climate change; and non-
Annex I Parties do not have specific GHG reduction responsibilities. On the other
hand, as strong a tenet for international investment regime is the principle of
non-discrimination. For the CDM, this could have interesting implications for
the eligibility criteria some countries, such as China, are considering imposing on
Governing Climate: The Struggle for a Global Framework Beyond Kyoto
114
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 114
potential Annex I CDM investors. Will their efforts to clearly define national stan-
dards for participating in the CDM run in the face of the intent of the international
investment regime? And now with the Executive Board of the CDM explicitly rec-
ognizing the right of developing countries to invest in CDM projects domestically
(commonly referred to as “unilateral” projects) what is the potential for conflict
with international investment rules should governments explicitly promote uni-
lateral projects to the disadvantage of Annex I investors? 
4. ODA, FDI and sustainable development: How to work
together for a future global climate regime
Surely ODA and private financial resources can play effective complementary
roles. What appears to make the most sense is that ODA should focus on capacity
building, policy cooperation and activities related to climate change adaptation.
The extent to which the CDM begins to successfully fund mitigation activities in
developing countries will ensure that limited ODA funds can be most effectively
used where the private sector is not likely to be nearly as active, for example, in the
field of adaptation. But we should be careful not to be too simplistic or formulaic
in our prescriptions—there is a clear need for ODA to support capacity-building
activities related to the CDM, for example in helping developing countries set up
National Designated Authorities or in helping them to develop national sustain-
able development criteria. And the WB’s Carbon Fund and the initiatives of gov-
ernments such as the Netherlands (although not directly tied to ODA) have been
extremely useful in helping to ensure that the CDM is a major player in the inter-
national carbon market. That said, as the market matures, particularly after 2012,
one hopes that the WB and these national governments will play a less prominent
role in developing a certified emission reductions (CER) market, leaving it to the
private sector to be the major player in that market.
Nor should we immediately dismiss prospects for private-sector participation in
adaptation-related activities. CDM sink investments, for example, if properly
designed, can provide sustainable mitigation and adaptation benefits. Traditional
climate policy tends to isolate adaptation and mitigation and assumes that one
chooses from a portfolio of independent adaptation and mitigation options. It is
argued that adaptation benefits are felt locally in time and space, whereas mitiga-
tion benefits (as opposed to the direct benefits of energy provision) are felt distant
in time and on a global scale. Even if large methodological hurdles can be over-
come allowing costs and benefits to be reliably estimated on vastly different tem-
poral and spatial scales, mitigation and adaptation measures are only substitutable
at the global level and relevant only to some non-existent global decision-maker.
However, such analysis provides no practical insight at the project or
national/regional scale where adaptation and mitigation decisions will actually be
taken. The potential for project-level integration of adaptation and mitigation is
also downplayed, and likely reflects the residual northern domination of the cli-
mate policy discourse.
Instead, it might be more beneficial and effective if we examine the potential for
adaptation and mitigation synergies, particularly to the extent that such activities
support ecosystem-oriented poverty alleviation priorities counselled by the World
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Summit on Sustainable Development in its Plan of Implementation (WSSD 2002).
Poverty is both a driver and an outcome of critical sustainable development-climate
linkages such as energy deprivation, desertification and deforestation. The ecosys-
tem focus to poverty alleviation moves us beyond the rather platitudinous observa-
tion that the poor are endowed with the least adaptive capacity and hence are most
vulnerable to climate change, to practical intervention policy.
The WB’s initiatives on the Community Development Carbon Fund and the
Biocarbon Fund represent innovative investments that provide a twinning of
adaptation and mitigation opportunities. Recognizing the challenge of delivering
GHG reductions in a competitive CDM market environment, these funds are
explicitly established to help small-scale projects from the local community
become competitive in the global market. In focusing on adaptation opportunities,
while also emphasizing GHG credit reduction opportunities, the Bank is helping to
highlight the potential role of the private sector in natural resource management
activities.
The key implication is that coherent climate policy as it relates to developing coun-
tries becomes much more closely aligned and, indeed, one aspect of a sustainable
development pathway committed to poverty alleviation. Climate change mitiga-
tion is a large co-benefit of this approach. The reader is cautioned that the inter-
section of adaptation-mitigation benefits is not proposed as panacea for climate
policy; it is however, proposed as a logical and equitable prerequisite to engaging
the South in an eventual comprehensive post-Kyoto mitigation regime.
In relation to ODA, it must be emphasized that the extent to which the market can
help bear the costs of climate change, including adaptation, is the extent to which
we are dependent on ODA to deliver on an issue that is but one of many, and vastly
less important than most developing countries’ immediate priorities for develop-
ment and poverty eradication.
5. Conclusion 
It is critical that attention be paid to domestic implementation mechanisms and
priorities. In particular, institutionalization of climate-change issues in domestic
government agencies would effectively create “champions” for mitigation and
adaptation within governments of developing countries. This is a crucial step that
would build a constituency for action, and help give domestic and foreign busi-
nesses and NGOs reliable points of contact to engage government on climate
change.
It also means much more effective co-ordination between aid agencies and interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) and enhanced coherence, in turn, with the FDI
flows to developing countries. And finally, above all, for OECD countries, it means
showing leadership at home. OECD countries must demonstrate that they are tak-
ing significant actions at home to mitigate climate change and without compromis-
ing their economic objectives. Until developing countries can see that this is in fact
the case, the prospects for bringing them aboard will always be challenging.
But what, at the end of the day, is the proper role of development aid and finan-
cial flow considerations in the post–2012 negotiations? First of all, we would
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strongly advise that Parties have a much more realistic understanding of how
appropriate development takes root in developing countries. For example, in the
area of technology transfer, it needs to be recognized that most of these technolo-
gies are not in fact a public good, but the result of private-sector investments. Even
if OECD countries strongly increase their ODA contributions, what will be made
available for climate change is likely to be limited. Second, the role of market
mechanisms should be expanded in the post-2012 regime, hopefully with emis-
sions trading representing a sufficient incentive for broader participation. In addi-
tion, the scope of the CDM needs to be broadened beyond project-based initia-
tives if it is to play the prominent role it needs to play in the international carbon
market. Approval and administrative procedures for the CDM also need to be sig-
nificantly simplified. Finally, the primary concerns of most LDCs on adaptation
activities need to be respected, notwithstanding the fact that there are potentially
much stronger synergies between mitigation and adaptation than originally sup-
posed. To the extent that mitigation opportunities are addressed through ODA, it
should only be with a view to helping developing countries develop more sustain-
able and accessible forms of energy systems.
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Experiences from German 
ODA-financed greenhouse gas 
reduction and sequestration projects
and lessons for the CDM
Felicia Müller-Pelzer and Axel Michaelowa
Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Germany 
1. Introduction
Many observers assume naively that Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) proj-
ects in developing countries will be implemented as specified in their Project Design
Documents (PDDs). This is very unlikely given the number of challenges to suc-
cessful project implementation. As there are substantial experiences with renewable
energy, energy efficiency and afforestation projects in over two decades of develop-
ment cooperation, we have a proxy to evaluate problems that CDM projects will
encounter. We analyzed 145 projects of German development cooperation imple-
mented in the last 25 years and draw conclusions for CDM project development.
The information has been collected from project records and comments which are
publicly available in the reports of the implementing agencies and on the Internet.
As the qualitative information used for evaluation is collected from different
sources that base their judgments on diverse evaluation approaches, a direct com-
parison between the projects is not possible. However, these case studies illustrate
the problems development projects frequently faced during implementation.
Thus, the findings from this analysis indicate which difficulties CDM project activ-
ities in these sectors are also likely to encounter.
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2. Overview of the projects
The quantitative project information has been taken from the reports of the Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) and the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ). It is summarized in Figures 1 to 4.
Figure 1. Share of project types (numbers)
The distribution of the different projects is not very different from the one in the
CDM, except for the high share of sinks.
Figure 2. Share of project types (volume of ODA, million €)
There is much more large hydro represented than in the current CDM portfolio.
The biggest difference relates to the regional distribution, where Africa has the
lion’s share.
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Figure 3. Host countries by regions
A rough evaluation of the qualitative information on a five-point scale shows that
more than one-third of the projects are a failure (levels four and five). Failure rates
are very high in the general renewable energy programs and hydropower, followed
by forestry and solar.
Figure 4. Evaluation of projects
In the following sections, detailed descriptive results from the analysis are presented
for each project category. Difficulties encountered throughout the categories are
subsequently summarized.
100
80
60
40
20
0
Good projects Bad projectsVery good projects
Pe
r c
en
t
Renewable
energy
general
Hydro Biomass
energy
Solar Wind Geothermal Energy
efficiency
Forestry
Africa
79
Asia
84
Latin
America
35
Countries
in transition
13
Development and Assistance
121
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 121
3. Findings by project category
3.1 Hydroelectricity
When observing the implementation of various hydro-electric projects, it
becomes evident that they can lead to disastrous consequences, especially when
large-scale dams are constructed. Changes in water level—either increasing or
decreasing—are often provoked by the installation itself and cause far-reaching
socio-economic interferences (e.g., affecting fish production, irrigation and eco-
logical diversity). Sinking water replenishment rates (Agrhymet 2004) and silta-
tion reduce the economic viability of hydro-electric power stations. Settlers are
those who suffer most under the construction of the dam, because they often
become the victims of poor resettlement and inadequate compensation by local
authorities. Immigration to newly irrigated areas, displacing former inhabitants,
may lead to increased ethnic violence.
Small scale hydro-electric projects have better chances to contribute to sustain-
able development. They do not provoke as many negative side effects as associated
with large-scale projects. Nevertheless, they face a major obstacle: due to their lim-
ited scale, transaction costs matter a great deal and financial viability is difficult to
achieve. Thus, the success of these sustainable solutions depends very much on
appropriate market conditions.
Finally, it has to be questioned whether heavily relying on hydro-electricity can be
considered a sustainable strategy against the background of increasing water
shortage in many developing countries.
3.2 Biogas and biomass
Today, the use of biogas and biomass no longer causes major technical problems.
Thus, economic viability of biogas plants is above all dependent on the structure
of the local tariffs. In Ankara, the tariffs allow one to cover the cost of a biogas
plant constructed with funding from the KfW, while the biogas plants in Nepal will
remain dependent on subsidies. When biogas plants are to be installed by farmers,
the high investment costs can create an obstacle to widespread adoption. Digested
sludge, a side product of the process, is an excellent fertilizer; yet training has to be
organized to enable the target group to make use of it (KfW Schlussprüfung
2001a).
Biomass used in household appliances (e.g., more efficient stoves) faces, first of
all, an investment barrier. Low incomes of the households and lack of access to
credit restrict the financial margin. Further, long distances and bad communica-
tion networks complicate the dissemination.
3.3 Solar energy
The biggest problem of solar energy remains the gap between the target popula-
tions’ income levels and the price of equipment.
Solar PV power plants: The present sectoral conditions in most developing coun-
tries do not allow for a sustainable introduction of this so-far expensive energy
source which, therefore, remains dependent on subsidies. Grid-connected solar
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power plants would need a legal framework guaranteeing an appropriate remu-
neration. Plants operating off-grid are more costly as they require the use of a bat-
tery, which has to be displaced regularly. Thus, if either knowledge or financial
resources are lacking, an actually intact plant runs the risk of being left to decay
after some short time of operation.
Solar Home Systems (SHS): Already today, SHS are an attractive option for off-
grid villages, when the overall investment required for the SHS is lower than that
for conventional equipment, taking into account connection costs and interior
installation. However, in case financial services are not available (such as in
Morocco), the typical SHS sold on a cash basis are of the smallest type which often
creates problems due to under-sizing, poor technical design and lack of after sale
services (GTZ 2000, p. 32f.). In countries with bad infrastructure, the use of SHS
is further complicated by expensive delivery systems. In Namibia, for instance,
transport is organized by taxis which increases the initial costs substantially and
creates a barrier to investment. Due to the deficient infrastructure, all communi-
cation with the users is difficult or even virtually impossible. Finally, maintenance
is impeded by the fact that local technicians do not dispose of spare parts.
Nevertheless, solar cookers have recently been successfully introduced in South
Africa. Manifold positive impacts could be observed (such as the strengthening
social networks, higher school attendance, monetary savings and shift in fuel mix-
ing). The key factor for the successful introduction was to abandon any technology-
driven approach and to focus on raising the user’s acceptance of the appliance. The
solar cookers need to fit the existing habits in the best possible way. When the user
recognizes the multiple benefits of the new appliance, he may be disposed to adjust
its habits to insuperable technical restrictions, e.g., by cooking hot meals at noon
instead of in the evening after sunset.
PV used for irrigation purposes: In spite of the high investment costs, photo-
voltaic pumps may be more cost-efficient than diesel- or petrol-powered pumps
under certain conditions. But the high initial investment costs are often not com-
pensated by the lower operational costs. High degrees of system utilization are
necessary to make photovoltaic appliances economically viable, at least if interest
rates on loans are high (IEA PVPS 2003). Therefore, barriers to the competitive-
ness of photovoltaic pumps are found, above all, in the lack of low-cost loans, in
import duties on photovoltaic systems and in subsidies for diesel fuels. In addition,
demands in terms of management are much higher with PV-powered irrigation and
intensive training is required. Appropriately used, the technology is reliable and
needs little maintenance (Key Factor Energy 2004). For irrigation purposes, mainly
surface water pumps are required, which still have to be developed or optimized
for PV, even though the technical aspects of solar irrigation are generally regarded
as adequately developed (IEA PVPS 2003).
3.4 Wind energy
The experience from wind farms shows that most installations are technically sat-
isfying, yet struggling financially. In the case of Colombia, the wind farm installed
in the context of the TERNA program can barely be operated economically even
with an estimated electricity production of 82 million kWh p.a., which is 2.3 times
more than a comparable German wind farm. This is not due to technical short-
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comings but to the low electricity market prices in Colombia. However, under
optimal wind conditions, wind farms may even turn out to be the most competi-
tive solution. This is the case of the Zafarana wind farm in Egypt. Nordex reports
that electricity production costs four cents per kWh, which is well below the costs
of the conventional power plants. In such cases, it has to be carefully analyzed, how
much ODA is actually required to realize the project, as it may just be a very inno-
vative, but entirely competitive, business-as-usual solution.
Regarding their sustainability, wind farms have often been subject to criticism.
They are suspected of being detrimental to bird migration and, in case of off-shore
wind farms, to submarine fauna. Thus, project developers are especially requested
to examine possible impacts on surrounding species in their EIA.
3.5 Geothermal energy
In this project category, the analysis focused on the Geothermal plant Olkaria II,
co-financed by KfW. This project is an example of a completely competitive appli-
cation of renewable energy technologies. In Kenya, geothermal energy represents
the country’s lowest-cost option for power generation. Therefore, the Government
of Kenya is strongly fostering the development of geothermal sources in order to
raise its ratio in the energy mix (KenGen 2003).
One could reason that this project has been an example of successful use of
German ODA. However, one major problem has to be recognized: the project
would probably have been feasible without such a large amount of ODA (or even
with none), as it would have been an attractive investment option for the private
sector. This is why the construction and operation of later units, Okaria III and
Olkaria IV, are now financed by private investors. KfW just provides the funding
for the initial planning stage.
3.6 Afforestation and reforestation
Sustainable forest cultivation offers a variety of benefits: the control of soil and
water erosion; improvements in local ecology; and the creation of new income
sources for the local rural economy. Positive benefits for the inhabitants may con-
sist of an improved water supply and increased productive capacity of agro-sylvo-
pastoral resources. Forest products, such as dead wood, branches, palm leaves and
fodder, can obtain market value (e.g., in Gambia). However, many obstacles may
hamper successful implementation.
Political conflicts are one of the big problems faced by afforestation and reforesta-
tion measures. In most developing countries, the position of the ministry of envi-
ronment is very weak. Local power constellations often impede improvements in
the livelihood of disadvantaged population groups as political lobby groups are
powerful and not ready to enter into negotiations. NGOs vehemently act against
the timber companies that disregard certification. Against this background, little
mutual acknowledgement renders any consensus utopian (such as in the case of
Cameroon). When farming land is turned to grassland or forests, farmers are
affected and need to be compensated appropriately. However, in many countries
(e.g., China), it is very unlikely that full compensation is given, due to financial
constraints of the state, arbitrariness of local authorities and corruption.
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Successful afforestation and reforestation projects have to be backed by an appro-
priate legal system, otherwise poverty alleviation and equitable sharing of the ben-
efits will be prevented. Any sound forest cultivation will be undermined, when a
high ratio of timber resources are illegally logged, possibly even with the consent
of state forest officers (such as in the case of Benin). The same is true when the
national fire legislation is not implemented.
Successful implementation is further impeded by the low awareness of the citizens.
Forests are widely considered as future land for agricultural use by citizens. In most
cases, people are not able to recognize the development potential forests can create
for them. A positive long-term impact can only be achieved when the stakeholders
are willing and enabled to operate and maintain the structures and plantations.
However, benefits resulting from sustainable forest cultivation take decades to
become visible. Many risks are associated with forest cultivation. Immature forests
cannot yet provide the full variety of benefits of mature forests (e.g., they lack full
hydrological functionality) and depending on local circumstances, new trees often
only have a low rate of survival. Although China has conducted extensive forest
management reforms over the past 20 years, and both forest area and volume of for-
est stands increased, the forestation rate has improved little, because China is a vast
country and the results become visible only after a certain period.
This long-term perspective is irreconcilable with the population’s short-term time
horizon. Development is desperately required, which makes it very difficult to
convince the stakeholders. Incentive-driven remuneration may be a way out of the
dilemma. Opportunities for additional income raise the acceptance for sustainable
forest management. The key factor for guaranteeing satisfying maintenance by the
locals is the use of an appropriate financial tool. For instance, in Vietnam, a sav-
ings account approach was applied instead of the usual direct disbursement of the
remuneration by the forest authority. On the one hand, this led to a reduction of
governmental intervention, and on the other hand, the private economic charac-
ter of the intervention was enhanced (KfW Projektkurzdarstellung 2001a).
Projects imposed upon the stakeholders are condemned to failure. In order to
guarantee the sustainability of the intervention, the project has to be accompanied
by a public education program. Long-term impacts can only be achieved when the
citizens internalize the underlying values and consider the protected area as an
integral part of their national identity.
Apart from shortcomings in general conditions and stakeholders’ awareness,
afforestation and reforestation activities may fail due to inappropriate program
design. For instance, when forests are not ecologically restored, but artificially
“constructed,” they do not generate the multitude of ecological advantages associ-
ated with natural forests. In Lesotho, the wrong market approach was chosen. The
evaluation of the project came to the final result that private tree nurseries oper-
ated more efficiently than the public tree nurseries installed by the project (KfW
Schlussprüfung 2002).
3.7 Energy efficiency
The biggest barrier to energy efficiency improvements on the supply side is the
limited access to foreign capital and expertise. Therefore, technology transfer and
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capital from industrialized countries is urgently needed. Unfavourable conditions
of the electricity sector such as electricity losses, blackouts and inefficient private
self-supply are detrimental to successful implementation.
When improvements are to be undertaken by the demand side, very similar prob-
lems can be encountered as already described for biomass used in household
appliances and solar home systems. For instance, the Stove Dissemination
Program in Pakistan (stoves with a double function: heating and cooking) faced
strong problems with dissemination due to its poor user-friendliness: the stove
was complex and could only be manufactured by skilled workers, the cleaning was
difficult and the use was limited to particular utensils only. In addition to the
shortcoming that the product did not correspond to the consumers’ needs, dis-
semination was further impeded because the population in mountain areas is
sparse and scattered over a wide area, i.e., difficult to inform and to physically
reach. When energy consumption is charged at a flat-rate (e.g., the heating costs in
Macedonia) (Key Factor Energy 2004), the population’s awareness of the need of
rational energy use is low and energy efficiency measures are difficult to imple-
ment. Therefore, ODA projects have to choose a broader approach in establishing
household energy issues as a priority in national energy policies. This is especially
important as the topic has little prestige value for policy-makers and financiers.
Generally, the signal effect of a lower electricity price is a valuable incentive, but it
may be ruined by the depreciation of the local currency, which is a frequent event
in developing countries. Therefore, in an unstable economic context, it is risky to
base the success of an energy efficiency activity exclusively on the price effect.
When a power plant is to be rehabilitated, due consideration has to be paid to the
remaining lifetime of the facility. Taking into account the unpredictable reliability
of old plants after repairs, the rehabilitation of a power plant towards the end of
its useful economic life (such as in the case of the “Kosovo A” project) is con-
tentious regarding sustainability.
3.8 Sector programs to promote renewable energies
Sector programs hold a high potential when they aim at adjusting general condi-
tions. They can support the restructuring of the sector, foster the elaboration of a
legal framework and improve infrastructure. But frequently, the result is a mix of
selective and incoherent interventions, as too little attention is paid to actively
shaping project environment and integrating projects into their specific sectoral
context. Thus, in many cases, little success is earned when translating the project’s
achievements into significant development impulses (Meyer-Stamer 1994).
The results of sector programs depend very much on the capabilities of the local
actors and on the involvement of the partner country. First, decision-makers have to
be made sensitive to the benefits renewable energies can create. In many developing
countries, they are still mainly interested in a large-scale energy supply that encour-
ages industrialization. But even if technical maturity is granted (which is not yet the
case for all uses of renewable energies), the appliance needs above all to meet con-
sumers’ needs in order to finally sell on the market. A technology-push is not a prom-
ising approach. Renewable energy sources shall not be taken as an end in themselves,
because the main objective is to contribute to sustainable development.
Governing Climate: The Struggle for a Global Framework Beyond Kyoto
126
Post-Kyoto6x9.qx  11/24/05  1:42 PM  Page 126
4. Lessons across project categories
Throughout the project categories some prominent errors stand out. Bad plan-
ning and management by the developers is a frequently-found deficiency. Many
reasons for failure can be traced back to errors at the planning stage. For instance,
if the problem analysis is crude and the goal system is unclear, all efforts made by
the participants will be misguided. This may even cause counter-productive
effects. There are also errors that occur during implementation. Quality assurance,
which is often neglected, is a pre-condition to immediately detect shortcomings
and to take counter-measures. Therefore, quality assurance measures have to be
specified in the CDM monitoring methodology at least for the components related
to emission reductions.
Even if the project itself is working, it is possible that no significant impact on
development is achieved. Two main reasons for this can be identified: first, a project
fails to contribute to the development goal when it is not appropriately embedded
into its context. Locals have to be enabled to maintain the project’s achievements
in the future. Many projects fail in the long term due to a lack of technical under-
standing and capital from the local population. A pre-condition, which is often
neglected, is to sufficiently involve the stakeholders in the project planning. Above
all, when a project is supposed to benefit the poor, their needs have to be taken into
account when designing the project. Otherwise, the desired distributional effects
cannot be reached. When support from the host country is lacking, it is virtually
impossible to appropriately embed the project.
The second reason, why a project may have no positive impact on development, is
a lack in allocation efficiency. If the long-term marginal costs of a plant are not
covered, if technology is not commercially viable or if the product is simply not
convincing the consumers, the project will remain dependent on subventions and
therefore, cannot be considered sustainable.
The general conditions of the host country may create barriers which inhibit
implementation. A deficient infrastructure complicates transactions. The political
and legal framework may not be supportive for the use of renewable energy
sources, e.g., regarding the electricity pricing policies. In many developing coun-
tries, stealing electricity and poor payment morality are jointly responsible for
project failure. Due to the poor state of electricity systems in developing countries,
technical losses contribute to weakening the viability of grid-connected projects.
In addition to these technical difficulties, credits may not be obtainable. Financial
shortage, high capital costs, high interest rates and even possible devaluations of
local currency are prohibitive. Political conflicts and disturbances (such as weak
local administrative structures, bribery, corruption and violent attacks) create fur-
ther risks for project developers. When barriers are so apparent that they cannot
be overcome, it is not advisable to undertake the project. The fifth step of the addi-
tionality tool for CDM project activities addresses this question.
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5. Conclusion
The evaluation of 145 German ODA projects in renewable energy, energy efficiency
and afforestation shows that more than one-third of the projects are failures.
Throughout the project categories some prominent errors stand out. Bad plan-
ning and management by the developers is a frequent deficiency. In the CDM con-
text, quality assurance could be achieved and specified in the CDM monitoring
methodology.
Development impacts of projects have been mixed at best. Integration of the project
in the local context and direct involvement of economically important stakeholders
are necessary conditions for positive impacts. Otherwise, the desired distributional
effects cannot be reached. When support from the host country is lacking, it is vir-
tually impossible to appropriately embed the project.
The second reason why a project may have no positive impact on development is
a lack in allocation efficiency. If the long-term marginal costs of a plant are not
covered, if technology is not commercially viable or if the product is simply not
convincing the consumers, the project will remain dependent on subventions and
therefore, cannot be considered sustainable.
The general conditions of the host country may create barriers which inhibit
implementation. The political and legal framework may not be supportive for the
use of renewable energy sources, e.g., regarding the electricity pricing policies. In
many developing countries, stealing electricity and poor payment morality are
jointly responsible for project failure. Political conflicts create further risks for
project developers. Due to the poor state of electricity systems in developing coun-
tries, technical losses contribute to weakening the viability of grid-connected proj-
ects. In addition to these technical difficulties, credits may not be obtainable.
Financial shortage, high capital costs, high interest rates and even possible devalu-
ations of local currency are prohibitive. When barriers are so apparent that they
cannot be overcome, it is not advisable to undertake the project. The fifth step of
the additionality tool for CDM project activities addresses this question.
While the detailed causes of the failures differ, they make clear that without a
sound evaluation framework for CDM project activities or future transfer-based
mitigation and adaptation projects, it is very probable that shortcomings such as
those highlighted by the evaluation will occur. If evaluations are only carried out
after completion of the project, problems occurring during implementation can
be detected too late. Therefore, ODA activities as well as CDM project activities
should be required to carry out on the one hand, formative evaluations to be able
to troubleshoot during implementation and, on the other hand, summary evalu-
ations to assess the project’s impact and to draw conclusions for future projects. In
this context, the ex-ante determination of a baseline is a crucial element in order
to reduce implementation risks and to make the projects appraisable. Many aid
projects have been undertaken without clearly specifying the reference case ex-
ante, which renders an ex-post evaluation difficult.
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GOVERNING CLIMATE
The Struggle for a Global Framework Beyond Kyoto 
The papers in this book, written by international climate
experts, explore three key building blocks of the future 
climate regime. First, a number of ideas on how to broaden
the current cap-and-trade regime are discussed. Second,
the role of technology is explored. Lessons from past 
successes are reviewed with a view to developing 
options for their most effective use over the near future.
Finally, the issue of financial flows to developing countries
is addressed, including the issue of mainstreaming 
assistance for climate-change response.
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